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“Here is a place of disaffection 
Time before and time after 
In a dim light: neither daylight 
Investing form with lucid stillness 
Turning shadow into transient beauty 
With slow rotation suggesting permanence 
Nor darkness to purify the soul 
Emptying the sensual with deprivation 
Cleansing affection from the temporal” 
(T. S. Eliot, The Four Quartets, ‘Burnt Norton’) 
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ABSTRACT:  
 
The thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that 
time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial 
respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of 
eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject 
the standard reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’ and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua 
living being. It follows that the creation of time – being the image of αἰών – is essential to the cosmic living 
being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion 
of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I 
examine two essential aspects of Plato’s account that need further enquiry – life and structure. In Part II I 
focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in 
relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’. In fact, αἰών and time 
are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is 
structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods 
of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure 
consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark 
out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Plato’s account of time presents a distinctive exegetical puzzle to readers. It challenges us to 
significantly reframe our conception of time, as only by doing so can his conception be rendered 
intelligible.1  In fact, unlike other cases in which Plato’s work might appear misleadingly familiar –
so much so that we take our understanding of the text to be straightforward – in the case of time, the 
conceptual distance is immediately evident, and requires a step back. To better appreciate that 
distance, let us consider three aspects of Plato’s account which are prima facie puzzling to us. 
Firstly, the definition of time, generally identified as the ‘moving image of eternity’ (37d5), 
focuses on the resemblance to eternity, or, more appropriately, to αἰών. As the translation renders it, 
time is defined in comparison with that familiar metaphysical notion, which however does not 
prima facie make time any more intelligible. In fact, we generally define eternity in terms of time, 
as a timeless present, so the definition of time in terms of eternity would be patently circular. 
Moreover, eternity is often associated with the absolute absence of passage or motion, but, if that is 
the case, the universe, in Plato’s conception, seems hardly capable of imitating eternity, given that 
in the Timaeus there is always motion in it. Secondly, time is said to be created by the Demiurge as 
part of the cosmogony (37c6-d7). In Plato’s view, there could be and indeed there has been a 
disordered universe that is, strictly speaking, atemporal, despite being in motion.2 I will return to 
this puzzle below. 
Thirdly, throughout his account Plato maintains a substantial commitment to a cosmological 
conception of time. He accounts for the creation of time as being dependent on the existence of the 
cosmos and the planets – so much so that the planetary revolutions are eventually identified with 
time (39d1). We are familiar with using the position of the planets in the sky as temporal markers of 
days, nights, months, years and so on, and nonetheless we would resist the claim that without those 
revolutions there would be no time. We would resist even more firmly Plato’s identity claim 
between the two.  
In fact, unlike Plato, we think it a conceptual mistake to identify the units of time, such as 
months and years, with the planetary motions that mark them out. Instead, we generally conceive of 
time as something different from the physical objects and phenomena surrounding us. In a 
theoretical context we define time as the dimension in which physical objects and phenomena 
 
1 For a complete list of the instances of ‘time’ in the Timaeus, see the Index of occurrences, s.v. χρόνος, p. 145. 
2 My thesis presupposes a literalist reading of the Timaeus (as, for instance, Vlastos 1965, Mohr 1985 and Broadie 
2012). For reasons that will become apparent in my analysis of Plato’s account of time, to understand time as actually 
created is crucial to have an adequate grasp of its ontological status and definition (see especially Chapter 1, 2 and 4). 
However, while rejecting the complete picture, an anti-literalist reading might still be compatible with most of the 
positions I argue for in Part III. 
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persist and change.3 So, we would rather classify the planets as clocks that measure the dimension 
‘time’ in their revolutions. 
 
Plato’s conception of time 
 
In this thesis, I refer on many occasions to Plato’s cosmological conception of time. With 
‘conception’, I simply intend to distinguish substantially different ways of accounting for the same 
subject matter. From the tenets introduced above we can already appreciate how distant Plato’s 
conception of time is from ours.4 For this reason, it is all the more important to offer the reader 
some preliminary clarifications about the reading of Plato’s account of time that my thesis proposes. 
The hope is that, by bearing those clarifications in mind, the reader will find it easier to follow the 
various stages of my enquiry.  
In my reading of Plato’s account of time, time is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon. I have 
chosen ‘phenomenon’ because of two concomitant connotations of the term that fittingly capture 
Plato’s conception: the contemporary use of the term and its Greek roots. In its contemporary use, 
which I also employed above, ‘phenomenon’, especially if together with ‘physical’, refers to the 
events occurring in the physical world, generally involving change and motion. In this way, time 
can be distinguished from physical objects. As we will see, while time is grounded in physical 
objects – the planets and the cosmos – the kinetic component is essential for defining what time is.5  
Secondly, the derivation from φαίνεσθαι brings to the fore the visible component that is 
equally essential to defining time. In fact, without the fiery bodies of the planets, and the visible 
patterns they display, there would be no time in Plato’s cosmos. Both the visible and kinetic 
connotation of ‘phenomenon’, then, already suggest to the reader the peculiar classification of time 
in Plato’s ontology: time, in his view, is not one of the invisible dimensions in which the physical 
world is structured. Time rather belongs to that world, as one of its items, and as such it is in 
motion, and visible. 
A further consequence of Plato’s conception of time that is just as striking, for us, is that time 
is not a fundamental feature of the physical world. In fact, time is created and could be destroyed. In 
 
3 This is also how metaphysicians conceive of time, most famously in the dispute between three-dimensionalism and 
four-dimensionalism. Of course, the notion of time as a dimension has its origin in modern physics. 
4 We might even wonder if the subject matter ‘time’ is the same as Plato’s χρόνος. I would contend that, to an extent, it 
is. For instance, Plato consistently treats time as something pre-eminently enumerable which measures events in the 
physical world, just as we do today. Another significant similarity, as we will see, lies in the meaning of ‘time’ as 
‘lifetime’, ‘age’ or ‘stage of life’ (“he seemed old before his time”), that is central to Plato’s imitative relation between 
time and αἰών. 
5 The kinetic nature of time, however, seems to be a persistent subject matter for debate in philosophy of time. In 
particular, the central question in the debate is whether time passes or not. The debate has its origin in McTaggart’s 
discussion of the A, B series of time (McTaggart 1908). 
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Plato, just as in Aristotle, change and motion are fundamental, constituting perhaps the defining 
feature of the physical world, together with space (or more appropriately, the receptacle).6 We 
would expect time and space to be on a par, but, as Cornford points out, in the Timaeus we find a 
significant disanalogy in the treatment of the two: while space is one of the three fundamental 
kinds, time is a rather late creation of the Demiurge’s craft.7 It is perfectly conceivable, in Plato’s 
view, for the physical world to be atemporal, in its original, pre-cosmic stage, without thereby 
being akinetic or non-spatial.  
 
On time and tense 
 
The final preliminary clarification on Plato’s conception of time concerns the distinction between 
time and tense. My claim is that in Plato’s account, the creation of time does not entail the creation 
of tense, as tense, unlike time, belongs to the physical world fundamentally. I will therefore 
consider the two subject matters as distinct, so that this thesis will treat Plato’s account of time 
while only occasionally touching upon Plato’s conception of tense and tensed expressions.8 Plato 
does discuss tense and the sort of distinctions that it allows to draw in terms of ‘older than’ and 
‘younger than’ in a section of the account of time (37e4-38b5), and it is not my intention to deny 
that time and tense are closely associated. However, I maintain that their relation has been misread 
as one of necessary co-belonging, which the text does not warrant.9 
Tense, in fact, is presented throughout the section as something arising from the ontological 
constitution of physical objects and phenomena in general, rather than as a consequence of the 
creation of time.10 Given that Plato conceives of time in the non-fundamental sense sketched above, 
we can see that what is really required in any physical object or phenomenon, to be described in 
tensed terms, is motion. For instance, we might state that the ball was in the corner, and as it moves, 
 
6 The main passages showing Plato’s commitment to the fundamentality of motion in the physical world – both in its 
ordered and disordered state – are 52d2-53b4 and 57d7-58c6. Aristotle offers an account and definition of motion in 
Physics III, 200b1-202b29 that bears no reference to time. Time, on the other hand, is treated only later, and its 
existence is grounded on the existence of motion and change (‘no time without change’, IV, 218b21-219a9). For a 
discussion of the ontological priority of motion, see Coope 2005, pp. 5-13. 
7 Cornford 1937, pp. 102-103. 
8 I do not follow the grammatical distinction between tense and aspect here because Plato treats any variation from the 
present indicative as equally a form that has come to be. 
9 A well-known example of this view has been proposed by Tarán, who runs his anti-literalist reading also on this basis 
(Tarán 1971, pp. 378-380).  
10 Evidence that the physical world is defined by becoming, tensed existence and older-younger relations before the 
creation of time can be found at various points in the dialogue: from the description of the uniqueness of the cosmos 
(ἀλλ’ εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς γεγονὼς ἔστιν καὶ ἔτ’ ἔσται, 31b2-3), to the order of creation between the cosmic soul 
and body (Τὴν δὲ δὴ ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς νῦν ὑστέραν ἐπιχειροῦμεν λέγειν, οὕτως ἐμηχανήσατο καὶ ὁ θεὸς νεωτέραν – οὐ 
γὰρ ἂν ἄρχεσθαι πρεσβύτερον ὑπὸ νεωτέρου συνέρξας εἴασεν, 34b10-c2), to the terminology used to describe the 
primeval chaos in the receptacle (ὄν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν εἶναι, τρία τριχῇ, καὶ πρὶν οὐρανὸν γενέσθαι, 52d3-4; 
τότε οὕτω τὰ τέτταρα γένη σειόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς δεξαμενῆς, 53a2-3; ὅτε δ’ ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν, 53b1). 
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it will be on the table soon. And this is clarified by Plato, as follows: “‘was’ and ‘will be’ are 
properly said about the generation that passes in time, for those are two motions (κινήσεις γάρ 
ἐστον, 38a2)”. Motion, as we have seen above, is fundamental to the physical world, even in its pre-
cosmic state, which is also, in Plato’s account, a pre-temporal state. 
Moreover, Plato explicitly grounds tense on γένεσις, becoming, which is responsible for 
associating tensed distinctions to things that move in the perceivable domain (τὸ γένεσις τοῖς ἐν 
αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσῆψεν, 38a5-6). On the contrary, time is never in itself the subject matter, 
when tense is discussed, at least until the end, at 38a7-8, when it is said that tensed expressions are 
associated with time. Up to that point, time is rather presented as that which contains what is 
responsible for tensed distinctions, i.e. becoming (περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν, 38a1-2; 
προσήκει γίγνεσθαι διὰ χρόνου, 38a4).11 
The point that Plato is arguing for, then, is rather that anything physical, qua having come to 
be and being in motion, is also tensed. If so, the section rather intends to apply that general claim to 
time, which, as a physical phenomenon, is no exception. The digression opens and closes with the 
claim that time has forms that have come to be (γεγονότα εἴδη, 37e4; γέγονεν εἴδη, 38a8).12 Now, 
the coming into being of time is mentioned three times, both before (γενέσθαι, 37e2; γένεσιν αὐτῶν, 
e3) and after (γέγονεν, 38b6) the digression. The most plausible reading, then, is that time, just as 
the coming into being that takes place in time, is tensed, by having past, present and future days and 
nights, months, years etc.13 
Nonetheless, time does have a preeminent connection with tensed distinctions, among 
physical phenomena, given its role as a unique frame of reference for everything in the physical 
world. Becoming is in time because everything that is part of the cosmos is coordinated with the 
sequence of past, present and future parts of time, so that tensed expressions become more 
 
11 Analogous considerations to the one on tense can be applied to the older-younger relation that is also mentioned in 
the digression, at 38a3-4 (οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον). The relation is predicated of things that become and seem 
to go hand in hand with tensed descriptions. If read in this way, there is a pre-temporal anteriority and posteriority, so 
the claim that the cosmic soul is anterior and older than the cosmic body (34b10-c2) is not incompatible with a posterior 
creation of time as in Tarán’s reading (Tarán 1971, pp. 375, 379-380), once the two are conjoined to make the cosmic 
living being.  
12 Εἴδη can be taken as distinctive classifications of a varying appearance relative to a position, i.e. the present. Consider 
the parallel case in Aristotle’s account of place, where he considers dimensions as “parts and forms of place”, and they 
can either be relative to us, thus becoming so, or absolute, thus remaining always the same (Arist. Ph. IV 1, 208b12-19). 
13 The interpretation above might be challenged by appealing to the second part of the Parmenides, where the older-
younger relation and tensed distinctions are ultimately grounded by time, in both the first (140e-141e) and second 
deduction (151e-155e). At 151e3-152a5, ‘was’ and ‘will be’ are also accounted for as participation in a time past or 
future. If taken as Plato’s position on the matter, the Parmenides would clearly contradict the reading I present above. 
However, the claims in the gymnasia are incompatible with the Timaeus on other, more fundamental issues than time. 
In fact, according to Parmenides’ deductions, there are no other ways for something to partake of being, except through 
tensed forms, which is explicitly denied in the section we are considering, where Plato argues for a tenseless way of 
being pertaining to the everlasting being. This seems sufficient to show that the ontology of the gymnasia, whatever its 
function in the Parmenides, presents us with very different ontological commitments from the Timaeus. 
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intelligible than in the pre-cosmic state.14 As Mohr puts it, “judgements of past, present, and future 
may also be made by reference to a clock, in which case we may make in addition to the raw 
judgment of past, present and future, a judgement of just how much in the past or future something 
is and we may identify when the present is”.15 So, after the creation of time, tensed expressions 
concerning intra-cosmic objects and phenomena can be qualified in temporal terms: for instance, we 
specify that I started my PhD in September 2015, and that my PhD will finish in September 2019.16 
 
Summary of the thesis 
 
In this thesis I will develop a reading of Plato’s account of time according to which time is a cosmic 
phenomenon, identified with the planetary revolutions and essential to the completeness of the 
cosmic living being. The thesis is divided into three parts, addressing different aspects of Plato’s 
account. In Part I, I present my assessment of early ancient sources and the existing literature on 
Plato’s account of time and argue that the crucial exegetical issue is how to connect Plato’s 
cosmological conception and the notion of αἰών, usually translated as ‘eternity’ (Chapter 1). I then 
proceed to offer a re-reading of the central section of Plato’s account – the definitional section 
(Chapter 2). I conclude that, in Plato’s definition, time is a cosmic phenomenon imitating αἰών that 
is constitutive of the cosmic living being. Aἰών, in this reading, does not have the abstract meaning 
of eternity but is rather a paradigmatic feature of life.  
In Part II, I focus on the connection between time and life, firstly by focusing on the 
characteristic nature of the cosmic living being, and secondly by offering an overview of the 
complex semantic history of αἰών. I argue that αἰών’s traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’ shifts in 
natural philosophy towards a notion of ‘totality of life’ that does not have temporal boundaries. This 
latter meaning is the one we find in Plato’s account of time (Chapter 3). On that basis, I argue that, 
in Plato’s account, αἰών and time describe different sorts of totalities of life. Time, in Plato’s 
understanding, is best thought of as the cosmic lifespan, as with its creation, the eight periods of the 
cosmic soul become structured as a totality. For that reason, I argue that the temporal structure is 
based, both in its parts and as a whole, on the cosmic periods (Chapter 4). 
Finally, in Part III, I focus on the enumerable structure that characterises time, and on how the 
Demiurge creates it by means of the planetary revolutions. I argue that the planets are instruments 
 
14 The intelligibility introduced by time has for Plato a crucial role even in the improvement of the human condition, 
through the development of historical documentation exemplified by the Egyptians (Sattler 2010, pp. 256-24). 
15 Mohr 1985, p. 65. However, it should be noted that with ‘clock’ Mohr is really referring to time. For my criticism of 
Mohr, see sub-section 1.2.2. 
16 Goldin argues along the same lines that time provides means to distinguish predication of contrary states of the same 
object, as in ‘being pale at t2’ and ‘being dark at t1’ (Goldin 1998, p. 133). 
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of time, unlike the fixed stars, because of their ‘wandering’ motions, that collectively display the 
complexity of the cosmic periods (Chapter 5). Moreover, after a digression on Plato’s notion of 
number, I argue that planetary revolutions display the enumerable structure of time in the visible 
patterns of phases and cycles. To conclude, I analyse the resulting enumerable structure, arguing 
that it stands out among the enumerable things in the physical world for its optimality (Chapter 6). 
 
Note on translation 
 
If not otherwise specified, I employ Zeyl’s translation for the Timaeus (Zeyl 2000). Reeve’s 
translation for the Republic, Frede’s translation for the Philebus (in Cooper 1997), Hussey’s 
translation for Aristotle’s Physics III-IV (Hussey 1983), Stock’s translation for De Caelo (in Barnes 
1984) and Baltzly’s translation for Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus (Baltzly 2009, 2013). 
Slight modifications of those translations, for matters of terminological consistency, sporadically 
occur. However, if the modification is substantial, it will be noted in a footnote. 
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PART I – TIME AND COSMOS 
 
“τό τ’ ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας,  
Χρόνου καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκτονος σοφοῦ” 
(Crit. fr. 1.33-34 Nauck – Sisyphus fragment) 
 
 
Surprising as it may seem, this work does not start with an analysis of the Timaeus, but with some 
preliminary considerations on Aristotle’s account of time in the Physics. Aristotle’s discussion of 
his predecessors is valuable for the enquiry I am undertaking, since, as on many other topics, he is 
an important critic of the previous views on time. In particular, Aristotle rejects some definitions of 
time that convey a cosmological conception of time as the starting point of his own enquiry. I 
stressed the importance different conceptions have for the study of time. In my reading, Aristotle’s 
rejection of a cosmological conception is the main point of departure between Plato’s account and 
his. Because of our own unfamiliarity with the cosmological conception approaching Plato’s 
account from Aristotle’s non-cosmological point of view is a useful starting point for the enquiry, 
insofar as it clarifies the key differences with cosmological conceptions and prevents us from 
conflating the two alternatives.17 As we will see in sub-section 1.2.2, avoiding a reduction of Plato’s 
cosmological conception to a non-cosmological one is a crucial exegetical issue. 
At the end of Part I, Plato’s particular version of the cosmological conception will be further 
specified, with an analysis of his definition. As we will see, Plato conceives of time as a physical 
phenomenon, and, in particular, as a cosmic phenomenon. For now, however, I will characterise the 
cosmological conception in broader terms, as follows: time is defined by an essential relation to the 
cosmos, and, in particular, to its circular motion. In Section 1.1 we will see how ancient sources and 
Plato’s text in the Timaeus equally support my hypothesis that Plato holds a cosmological 
conception. In Section 1.2 my focus will be on how modern scholars interpret Plato’s account of 
time, and in particular, their analysis of the definitional section, at 37c6-e3. The literature takes the 
definition of time to be ‘moving image of eternity’, where ‘eternity’ is the contentious translation of 
αἰών. The crucial exegetical question, I will argue, is how to connect Plato’s cosmological 
conception of time with that metaphysical definition. I will criticise the existing literature in two 
respects: (1) the widespread presupposition about the meaning and role of αἰών; (2) the solutions 
 
17 At various points in the thesis (in particular Section 1.1, 1.2, 3.3, 4.2 and the Conclusion), I will highlight how Plato’s 
and Aristotle’s accounts bear a degree of resemblance, while having conflicting conceptions at their foundations. 
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offered in the literature to connect the metaphysical definition of time with Plato’s cosmological 
conception.  
The critique of the literature will lay the foundations for articulating my exegetical position on 
the definitional section and, in particular, on the function played by αἰών in Plato’s definition. In 
Chapter 2 I will first discuss the dualistic framework in the Timaeus and the peculiar position of 
Plato’s account of time in the cosmogony (Sections 2.1 and 2.2). That will serve as groundwork for 
my reading of the definitional section, which I will offer in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
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Ch. 1: The puzzle of Plato’s definition of time 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to survey other authors’ exegetical positions on Plato’s definition, to 
introduce the reader to the main exegetical issues that I will address in Chapter 2 and beyond. 
There, I will present the pars construens of my thesis. In the present chapter I will argue that Plato’s 
definition of time plausibly expresses a cosmological conception, via textual evidence corroborated 
by early ancient sources (Section 1.1), and discuss the issues raised by the meaning and role of αἰών 
(sub-section 1.2.1). The two factors are, in my reading, crucial to adjudicate whether an 
interpretation of Plato’s account and definition of time is an adequate one. Based on those factors, I 
will show why previous attempts for the most part do not succeed in adequately reconstructing 
Plato’s account (sub-section 1.2.2). 
 
1.1. Evidence of Plato’s cosmological conception 
 
As indicated above, I take Aristotle’s Physics to be a central source critically addressing Plato’s 
cosmological conception of time. Hence, I will briefly comment on Aristotle’s discussion of his 
predecessors’ definitions of time: 
Some say that (1) time is the motion of the whole, others that (2) it is the sphere of the whole 
itself (οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν εἶναί φασιν, οἱ δὲ τὴν σφαῖραν αὐτήν). (1.1) Yet of the 
rotation of the whole even a part is a time, though it is not a rotation (the part considered is a 
part of a rotation, but not a rotation). (1.2) Again, if there were more than one heaven, time 
would equally be the motion of any one whatever of them, so that there would be many times at 
once. (2.1) The sphere of the whole was thought to be time, by those who said it was, because 
everything is both in time and in the sphere of the whole; but this assertion is too simple-minded 
to consider the impossibilities it contains.18 
Aristotle presents two definitions but gives explicit arguments only against definition (1), whereas 
he considers definition (2) only to report the reasoning behind it, despite the fact that it entails 
evident absurdities. Later, at 223b13-224a2, Aristotle also accounts more extensively for the sort of 
reasoning that led him to propose definition (1), showing that he considers that opinion to be widely 
held, beyond the boundaries of natural philosophy.19 Both definitions of time presented by Aristotle 
hold that a reference to the cosmos, or a certain aspect of it (motion, τοῦ ὅλου κίνησιν, the sphere, 
τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σφαίρᾳ) is essential in accounting for time. Both definitions, then, expresses what I 
described above as a cosmological conception. In particular, both definitions are taking the relation 
between time and the cosmos, or its motion, to be one of identity.  
 
18 Arist. Ph. IV 10, 218a33-b8.   
19 διὰ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς λέγεσθαι συμβαίνει, 223b23-24. 
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As they are presented as anonymous definitions, who is behind each definition can only be 
hypothetically retraced.20  Although Plato is not explicitly mentioned in the section, I would argue 
that he is either directly or indirectly the target behind definition (1). Aristotle’s students Eudemus 
and Theophrastus, as well as Alexander of Aphrodisias, all refer to the definition as Plato’s.21 And, 
even if we denied that is Plato’s definition, (1) is an early testimony of a definition that is clearly 
Platonic in spirit, as we will see below, despite not employing the same terminology as the Timaeus. 
Aristotle, by refuting cosmological definitions at the outset of his account, aims to develop a 
non-cosmological definition of time. The first objection (1.1) highlights the irrelevance of a full 
rotation of the cosmos for the existence of time, since even any part of that motion (τῆς περιφορᾶς 
τὸ μέρος) would be some time. The importance of circular motion for time, in Plato’s view, will be 
discussed in Chapter 4 and 6, where I will bring back Aristotle’s objection and view as a term of 
comparison.  
The second objection (1.2) foregrounds what Aristotle takes to be the absurd consequences of 
identifying time with cosmic motion. While the same sort of motion, according to Aristotle, can 
have many instantiations, time is necessarily singular. Aristotle entertains the possibility of multiple 
cosmoi as a reductio of definition (1), as it would take each a rotation as identical with time, having 
many simultaneous times. Maintaining that there are multiple concomitant times is patently absurd 
for Aristotle, and therefore definition (1) cannot be correct. However, as we will see, in the 
Conclusion, this objection highlights, from our standpoint, a valuable feature of Plato’s account that 
Aristotle’s lacks. 
As for Aristotle’s discussion of definition (2), he argues that it is maintained because time and 
the geometrical shape of the cosmos are both universal containers of sorts (ὅτι ἔν τε τῷ χρόνῳ 
πάντα ἐστὶν καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ ὅλου σφαίρᾳ). While he recognises that time, unlike motion, is not 
localised in any intra-cosmic object, but it is everywhere and with all things alike (ὁ δὲ χρόνος 
ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν, 218b13), the conditions for being in time and being in the 
cosmos are distinct ones, despite the fact that they apply, for the most part, to the same sort of 
objects (see 219b15-220a9). 
Beyond Aristotle’s discussion, the Platonic Definitions also propose a definition of time that 
bears significant resemblance to definition (1) in Aristotle, while also introducing new aspects. 
Time is defined as “the motion of the Sun, the measure of its course (ἡλίου κίνησις, μέτρον 
φορᾶς)”22. As we can see, only the first part of the definition presents an identity with motion 
 
20 Coope 2005, p. 32. 
21 Simplicius reports to us of the consensus in his commentary on the Physics (In Ph. IX-I, p. 700, 16-20). 
22 411b3. The day is defined immediately after time, as “the journey of the sun, from rising to setting; the light opposed 
to the night”. 
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analogous to the one discussed by Aristotle, whereas the second part of the definition highlights a 
distinction between time and the motion of the Sun, as the measure and the measured, which 
suggests a weaker relation of dependence.23 Most importantly, the motion that defines time is not 
that of the cosmos, but specifically the Sun’s, making less clear whether the definition holds a 
cosmological conception of time.  
Now, the account of time in the Timaeus provides some crucial insights on the terminology 
and claims of the definition above, which makes it far more similar to Aristotle’s definition (1) than 
it may initially appear. For instance, the creation of a measure for planetary revolutions is 
accomplished by kindling the Sun (39b2-5), and the Sun, just as the other planets, is moving along 
the paths of the circles of the Same and the Different composing the cosmic soul (38c7-d4, 38e3-
39a2).24 Leaving aside for the time being the function played by the Sun and the other planets, we 
can see how the identification with the motion of the Sun would be close enough to an identification 
with the motion of the cosmos, giving further ground to a Platonic vindication of a cosmological 
conception of time. 
Most importantly, however, Plato’s account itself provides significant evidence that the 
definitions discussed above capture his commitment to a cosmological conception of time. There 
are, in fact, two respects in which Plato’s account openly shows that commitment. Firstly, there are 
the three passages presenting a ἅμα relation between time and cosmos, or heaven (37d6, e2, 38b6-
7).25 The first ἅμα relation has a slightly different connotation, as it focuses on different aspects of 
the creation of time, as we will see in Section 2.4. In the other two occurrences, however, the 
relation puts forth a significant ‘togetherness’ in creation and destruction between time and the 
cosmos. 
It is ambiguous what exactly ‘together’ here means. Ἅμα can express a range of different 
meanings, depending on the context. It could stand for ‘together in time’, that is ‘simultaneously’, 
rendered as ‘at once’, as well as ‘necessarily together in existence’.26 Hence, depending on how we 
 
23 The reference to the measure of motion could also be a proto-Aristotelian account, as time is also described by 
Aristotle as the measure of motion (ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, Cf. 220b32-221a1), and is not 
identified with motion itself. In Speusippus (fr. 64 IP = Plut. Plat. Quaest. 8, 1007a-b) and Xenocrates’ definitions (fr. 
79 IP = Aetius, Plac. 318, 13-14), the cosmological conception is not explicit anymore, perhaps showing a general 
tendency, as with other topics in natural philosophy, to conform to Aristotle’s non-cosmological conception of time. 
24 I use ‘planets’ to refer to all the seven heavenly bodies involved in the creation of time, of which traditionally only 
five (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn) were called ‘wanderers’. For my defence of this terminological choice, 
see p. 94. 
25 In this whole work I will use ‘cosmos’ and ‘heaven’ interchangeably, as Plato himself suggests at 28b2-4, (κόσμος, 
οὐρανὸς) to refer to the single, all-comprehensive and supremely ordered living being created by the Demiurge. The 
term ‘universe’ (τὸ πᾶν), on the other hand, seems synonymous with ‘physical world’, i.e. the ensemble of all the 
corporeal and sensible nature, before and after the Demiurge’s intervention. 
26 LSJ s.v. ἅμα. Aristotle distinguishes in the Categories a non-temporal meaning of ἅμα, ‘by nature’, as an example of 
which he gives the double and the half, pointing out that they are together because they necessarily coexist, and none of 
the two has a causal priority over the other in being (Cat. 13, 14b27-29). They are, we could say, two aspects of the 
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read the ἅμα relations, we might have a stronger or weaker claim about the relation between time 
and the cosmos. However, at least ‘simultaneously’ as in ‘at a certain time’ should be ruled out as a 
reading, since defining the creation of time in temporal terms seems circular.27 Nor could it be an 
accidental concurrence, up to an arbitrary decision on the Demiurge’s part. Otherwise, the insight 
would not be significant enough to present it via three connected ἅμα relations. This is especially 
true in the last passage, where the same ἅμα relation is said to apply also in case of (hypothetical) 
destruction: “they would also be dissolved together (ἅμα), if ever a dissolution of them should take 
place”. 
There is an array of possible explanations of the necessary co-dependence between time and 
the cosmos. The bottom line is that time, while being presented as distinct from the cosmos, is also 
dependent on its existence, and vice versa. Hence, their concomitant creation must be grounded in 
non-accidental reasons. We will see in Section 2.4 that the ἅμα relation follows from Plato’s 
definition of time. For the time being, it is sufficient to see that those passages set the expectations 
for a definition of time that expresses a cosmological conception. 
The second respect in which Plato’s account is a proponent of a cosmological conception of 
time is even more significant. The claim is most clearly stated at 39d1, as an identity claim between 
time and the planetary revolutions. This passage refers to the motion of the five traditionally 
‘wandering’ heavenly bodies, i.e. Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn (χρόνον ὄντα τὰς 
τούτων πλάνας), but it is meant as a generalisation of the identity claims already proposed between 
the revolutions of the Sun and the Moon and the night-and-day, the month and the year respectively 
(39c1-5, see Section 5.1). The eight revolutions of the seven planets, if we take Plato at face value, 
are identical with time, thus resembling the Definitions’ identification of time with the revolution of 
the Sun. Moreover, as I pointed out above, the planetary revolutions are following the motions of 
the two circles of the cosmic soul, hence making the above identity claim also greatly resemble 
definition (1) in Aristotle (see Section 5.2). In fact, the identity between time and the revolutions of 
the planets entails identity with cosmic circular motion, just as definition (1) states. 
 
same quantitative relation. As we will see in Section 2.3, the first ἅμα relation is a case of two aspects of the same 
operation, whereas the second and the third express an essential coexistence, highlighting how time is an essential part 
of making a cosmos. 
27 Some authors take Plato to intentionally use occasional temporal references in accounting for time (Mohr 1985, p. 59, 
Mason 2006, pp. 180-181, Taylor 1928 p. 190). The most controversial case is the passage at 38c1-3, where some read 
the subject of the sentence to be ‘time’ despite the predication “for all time”. However, despite the controversial 
syntaxis, taking time to be the implicit subject would lead – at best – to the uninformative consequence of temporally 
qualifying the existence of time as ‘for all time’ (see Brague 1982, p. 40, and Johns 2014, p. 7-10, for a discussion of 
the reading I propose). However, readings that seem uninformative and out of place with the argument developed 
should be taken as an indication that we, not Plato, are on the wrong track. There are, in fact, additional contextual 
reasons concerning the comparison that rule out the reading above, indicating that the subject is rather the cosmos (see 
Section 4.1). 
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Given our contemporary conception of time, however, taking the identity claim at face value 
is problematic. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that its significance has been downplayed by most 
modern scholars, as we will see in sub-section 1.2.2. While it is generally recognised that for Plato 
the creation of the planets is part of the creation of time in a loose sense, most interpreters envisage 
their function as that of a cosmic clock, hence showing a substantial agreement with the Aristotelian 
standpoint on the issue. However, we might wonder if this approach is fruitful for an understanding 
of Plato’s account of time, where in addition to explicit claims like the ones presented above, the 
whole picture presented in the account does not seem to be easily adaptable to our own assumptions 
about the nature of time. To understate claims proposing a strong cosmological conception is even 
more misleading when there is early evidence, as seen above, that Platonist definitions of time do 
express such a conception.  
There is however a second, more significant reason why Plato’s cosmological conception has 
been downplayed. As first pointed out by Remi Brague, what is today taken to be Plato’s ‘official’ 
definition of time in the Timaeus does not resemble in any way the cosmological definitions 
considered above, nor does it prima facie expresses a cosmological conception of time: time is 
defined as a moving image of eternity (εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος, 37d5).28 I will refer to this 
definition as the metaphysical definition of time. In fact, at the core of the definition lies a 
metaphysical imitation where the paradigmatic term, αἰών, translated as ‘eternity’, pertains to the 
ideal rather than the physical domain. Eternity is evidently central to the metaphysical definition 
while it is never mentioned in the external sources we looked into above, suggesting that Aristotle 
and the scholars that put together the Definitions did not consider eternity as a crucial aspect of 
Plato’s contributions to the enquiry on time.  
George S. Claghorn argues that with definition (1) Aristotle is presenting a strawman of 
Plato’s account while not addressing the ‘real’ definition of time Plato proposed, i.e. the 
metaphysical definition. This criticism is coupled with an important exegetical claim, namely that 
Aristotle’s definition “will be found to bear a close resemblance, if not to be identical, with that of 
Plato”. Thus, he infers, Aristotle couldn’t have criticised Plato on the crucial aspects of his 
metaphysical definition, agreeing with him substantially. I will refer to this exegetical position as 
syncretistic.29 Although Claghorn’s syncretism misses the mark in portraying both Plato’s and 
 
28 Brague presents an extended examination of ancient doxography to show how the cosmological definition is 
generally recognised as one of the two definitions of time attributed to Plato, being often presented together with the 
moving image of αἰών (Brague 1982, pp. 13-24). As Brague points out, that consensus has a rather late origin, at least 
among the ancient scholars, given that it is only with Plotinus and later Neoplatonist that the metaphysical definition 
comes to the forefront. 
29 Claghorn 1954, pp. 88-89. Wolfgang Von Leyden proposes a more cautious attempt to compare Plato’s and 
Aristotle’s accounts of time in a syncretistic way (Von Leyden 1964, p. 52). 
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Aristotle’s account and their substantial disagreements, it is an outstanding representative of a 
general tendency in the literature to downplay the cosmological claims present in Plato’s account so 
as to prioritise the metaphysical definition. 
At the other end in the spectrum of possible interpretations is the position maintaining that 
both the metaphysical definition and the cosmological conception of time are valid, but they refer to 
two different times, as argued in Proclus’ commentary. Proclus maintains the ‘twofold time’ 
interpretation, that takes time to exist in two distinct ways: there is the invisible and hypercosmic 
time (discussed at 24 – 32), that defines its essence and is presented as the image of eternity, while, 
on the other hand, there is a visible and encosmic time (discussed at 53 – 57) that is constituted by 
the revolutions of the heavenly bodies in the cosmos.30 Proclus’ interpretation is not tenable, and no 
contemporary scholar holds the view, as there is no textual ground to claim that Plato had two 
distinct notions of time at play in his account. Nonetheless, his position certainly highlights the 
tension between the metaphysical definition and the cosmological conception displayed in Plato’s 
account. 
The same tension can be found in contemporary interpretations, falling between the two 
extremes, as we will see in the next section. That tension, it seems to me, highlights a crucial issue 
that I will expand in the next section, namely that Plato’s commitment to a cosmological conception 
of time is difficult to reconcile with the accepted reading of the metaphysical definition. 
Reconciling the two in an adequate way is the exegetical puzzle posed by Plato’s account of time. 
In an attempt to solve this puzzle, we will turn once more to the secondary literature, and analyse 
the main exegetical positions to see whether they succeed in the task, and what their shortcomings 
are. 
 
1.2. A review of contemporary scholarship and its presuppositions 
 
As anticipated, the answer given by most contemporary scholars to the question ‘What is time, 
according to Plato?’ is found in the section I will refer to as ‘definitional section’ (37c6-e3). Here 
follows Zeyl’s translation, slightly modified to render it more neutral:  
 
30 “There has also been a twofold precession of time into existent things, the first of which is hypercosmic 
(ὑπερκόσμιος) while the other is encosmic (ἐγκόσμιος). While the first one both proceeds and remains simultaneously, 
the other is carried along in motion. The time that undergoes participation is likewise twofold. On the one hand, there is 
that which exists by virtue of simple participation. On the other hand, there is that in the cycles of the celestial stars 
which produces months, days, nights and years […]. Since the understanding is dual in form, one is understanding of 
time as it truly is (which is the number of all the cycles in everything), while the other is understanding of the time that 
is said to derive from the former (which proceeds in accordance with number)” (In Ti. IV, 53, 13-18; 54, 15-18). 
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Now when the Father who had begotten the universe observed it set in motion and alive, a thing 
that had come to be as a shrine for the everlasting gods, he was well pleased, and in his delight 
he thought of making it more like its model still. So, as the model was itself an everlasting 
Living Thing, he set himself to bringing this universe to completion in such a way that it, too, 
would be like that (τοιοῦτον) to the extent that was possible. Now it was the Living Thing’s 
nature to be αἰών-ly, but it isn’t possible to bestow it fully upon anything that is begotten. And 
so he began to think of making a moving image of αἰών: at the same time as he brought order to 
the universe, he would make an αἰών-ly image, moving according to number, of αἰών remaining 
in unity. That (τοῦτον), of course, is what we now call “time”.31 
There is good reason to concede that the section is giving us Plato’s official definition of time: at 
the end of the section Timaeus reveals that he was describing the creation of time (τοῦτον ὃν δὴ 
χρόνον ὠνομάκαμεν, 37d7). Naming the referent of τοῦτον ‘time’ makes it a definition. The 
question is, however, whether the moving image of eternity is the only candidate as a definiens in 
the definitional section, and, even if so, what it means.32 
These exegetical issues, however, cannot be addressed apart from the question about the 
meaning of ‘eternity’ in the definition, as the standard translation of αἰών in Plato’s account of time. 
On a widespread understanding, αἰών describes the ontological status of forms, which is either 
synonymous with or derived from their everlasting nature (τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν, 37e5). Such status is 
often described as a ‘timeless’ present, absence of passage or endless duration, taken to be 
expressed by the established connection between αἰών and an absolute unity of existence (μένοντος 
αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ, 37d6).33 As I just described it, the translation of αἰών as ‘eternity’ seems apt. 
However, I will challenge that understanding and translation of αἰών in the next chapter, as it fails 
to adequately capture the structural and biological connotation of the term. In view of the 
importance played by αἰών in the account of time, I will use the Greek term from now on, to leave 
its meaning open until it will be further dissected in Chapter 3. 
 
31 Zeyl’s translation differs from translations like Cornford’s and Taylor’s, in that it takes the final τοῦτον as a 
demonstrative pronoun referring to number. This issue will be discussed in Section 2.4. Moreover, as we will see in 
Sub-section 1.2.1, the τοιοῦτον at 37d2 is usually translated in a non-neutral way, making explicit a certain 
interpretation of the passage. I render it as ‘like that’ in the translation to maintain the ambiguity concerning what it 
refers to. For my outline of Plato’s account of time, see p. 137. 
32 I will address the issue of whether the above is the complete version of Plato’s definition of time in Section 2.4. 
33 Here follows a variety of characterisations of αἰών as eternity: “The παράδειγμα is not a thing ‘in the making’ at all; 
passage and succession have nothing to do with it; it has its being in αἰών, eternity” (Taylor 1928, p. 187). “The concept 
of duration without change, as the attribute of real being was first formulated by Parmenides. Plato echoes his words 
about the One being: ‘It never was nor ever will be, since it is now all at once’ (frag. 8, 5). The ‘indivisible’ being of 
Plato’s intelligible world demands a duration that ‘abides (rests) in unity’” (Cornford 1937, p. 102). “Le Temps est né 
avec le Ciel et il a été creé sur le modéle de la substance éternelle, afin qu’il lui resemblât le plus possible selon sa 
capacité” (Festugière 1949, p. 267). “Plato is to be credited with the introduction of this term [αἰών] in the sense of 
timeless eternity, though in further defining the concept he adopts a language similar to Parmenides' description of the 
One as being now all at once, a single whole” (Von Leyden 1964, p. 36). “If eternality is a matter of immutability it can 
well be expressed also as ‘abiding in unity’ […]. The Forms are a sort of thing that never at any time fails to exist, and 
in that sense may be considered sempiternal; but their possession of a kind of being utterly immune to any sort of 
change or destruction, a being that cannot fail to endure without limit and with absolute stability, is complete at every 
instant, and does not materialize or increase as time passes” (Patterson 1985, p. 40). 
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The standard presupposition about the meaning of αἰών is the main point of substantial 
agreement for the array of different readings of Plato’s account. I will present the exegetical issues 
concerning αἰών in the definitional section in Section 1.2.1 and I will discuss the main families of 
readings of Plato’s conception of time in Section 1.2.2. My claim is that reading αἰών as ‘eternity’ 
leads to further exegetical issues and to implausible interpretations, thus making a strong case for 
the revision of the meaning and consequent function of αἰών in the definitional section as 
articulated in Chapter 2. 
 
1.2.1. On ‘eternity’ 
 
Whereas there is a substantial consensus on the presupposition concerning the meaning of αἰών, 
there are at least two respects in which interpretations of the definitional section diverge 
significantly: (a) the relation between being everlasting (αὐτὸ τυγχάνει ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν, 37d1) and 
being of an αἰών-ly nature (τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, 37d3), both associated with 
the model in two consecutive sentences; (b) the relation between αἰών itself and the model and 
image qualified as αἰών-ly.34 I will argue that the presupposition concerning αἰών restricts the 
exegetical options in both respects and generates unnecessary concerns. 
The exegetical options in the literature concerning (a), i.e. the relation between ‘everlasting’ 
and ‘αἰών-ly’, are two: they are taken to be either synonyms, or as one entailing the other. The first 
option is best exemplified by the influential analysis of André-Jean Festugière, although he is by no 
means the only scholar who reads the text in this way.35 The supposed meaning of αἰών is 
introduced by Festugière as the ever-existing status of something that has never-ending duration, 
which is predicated of the model as αἰών-ly.36 Festugière explicitly reads ἀίδιος and αἰώνιος as 
synonyms, both contrasted with the αἰών-ly image: “d’un côté on a l’ἀίδιος οὐσία (37 e 5 = 
ζῷον ἀίδιον d 2 = φύσις αἰώνιος d 4) dont la durée ne comporte aucune division temporelle, qui est 
 
34 I translate ἀίδιος as ‘everlasting’ because ‘eternal’ is widely employed as a translation of αἰώνιος, and the two need to 
be distinguished. In Plato’s specific use in the Timaeus, however, ἀίδιος is not describing anything lasting in a 
durational sense, as it rather qualifies the tenseless existence of the ideal kind as the negation of coming into being (see 
sub-section 2.1.2). I will use ‘sempiternal’, in accordance with the literature, to refer to the created and yet endless 
existence of the cosmos. 
35 Richard Mohr shares Festugière’s reading, insofar as he refers to the section 37e4-38a8 of Plato’s account of time as 
“Plato’s elaboration of the nature of eternity of the model”, despite the fact that the focus of that section is the ἀίδιος 
οὐσία (Mohr 1985, p. 71-75). More recently, Andrew S. Mason endorsed the reading: “The most natural reading of 
aiōnios would seem to be ‘everlasting’; and this is certainly true of aïdios and of aei on or aei kata tauta echon. These 
terms are frequently applied to the Forms before 37c, and no one would suspect, in advance of this passage, that 
anything other than endless duration was being ascribed to them” (Mason 2006, p. 181). 
36 “Le ‘toujours’ désignant un ‘permanent recommencé’ devait dépendre d’un ‘toujours’ désignant un ‘permanent et 
immobile’, que ce qui change constamment de la même façon devait dépendre d’un principe, ou participer à un modèle, 
absolument immutable”, Festugière 1971, p. 264.  
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un éternel présent: de l’autre on a l’αἰώνιος εἰκών dont la durée indéfinie progresse selon les parties 
(μέρη χρόνου 37 e 4) ou catégories du temps, passé, présent, avenir”.37 
However, this interpretation is simply stipulated, with no argument in its favour. As far as I 
am aware, the only reason justifying the hypothesis is found in the similar phrasing introducing 
‘everlasting’ and ‘αἰών-ly’. Both are in fact presented as qualifications of the living being used as a 
model for the cosmos (τυγχάνει ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν, τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος). If 
anything, the repetition of a statement that supposedly conveys the very same content should be 
taken as odd, especially given that, while ἀίδιος and other terms describing an everlasting existence 
are employed throughout the first part of the dialogue, before the account of time begins, αἰών and 
its adjectivization exclusively appear in the account of time.38 
The second option is more plausible, as it acknowledges a degree of complexity in the text. It 
takes ‘everlasting’ as entailing ‘αἰών-ly’ while having a distinct meaning. This reading is presented 
by Taylor as follows: “the thought is that only that which is αἰώνιος, ‘eternal’ in the sense that it 
knows no ‘passage’, is never ‘in the making’, can strictly be called ἀίδιος, ‘everlasting’”.39 Taylor’s 
view suggests that despite being predicated of all the same beings, the two terms focus on different 
aspects, αἰών-ly describing a ‘timeless’ absence of passage, which suggests no past and no future 
and is defined by unity, whereas ‘everlasting’ highlights not being subject to generation and 
destruction. Hence, the view could address the worry raised above about the specificity of the role 
played by αἰών in the definitional section, by noting that while the αἰών-ly nature of forms has not 
been important up to that point in the dialogue, it is crucial for the creation of time. 
While this interpretation is more tenable, it also fails to consider further exegetical options as 
equally (or more) plausible, as it takes for granted the presupposition concerning the meaning of 
αἰών without further discussion. In fact, it stipulates that αἰών-ly is a property of forms qua forms. 
However, this does not have to be the case, and, indeed does not seem to be the most intuitive 
reading of the two passages above, where the reference is twice to the intelligible living being 
chosen as a model. It remains an unexplored option that the αἰών-ly nature is specific to that model, 
as a living being, despite being dependent on its everlastingness. In this alternative reading, being a 
living being and being everlasting are both necessary conditions for being αἰών-ly, so that αἰών-ly is 
 
37 Festugière 1971, p. 269. Even in Festugière’s translation, ‘eternal’ and ‘eternity’ ambiguously render ἀίδιον and αἰών, 
while αἰώνιος is translated as ‘never-ending duration of life’: ‘Vivant éternel (ζῷον ἀίδιον)’, ‘la nature du Vivant 
intelligible comporte un durée de vie sans fin (τοῦ ζῴου φύσις ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος)’ and ‘image mobile d’éternité 
(εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος)’ (ibid. p. 264).  
38  Ἀίδιος is mentioned three times (37c6, d1, e5) in the account of time, against the eight times for αἰών and its 
adjectivized forms (37d3, d5, d6, d7, 38a7, b8, c2, 39e2). Moreover, αἰών is never used in the rest of the speech, 
whereas ἀίδιος appears at 29a3 and a5 and later at 40b5, and ἀεί is associated with ‘being’ ten times (27d6, 28a1, a2, a7, 
b6, 32b3, 34a8, 35a2, 37a1, b3). 
39 Taylor 1928, p. 186. 
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not a synonym nor entailed by being everlasting per se. This unaddressed alternative is developed in 
my positive analysis of the definitional section, in Chapter 2. 
Now we can turn to issue (b), namely the unclear relation between αἰών, the αἰών-ly nature of 
the model and the αἰών-ly image. A first issue is that of having one too many models. On the one 
hand the intelligible living being is still the model (37c8, 38c1), insofar as its αἰών-ly nature is the 
one that is imitated in the αἰών-ly image (αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, 37d7). However, αἰών itself is also 
presented as the object of imitation for the image in the metaphysical definition of time. Now, this 
issue could be solved by taking αἰών as meaning the same as the αἰών-ly nature of the model, so 
that there is no separate αἰών over and above the αἰών-ly nature. Indeed, that will be my reading in 
Section 2.4.  
This reading, however, has been challenged by raising the further issue of the αἰών-ly image. 
In fact, if we take αἰών as ‘eternity’, i.e. the absence of passage typical of forms, a worry can be 
raised about the ways in which a physical image can also be αἰών-ly, ‘eternal’.40 As a response to 
this exegetical pressure, some interpreters take the adjective αἰώνιος to only describe the imitation 
of αἰών, despite the fact that the model is presented as having an αἰών-ly nature in the first place. 
This remark is usually coupled with the claim that resemblance with αἰών is accomplished in the 
physical domain through a sempiternal cosmos (see sub-section 1.2.2). 
As with the previous issue, the vast majority of the commentators does not consider the full 
range of exegetical options available: once we consider that αἰών might not mean ‘eternity’ and 
might be a specific feature of that model, as suggested above, it turns out that the one and only form 
with an αἰών-ly nature is the everlasting living being. While the issue of clarifying how there can be 
a moving image of αἰών still remains, the hypothesis allows to dissolve the issues raised above, 
thereby making alternation in terminology between αἰών and αἰών-ly as not problematic: αἰών 
would be a feature specific to that model (therefore described as αἰών-ly) that needs correspondence 
in the image, i.e. the cosmos, with a moving image of αἰών. I will put forth this reading in Section 
2.4, where I will also clarify in what respect the cosmos can be αἰών-ly as the model. 
  
 
40 This worry is raised already in Proclus, who takes αἰών to be ontologically prior to the αἰών-ly living being that 
partakes in it (in Ti. IV 1, 12 – 14). Similarly, Mohr takes αἰών to be a ‘meta-form’ similar in function to the five great 
kinds in the Sophist or the One in the Parmenides (Mohr 1985, pp. 70-75). Cornford even proposes to emend the 
αἰώνιον predicated of the image as ἀέναον, ‘ever-flowing’ (Lg. 966e), maintaining that Plato must have drawn a clear 
difference between the image and the αἰών-ly model (Cornford 1937, p. 98). 
 
 
19 
 
1.2.2.  Readings of Plato’s definition of time 
 
I now turn to the interpretations of Plato’s metaphysical definition of time. Although most accounts 
disagree on the details, their exegetical stances can be led back to four main families.41 We will see 
how, in maintaining their reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’, most contemporary scholars fail to account 
for the specificity of Plato’s cosmological claims. In fact, if αἰών means eternity, the creation of its 
image entails the imitation of a feature of forms qua forms, and it is not intuitively accomplished by 
any cosmic arrangement.42 Hence, despite the acknowledgement of Plato’s overall cosmological 
conception of time in the literature, most contemporary views cannot satisfactorily account for why 
such conception would follow from the metaphysical definition of time. 
I will start with the view that is most influenced by the reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’, thereby 
being the most unsuccessful in reconciling the definition of time with Plato’s cosmological 
conception. That view is followed by progressively more promising ones. As with my analysis of 
the exegetical issues concerning αἰών, my criticism also underscores, by way of contrast, what a 
promising reading of Plato’s account should commit to. 
(1) Time as ‘sempiternity of cosmic motion’:  
This view has been proposed first by Festugière and later developed further by Patterson and 
Mason.43 The view most consistently envisages αἰών, intended as the absolute absence of passage 
characterising the forms, as the core of Plato’s conception of time. Of course, time is deficient when 
compared to αἰών, insofar as it is a moving image of it. Time, then, as the second-best version of 
‘eternity’, consists in the sempiternity of the cosmos. Sempiternity is defined as the stable 
persistence of the cosmos and its order throughout its never-ending motion, such that, even if it had 
generation, it won’t ever be destroyed. The authors that hold this view do recognise the importance 
of the regularity of cosmic motion as in view (2). However, their claim is that the regularity of 
motion is only instrumental to the attainment of structural stability that grants the cosmos a 
sempiternal existence. The regular and circular motion, then, appears as merely a precondition for 
 
41 This division does not aim to assess each author’s view individually. For instance, Taylor’s can be taken as an 
instance of (1) or (2), depending on the passages chosen (see fn. 43). My goal is rather to recognise that the two views 
stand as distinct exegetical stances and to evaluate each in its own merit. 
42 These considerations will be further articulated once I set out the positive part of my thesis, in Section 2.1 and 2.3. As 
for my use of ‘fundamental ontology’ with a distinct meaning from ‘metaphysical’, see fn. 62. 
43 “His general concern is (A) to establish a strong distinction between eternity and time consonant with his basic 
division between Being and Becoming, where there is yet (B) a natural association between the two. The distinction he 
draws is in effect that between two types of stability: one a matter of absolute immutability, the other of everlasting 
regular mutation” (Patterson 1985, p. 42). Moreover, see Festugière 1971, p. 266, Patterson 1985, pp. 36-37 and 41-43, 
Mason 2006, pp. 182-185. Even Taylor, who mostly seems to hold view (2), remarks that “the sensible world is a thing 
of passage, but it never passes away; its passage fills all time, and of course, the formal laws of its structure remain the 
same throughout” (Taylor 1928, p. 187).  
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sempiternity. That is how they also read the following passage: “for the model is something that has 
being for all αἰών (πάντα αἰῶνά), while it, on the other hand, has been begotten, is, and shall be, up 
to the completion, for all time (διὰ τέλους τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον)” (38c1-3). ‘For all time’ simply 
means that the cosmos is sempiternal.  
Support for this reading is usually found in the section of Plato’s account of tense and 
tenseless existence (37e3-38b5). This family of views, consistent with their reading of αἰών as 
eternity, takes time as a newly acquired ontological status of the physical world – sempiternity – 
approximating the absence of passage of ‘eternity’. They generally argue that such an ontological 
modification is what grounds the phenomena of becoming older and younger and tensed 
distinctions such as ‘was’ and ‘will be’.44 However, as mentioned in the Introduction, tense is a 
matter of fundamental ontology, i.e. a fixed aspect that defines the physicality of the world as such, 
while time, in Plato, is a non-fundamental feature of the physical world. As Plato makes clear in the 
text, it is not time itself, but becoming that is responsible for the tensed distinctions, as much as 
older/younger relations of physical, perceivable objects (38a6). Physical objects and phenomena, 
then, exist in a tensed way independently from the creation of time of a moving image of αἰών, so 
they should not be considered as evidence for the view. 
Moreover, the ‘sempiternity’ view can be rejected in a weaker and stronger way. In a weaker 
way, it can be argued that the creation of time is not the same as, nor it is essential to the attainment 
of sempiternity for the cosmos, since the latter is a consequence of separate demiurgic operations. 
Firstly, we have the Demiurge warranting the indissolubility of the cosmic body at 32c2-4. Later, 
we have the creation of the cosmic soul and the union of the two, which leads to “a divine 
beginning of intelligent and unceasing life (θείαν ἀρχὴν ἤρξατο ἀπαύστου καὶ ἔμφρονος βίου, 
36e4)”. Then, and only then, the creation of time is introduced, at 37c6, with a reference to the 
cosmos, already “alive and set in motion”. While it is true that the unceasing life of the cosmos is 
further qualified as “for all time” (πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον, 36e4-5), which seems to anticipate 
the creation of time, we should not take ‘unceasing’ and ‘for all time’ as synonyms for ‘without an 
end’, as it would simply be redundant. Furthermore, while the unceasing life is grounded in the 
indestructibility of the cosmic soul and body, in their harmonious motion, the creation of time is 
introducing something additional to that life, namely the planetary revolutions. Unceasing cosmic 
life, then, is at best a precondition for the cosmos to live ‘for all time’. 
Finally, the Demiurge’s speech at 41a7-d3 describes the same (precarious) sempiternity as 
quasi-immortality and indissolubility attained in virtue of the Demiurge’s unfailing good will. 
 
44 Patterson, just as Mason (Patterson 1985, p. 37, Mason 2006, p. 183), appeals to the Parmenides for drawing this 
inference. However, see fn. 13 for why the Parmenides should not be compared with the Timaeus for matters of tense 
and time. 
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There, the sempiternal condition already bestowed to the cosmic god before the creation of time is 
extended to all created gods, without any mention that they would henceforth partake in time. The 
view, then, fails precisely in narrowing down what the creation of time brings to the table, as that 
cannot be sempiternity. 
A stronger criticism to that position, however, holds that for the cosmos to be “for all time” 
does not even require a sempiternal existence as a precondition. As I will argue in Section 4.2, ‘for 
all time’ should not be taken as meaning ‘an infinite amount of time’, as it rather corresponds to the 
complete number of time (39d3-4), which is a finite totality time. If I am correct in my assessment, 
then, to be ‘for all time’ would be compatible with the event of a cosmic destruction at the end of it, 
that is with a non-sempiternal cosmos. The reason why a cosmic destruction does not happen is 
entirely independent from the creation of time as a moving image of αἰών, as it is due to the craft 
and good will of the Demiurge. 
 
(2) Time as ‘regular cosmic motion’:  
Unlike (1), this view acknowledges the cosmological conception of time in Plato’s account. The 
view is held in various forms by Alfred E. Taylor, Harold F. Cherniss, G. E. L. Owen and Gregory 
Vlastos, and claims that time is, in Plato’s definition, identical to the regular and circular motion of 
the cosmos, just as in Aristotle’s definition (1) in Section 1.1. As Taylor puts it: “The revolution of 
the eight circles is ‘time’. There are not two separate stages in fact, though in the narrative we have 
first to speak of the ‘making’ of the ‘circles’ and then of the ‘making’ of ‘time’. The two are aspects 
of the same process”.45 Before the arrangement of the cosmos, motion in the physical domain was 
disordered and didn’t proceed on a circular path, hence not bearing any resemblance to αἰών. Once 
the cosmos is made, though, there is circular and regular motion in the physical domain, as the 
closest kinetic approximation to the unchanging sameness of αἰών.46 
This view seems to be supported by the three ἅμα relations discussed in Section 1.1. In fact, 
the view would allow the strongest reading of the relation, since the cosmos, as a living being, is 
defined by its circular and regular motion. Hence, creating the cosmos entails creating its regular 
motion, i.e. time, and likewise for its destruction. Vlastos’ position is of particular interest, insofar 
 
45 Taylor 1928, pp. 187-188. 
46 “The visible οὐρανός has its life in time, not in eternity, but the way in which its life is made up of unending cycles of 
motion is the nearest approach which ‘passage’ (τὸ γιγνόμενον) can make to the abiding self-sameness and quiet of 
eternity” (Taylor 1928, p. 221). Owen describes the motion of the planets as being flawed because they display both 
stability and instability, as that is the best approximation of the physical world to αἰών as eternity (Owen 1966, p. 334). 
According to Vlastos, what the Demiurge created in making time is simply a cosmos in which there is “uniform and 
measurable time-flow” because of the kind of heavenly revolutions it started (Vlastos 1965, p. 410). Cherniss takes as 
similar reading: “time is the rational aspect of orderliness in the phenomenal realm by which the flux of becoming can 
simulate the eternity of real being” (Cherniss 1977, pp. 236-37). 
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as it explicitly draws a contrast between Plato’s and Aristotle’s standpoint, arguing that “the 
doctrine of time in the Timaios is a stronger version of the cyclical time of Phys. 223b2-224a2. If 
Aristotle takes the heavenly revolutions as a necessary condition of time, the Timaios seems to 
identify them with time”47. In this way, Vlastos makes an important step further in understanding 
the relation between time and cosmic motion as the core of Plato’s account (see Section 1.1). If we 
take the weaker reading, as a relation of dependence, our reading is closer to the Aristotelian 
viewpoint. This distinction will be important when I discuss view (3). 
However, while this view recognises that the planets also play a part in the creation of time, it 
takes them as additional tools for making time accessible to us, as a cosmic clock. The view holds 
that there is no essential difference between the cosmic rotations per se and the planetary 
revolutions, insofar as the imitation of αἰών is concerned. In fact, the difference-maker is the 
regularity and circularity of cosmic motion.48 
The ‘regular cosmic motion’ view, then, is criticisable for the same reason view (1) was. 
Firstly, circular and regular motion is introduced to make the universe alive and intelligent, so the 
goal of that operation does not seem to be the approximation to the ‘eternity’ of forms. Secondly, 
while the regularity and circularity of cosmic motion are introduced already with the crafting of the 
cosmic body and soul, and their unified life (34a, 36c-d), that living being is not yet αἰών-ly. In fact, 
time is created as a further step via the creation of the planets, which are the focus of the account 
for more than half of its length (38c3-39e2).49 The view, then, does not adequately thematise the 
crucial function played by the planets. While the acknowledgement that cosmic circular motion is 
the focus of Plato’s account of time is on point, that does not entail an unqualified identity between 
time and cosmic motion. There is an intermediate option between identity and mere dependence 
that is not considered by Vlastos, which allows for a partial identity. That relation is, as we will see, 
the constitution relation: cosmic motion becomes a moving image of αἰών only when the planets 
move along the circles of the cosmic soul, bringing visibility and enumerability to that motion (see 
Part III for an extended discussion of the point). 
 
 
47 Vlastos 1939, p. 76. In footnote he adds that “in the Timaios he [Plato] is contrasting χρόνος as periodic form with the 
formlessness of random process” (p.76, fn. 2). Vlastos’ assessment seems to overstate the role played by heavenly 
motion in Aristotle’s account of time. It is clear from what Aristotle says that, in his view, there would be time even 
without heavenly motion. What would be lost is ‘just’ the best clock available (see view (3) for a brief discussion of the 
Aristotelian view). 
48 “If there is to be equable succession, time must be measurable. Hence for the origination of time the ‘planets’ are said 
to be made to be the world’s great natural time-keepers […]. They ‘divide’ or ‘determine’ the numbers, because we use 
their revolutions as units for measuring time”, Taylor 1928, p. 191-192. 
49 While the account of time goes from 37c6 to 39e2, the making of the cosmic body, soul and their joint circular 
motion is accounted for between 31b4 and 37a3. The creation of time is treated as an entirely distinct demiurgic 
operation. 
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(3) Time as ‘the cosmic clock’:  
The ‘cosmic clock’ view is the one that most adequately acknowledges the specificity of Plato’s 
cosmological conception of time, insofar as it recognises the setting up of the planets and their 
revolutions as the operation the creation of time consists in. Cornford is the first to gesture at the 
view, as follows: “time is essentially divided into the three ‘forms’, past, present, future; and it 
‘moves according to number’, being measured by a plurality of recurrent ‘parts’, the periods called 
day, month, year. Nothing that we can call Time can exist without these units of measurement; and 
these again cannot exist without the regular revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the motions of the 
celestial clock”.50 The emphasis is on how the planets contribute in creating time as something 
enumerable, which did not exist before. In fact, despite being circular and regular, the rotations of 
the cosmos could not yet be counted as sequence of units, and enumerability is essential for time. 
 Richard Mohr develops the view in a thorough and compelling way. In Mohr’s view, Plato’s 
conception of time does not modify the physical world in any fundamental way, as it seems that 
view (1), and in certain cases view (2), suggest. His main thesis is that “when Plato says that the 
Demiurge makes time, he means that the Demiurge makes a clock, nothing more, nothing less”.51 
As seen in the Introduction, Mohr also rejects the reading that tense is part of the creation of time.52 
To do justice to Mohr’s account, we need a brief outline of his broader epistemological and 
ontological claims concerning the forms and the model-image relation. Mohr puts forth the notion 
of ‘immanent standard’ as the crucial one to understand Plato’s natural philosophy. Immanent 
standards are compared by Mohr to physical objects taken as universal standards, as the Standard 
Meter Stick or the Standard Pound. The peculiarity of similar objects, according to Mohr, is that 
they can be considered in two respects: “they will be that by which other phenomena are identified 
and so these other phenomena may be viewed as instances of them, and in this way they will be like 
Forms in serving as universals. Yet, on the other hand, immanent standards will themselves be 
instances of Forms; they will be perfect instances, corresponding precisely to their Form-standard, 
but they will be instances nonetheless”.53  
 
50 Cornford 1937, p. 102. Cornford does not offer a substantial explanation for why the planets, more than any other 
clock, are necessary for the creation of time. The only addition to the cosmos introduced by the planets seems to be the 
primary role they have in teaching mankind to count and calculate (Cornford 1937, p. 105). His reference to Aristotle’s 
explanation of what he deems a mistaken view makes it clear that Cornford, just as Mohr, approaches Plato’s account 
with Aristotelian spectacles on (p. 103). While I also employ Aristotle’s account as a valuable term of comparison for 
Plato’s, I maintain that two are competing accounts of time. Aristotle’s report of cosmological views of time comes with 
an explanation of them in non-cosmological terms, thus making it exegetically unreliable. 
51 Mohr 1985, p. 54.     
52 Ibid., pp. 64-66. 
53 Mohr 1985, p. 56. The driving motivation behind the creation of immanent standards is their function as epistemic 
support: “the immanent standards serve as the objects of true opinion in the same way that Forms (as standards) serve 
as the objects of knowledge. The Demiurge, by introducing immanent standards, improves the world by making it more 
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What is crucial, in Mohr’s view, is that in making immanent standards we create an absolute 
term of comparison for measurement in the physical world, whereas in their absence only relative 
comparisons are possible. Once the relevant immanent standard is in place, we can use it to 
compare every other two or more items one against the other in terms of meters, pounds, and so on. 
Time, in Mohr’s reading, should be understood as one of these standards, that is as a standard clock. 
For instance, Achilles is faster than the tortoise, but with the immanent standard ‘time’ we can 
determine how much faster.54   
This reading is also connected with Mohr’s original reading of αἰών, that separates it from the 
notion of an unchanging present, although he maintains it is a property of forms as such. In Mohr’s 
view, in describing the nature of the model as being αἰών-ly, what is highlighted is the nature of 
forms as absolute standards. In fact, being qualified as αἰών-ly, ‘eternal’, just means that something 
does not belong to the class of objects that undergo change and is thereby measured by standards. In 
virtue of their αἰών-ly nature forms are taken as standards-defining instances in the world, while not 
being confounded with those instances. On the other hand, the cosmic clock, as an immanent 
standard in motion, is both a standard that measures (i.e. a moving image of αἰών) and an object that 
undergoes change, thereby an instance of forms.55 
 Despite its value in recognising that the planets bring temporal measurability to the cosmos, 
Mohr’s reading also fails to provide an adequate analysis of their function, in two respects: firstly, it 
does not appropriately ground the claim that the planetary revolutions are a standard for measuring 
motion and, secondly, it does maintain two incompatible notions of time, one of which is implicitly 
Aristotelian. 
On the first point, Mohr’s account does not specify any objective requisite for distinguishing 
an immanent standard from the changeable material objects it measures, other than the function it 
plays for us. The cosmic clock is an immanent standard, then, simply because that is how we use 
it.56 This position seems especially problematic given that the notion of clock Mohr is working with 
 
intelligible” (Mohr 1985, p. 3). Moreover, immanent standards, like the forms, have two functions: “First, they in 
themselves are in some sense objects of knowledge and second, they as standards or measures allow us to identify, by 
reference to them, the types and kinds of other things” (Mohr 1985, p. 13). 
54 Here Mohr is drawing an interesting distinction between what he calls determinate and indeterminate kinds of 
measurements. Even without a standard we can easily make comparisons concerning ‘more’ and ‘less’, but to have a 
determinate measurement, answering the ‘how much’ question, we need a standard with reference to which everything 
in a certain domain is measured. The cosmic clock has precisely this standard role in Mohr’s picture. 
55 Mohr 1985, pp. 70-75.   
56 Despite broadly endorsing Mohr’s reading, Goldin remarks that his account “places undue weight on the role the 
Forms play for us, as standards by which we account for and measure things”, at the expense of the ontological basis 
grounding what counts as a standard (Goldin 1998, p. 133). Goldin’s additionally argues that the creation of time brings 
further order and determinacy to the physical world, hence making it more similar to the realm of forms. Hence, 
although he partially embraces the ‘cosmic clock’ interpretation, his account seems ultimately to turn back to view (2), 
when he argues that the cosmic clock also affects the ontological status of the physical world (Goldin 1998, p. 133). 
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leaves open the possibility of instantiation of multiple clocks, so that it remains unclear what 
accounts for one in particular being a standard. In fact, the view leaves a choice between two 
unappealing alternatives, for different reasons: either (a) we accept that the form-like status of 
immanent standards is arbitrarily assigned (e.g. by human conventions and use, or by some 
historical reason, such as ‘the Demiurge intended for these planets to be used as a standard’) or (b) 
we claim that something is an immanent standard because it has certain optimal features for the goal 
of measurement (e.g. the most precise clock), thus defining time as the material object that best 
functions as a clock. 
Option (a) takes the status of standard as a stipulation not grounded on features intrinsic to the 
object. Whereas convention is what determines the case of the Standard Meter, it cannot be applied 
to forms and their instances, as on Plato’s account ontological constitution is crucial to separate out 
standards from instances. The Standard Meter is universally recognised by us to be the object after 
which we measure any other length, but it is not any different from other objects of the same length 
we might fabricate, as a standard. Arguing that in setting up the planets as a clock, the Demiurge 
“removes that part of the world in its aspect as a standard from being the subject of judgements of 
dates and duration” is, via option (a), just a metaphorical description. In fact, all it is claiming is that 
the Demiurge created the planetary revolutions to be used as the standard clock, despite there being 
no objective difference between the those revolutions and, for instance, a water clock in Egypt.57 
In considering option (b), however, the concern remains that, as noted above, in Mohr’s view, 
a standard is simply one with reference to which we measure in absolute terms. Insofar as more than 
one clock can or does exist (e.g. man-made ones), hence potentially playing the function of a 
standard, more than one time would also exist at once. In fact, if the only objective difference is 
how effective they are at measuring, because of precision and longevity, the change brought about 
by the creation of a cosmic clock would not be the introduction of something entirely new, but 
 
57 Mohr 1985, p. 69. In outlining his notion of ‘immanent standard’, Mohr seems to suggest that indeed his reading is a 
conventionalist one: “the only occasion on which it is natural in ordinary discourse to predicate (change) of standards 
with respect to their status as standards is in fact when the standards have broken and so have reverted to being just any 
material objects. When they are working, we do not make predictions of them; we use them to make predictions” (Mohr 
1985, pp. 68-69). The Demiurge does concern himself with our epistemic access to time, as shown at 39b5-c1 and 47a1-
7. However, the term employed to describe our access to number via the observation of the planetary revolutions is 
‘partaking’ (μετάσχοι, 39b6). To partake in something entails that it is not exhausted by our use, as those revolutions are 
already part of what makes the cosmos an adequate image of the chosen model independently of human beings. The 
very idea of making time a particularly excellent clock for our epistemological progress presents the universe as created 
for us, which is clearly non-platonic. As stated in the Laws to reprimand the lazy young man that does not revere the 
gods, “you who have forgotten that nothing is created except to provide the entire universe with a life of bliss. You 
forget that creation is not for your benefit: you exist for the sake of the universe” (903c2-5). We know that Plato was 
familiar with man-made clocks, although only to measure short intervals of time. For instance, Socrates twice refers to 
the use of water-clocks to measure the maximum length of a speech in courts or assemblies in the Theaetetus: 
κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον—καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ (172e1); πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι, 201b2-3. For the ancient use of 
water-clocks in Egyptians and Babylonians to measure hours in the day and the night, and hence as a proper clock, and 
not just as a timer, see Hannah 2009 pp. 98-99. 
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simply the introduction of something better, and that is not enough to claim that time is the cosmic 
clock, any more than another clock. The excellence at being a standard is an insufficient 
explanation of the fact that time, in Plato’s account, is identified with the cosmic clock. This makes 
Mohr’s view at best incomplete, in that it does not adequately explain Plato’s cosmological 
conception. 
Option (b), then, would force Mohr’s interpretation to claim either that there are as many 
times as there are clocks, or to collapse into an Aristotelian position, where the notion of time and 
clock are clearly distinct. The latter option is the one that Mohr seems to end up with. In fact, my 
second objection concerns how Mohr (and Cornford, for that matter) is implicitly introducing an 
Aristotelian reading of Plato’s account of time to accommodate for the problems highlighted above. 
Mohr, in his own words, conceives of time, in Plato’s sense, as a clock. But our familiar notion of 
clock is de facto Aristotelian, as it distinguishes between the clock and time, as the former serve to 
measure the latter (a clock is “an instrument for the measurement of time”).58  
Because he takes Plato’s time to simply refer to a clock, Mohr is forced to introduce a second 
notion of time, to render the notion of clock intelligible. This is most evident when he points out 
that Plato is proposing a technical notion of time as “a clock by which we measure time, where 
'time' here is used in a colloquial sense, as that about motion and rest which is measurable”.59 That 
distinction, however, exactly corresponds to the Aristotelian distinction between the motion that 
measures time and time itself: “time is a measure of motion and of being moved, and it measures 
the motion by determining a motion which will measure the whole motion, as the cubit does the 
length by determining an amount which will measure out the whole”.60  
As we have seen in Section 1.1, Aristotle’s conception of time is a non-cosmological one, 
which means that time is not defined by its relation to cosmic motion. Hence, Aristotle’s 
reconstruction of time-measurement is that, by (1) selecting motion A, e.g. the Sun’s daily 
revolution, which marks out a shorter time than motion B, i.e. the one we intend to measure, and, 
(2) by considering the temporal intervals of equal length motion A marks out, (3) we measure 
motion B. In Mohr’s take, both (1) and (2) are time, i.e. both that which is marked out and that 
which marks out. This, however, is not a plausible interpretation, given that on the one hand, Plato 
never lays out a twofold notion of time, but only the so-called technical notion, while, on the other, 
Aristotle criticises the cosmological conception precisely because it conflates (1) and (2). 
Of course, there are reasons for finding it natural to read Plato’s account with Aristotelian 
spectacles. We are clearly more sympathetic to understanding the planets as a cosmic clock, with 
 
58 OED, s.v. clock. 
59 Mohr 1985, p. 59. 
60 Ph. IV, 220b32-221a4. 
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Mohr and Aristotle, than to accept the cosmological conception proposed by Plato and the related 
puzzling theoretical commitments seen in Section 1.1. What is more, while Aristotle’s account is 
extensive and addresses a number of issues in detail, Plato’s is often elliptical in presenting his 
view, so seeking Aristotle’s help in exegesis is understandable. Nonetheless, we must avoid the 
undesirable move of entrusting Aristotle’s standpoint to be the judge of Plato’s account and 
conception, precisely because we find it much more familiar. In fact, the danger of imposing alien 
positions and issues on the text is very high. Even if there is no ‘innocent’ perspective to start with, 
we should strive as much as possible to understand Plato’s account as a well-integrated part of the 
cosmogony, in the terms presented at the beginning of Timaeus’ speech. That is the goal of the last 
view I consider. 
 
(4) Time as a cosmic phenomenon:  
The last position, first outlined by Remi Brague, is the one I also subscribe to. Brague’s main 
contribution is the thorough critique of the widespread presupposition concerning the role played by 
αἰών and the metaphysical definition in Plato’s account. His critique opens new exegetical 
possibilities for a more adequate reading, in two ways. Firstly, Brague’s critical assessment puts 
forth an understanding of αἰών as a term which is specifically tied to the model qua living being. 
This claim allows Brague to bring together the insights from the previous views, while avoiding 
their shortcomings. In fact, it renders the creation of time intelligible, as it concerns the cosmos and 
its living motion, as recognised by view (2). Secondly, it also captures the fact that time is created 
by setting up the planetary revolutions, as view (3) acknowledges, given that the moving image of 
αἰών is only created in the cosmos once the planets visibly display cosmic living motion, so as to 
make it enumerable. 
Most importantly, however, this reading highlights how the metaphysical definition of time, 
i.e. the moving image of αἰών really is presenting a cosmological conception of time.61 Time is in 
fact conceived as a cosmic phenomenon consisting in the collective motion of the planets and 
characterised by the display of visible patterns (i.e. nights-and-days, months, years etc.), based on 
the circles of the cosmic soul. In Chapter 2, I will discuss Brague’s remarks in detail and highlight 
the disagreements between our readings. Nonetheless, this thesis wouldn’t have been written 
without Brague’s insights to begin with. 
 
61 “Ainsi, nous avons vu que ce sont les astres en leur mouvement régulier qui sont image. Il est d’ailleurs bien plus 
naturel, nous semble-t-il, de nommer image le ciel visible plutôt que le temps, inaccessible aux sens” (Brague 1982, p. 
55). “Car ce à quoi le temps est ici presque identifié n’est pas le ciel, l’ensemble de corps célestes en leur matérialité, ni 
même le mouvement de ces corps, mais bien le ciel dans la mesure où celui-ci est en mouvement, et dans la mesure où 
ce mouvement, à son tour, se règle sur le nombre” (Brague 1982, p. 61). 
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Ch. 2: A re-reading of the definitional section 
 
The criticism of contemporary views on Plato’s account of time proposed in Section 1.2 focuses on 
the common presupposition concerning the meaning of αἰών as ‘eternity’. That presupposition, I 
argued, leads the vast majority of scholars to face exegetical deadlocks in their attempt to bring 
together the metaphysical definition of time (i.e. the moving image of αἰών) and Plato’s 
cosmological conception. In this chapter I offer an interpretation of Plato’s definitional section 
(37d6-e3) that adequately connects Plato’s metaphysical definition and cosmological conception.  
A preliminary discussion of the framework outlined in the beginning of the Timaeus’ 
cosmogony is needed as a basis for my analysis. In fact, the metaphysical imitation of αἰών is best 
understood in light of the overarching metaphysical imitation that defines the cosmogony as a 
whole.62 In this framework, we will also be able to see that in the definitional section the 
metaphysical definition of time is only a provisional definition of the phenomenon ‘time’ that 
focuses on the goal for why time is created. That definition is in fact followed by a cosmological 
definition that completes it, insofar as it additionally illustrates how time is created. In this way, the 
definitional section already hints at the setup of the planetary revolutions described in detail later in 
the account.  
In Section 2.1 I will outline the dualistic framework Plato employs to set up the metaphysical 
imitation and Keyt’s critical remarks on the topic (subsection 2.1.1). Then, I will focus on three sets 
of features (proper, physical and ideal) which are crucial to outline a metaphysical imitation, 
because of their special relevance for the definitional section (sub-section 2.1.2). Moreover, I will 
briefly discuss how the account of time connects with the rest of the cosmogony (Section 2.2). On 
the basis of those general conclusions about the cosmogony and its framework, I move on to 
analyse the definitional section in two steps: firstly, I focus on the introduction of αἰών and its 
relation to the model, needed to explain the purpose for which time is created (Section 2.3) and, 
secondly, I discuss the two definitions of time and the essential relation to the cosmos and the 
planets they delineate (Section 2.4). 
 
 
62 My use of ‘metaphysical’ and ‘ontological’ in the thesis will be as follows. I am not using the two terms as 
synonyms. With ‘ontological’ and ‘fundamental ontology’ I refer to Plato’s distinctions in terms of fundamental kinds, 
as discussed in Section 2.1. These are the intelligible and sensible kind, with the receptacle later included as a third (see 
p. 34). I will also talk about ‘ontological constitution’ or ‘fundamental nature’ of an item to focus on the fundamental 
kind it belongs to, thereby possessing certain defining features associated with it. ‘Metaphysical’ is used in contrast with 
‘physical’. For instance, I contrasts the metaphysical imitation of αἰών with a physical or mundane imitation, such as 
that of a person in a portrait: both the portrait and the person belong to the same fundamental kind, whereas in the first 
case the imitation stands between items of different kinds, αἰών and its image, time. 
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2.1 The metaphysical imitation 
 
Plato’s framework distinguishes two fundamental kinds, which I will refer to as the sensible or 
physical kind and the intelligible or ideal one.63 The framework is outlined in the first section of the 
cosmogony, at 27d5-29b2, as it serves to frame the cosmogony as the establishment of a 
metaphysical imitation. Timaeus introduces the two fundamental kinds (27d5-28a1) as 
contradictory opposites (“that which always is and has no becoming, and that which always 
becomes but never is; τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γιγνόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ 
οὐδέποτε”), and he further characterises them as accessible through two different sorts of cognition 
– on the one hand, intelligence and, on the other, opinion acquired through perception (28a1-4). 
Each following claim articulating the metaphysical imitation relies on the dualistic premise: 
(a) the claim that the cosmos had come to be, which necessarily follows from its physical nature 
(28b1-c2) and (b) since everything that has come to be must have a cause, and the cosmos is 
beautiful, the cause is identified in the divine craftsman (28a4-b1, 28c2-5).64 (c) The choice of the 
model for the cosmogony is between models of the two fundamental kinds – one has come to be, as 
the cosmos, whereas the other is everlasting and always identical with itself (28c5-29b1). Given that 
the Demiurge is always doing the best, the inevitable choice is the latter, thereby establishing a 
metaphysical imitation between the everlasting model and the cosmos. This last step also 
establishes that the cosmos is the image of that model (τὸν κόσμον εἰκόνα τινὸς εἶναι, 29b1-2).65 
A second, more specific enquiry concerning the model of the cosmos is presented at 29e7-
31b3. The first part is concerned with the motivations behind the creation of the cosmos, which is to 
make it as fine as possible and as good as the Demiurge himself (29e7-30a7). This leads to a further 
choice, namely to choose the best ideal model, and the choice falls on the intelligible living being 
(30a7-30c1). Finally, there is a third choice to employ the best among the intelligible living beings 
 
63 The exegetical commitment I am assuming for the reading of Plato’s dualism I propose is not demanding. It requires 
that the two kinds are mutually exclusive, such that for any object or phenomenon, it either belongs to one or the other, 
except for certain the special cases of the soul and the receptacle (see sub-section 2.1.2). The claim is compatible with 
different takes on the details of that metaphysical relation – even with Gail Fine’s ‘reluctant’ reading of separation 
between the two fundamental kinds as independent existence (Fine 2003, pp. 292-295). 
64 Gábor Betegh highlights how the assumption of an intentional and intelligent cause fits with the etiological ‘myths’ 
Timaeus’ speech structurally resembles (see Betegh 2010, pp. 222-224). Moreover, see Thomas Johansen on its 
classification as a craftsman (Johansen 2014, pp. 302-310). The Demiurge is qualified by features pertaining to the 
intelligible kind (e.g. at 37a1-2, τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀρίστη γενομένη τῶν γεννηθέντων) so it 
would seem that it also belongs to that same kind. However, given his distinctive function as a cause, clearly different 
from the two fundamental kinds first introduced, I won’t commit my reading to a particular classification. 
65 In the Sophist, εἰκόνες are presented as the sort of result of image-making (εἰδωλοποιία) that remains faithful to the 
model (235c8-236c8). I will translate εἰκών as ‘image’ and not as ‘likeness’ to adhere to Plato’s characterisation of the 
physical domain in terms of its perceivable – and primarily visible – appearance while retaining the relational nature of 
the Greek term. In fact, in the dualistic framework, whereas the model can belong to either kind, the image will always 
belong to the physical kind. Moreover, I will argue that the visible nature of the εἰκών has a crucial importance in the 
case of the imitation of αἰών, as we will see in Chapter 5. 
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as a model, and that is the complete living being (30c2-31b3).66 If the dualistic framework is the 
ontological groundwork for the cosmogony and the metaphysical imitation it involves, the imitation 
of αἰών should also be understood along the same terms. 
 
2.1.1. Keyt’s challenge to the metaphysical imitation 
 
David Keyt has famously accused Plato’s metaphysical imitation of stretching the model-image 
relation to absurd consequences. Keyt’s general point is that in any attempt at imitation – be it a 
metaphysical one or between physical objects – there is a set of features that are essential to the 
model and should therefore be shared with a faithful image, and others which cannot, or are not 
expected to, be shared. To use Keyt’s own example concerning the mundane imitation of a chariot, 
“the model has some features that a chariot maker will not want to copy and others that he cannot 
copy: its nicks and scratches, for example, and its age. He cannot make a chariot that is as old as his 
model”.67 The pertinent features to be replicated are named proper features (or attributes) by Keyt 
and they are contrasted with non-proper ones. As the metaphysical imitation is the focus of Keyt’s 
discussion, the non-proper features discussed are labelled as ideal features: namely the features that 
distinguish the intelligible from the sensible kind. 
In the Timaeus, we would expect that the imitation focuses on what characterises the form 
chosen for the creation of the cosmos, and, since the form selected is the intelligible living being, it 
has “only one feature that a sane craftsman would copy, having a soul in a body”.68 Yet, Keyt 
argues, Plato describes more than once the Demiurge as attempting to establish imitation between 
the cosmos and ideal features, in a way that makes him look like a mad craftsman. Keyt includes 
αἰών, read as ‘eternity’, among the ideal features that the Demiurge is not supposed to imitate in the 
cosmos.69 
Keyt’s remarks, I would argue, are on point, especially because they are in agreement with the 
general account of imitation presented by Plato in the Cratylus. There Socrates persuades Cratylus 
to accept that an image is not the same as an exact double of the original precisely because it is not 
identical to the original in every respect.70 This suggests that Plato also considered that every 
 
66 In Section 3.1 I will argue against interpreting the intelligible living being as a genus of living beings, suggesting that 
it is rather a paradigmatic representative of a species of living being. At the beginning of Chapter 4 I will discuss what it 
could mean that the model is a living being. 
67 Keyt 1971, p. 232. Note that while in a physical imitation, the model might have non-proper features that are 
accidental (e.g. it might be damaged), in a metaphysical imitation, that is not the case. 
68 Keyt 1971, p. 232. 
69 The cases Keyt considers in arguing for his view are the uniqueness of the model, its ‘eternity’ and the completeness 
which justifies the sphericity of the cosmos (Keyt 1971, pp. 232-34). 
70 432b-c5. 
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imitation necessarily involves non-proper features, not up for imitation. As generic features, then, 
ideal features are natural candidates to be identified as not up for imitation. Attempts to mitigate 
Keyt’s criticism have been proposed with regard to the particular cases discussed by Keyt, although 
no one, as far as I am aware, focuses on his discussion of αἰών. Brad Berman, for instance, argues 
that for Plato, certain ideal features are intrinsically better than the original state of the physical 
world, so much so that it is not unreasonable to instantiate those features, as much as it is possible, 
in the physical world, even though they are non-proper features.71  
That, however, is not the strategy I am pursuing. In Section 3.1 I will criticise Berman’s 
reading, among others, on an exegetical level, arguing that no ideal feature is imitated by the 
cosmos, in the Timaeus, and that uniqueness, together with completeness and all-
comprehensiveness, are proper features of the model. Most importantly, however, my criticism rests 
on conceptual grounds. I take it that Plato would agree with Keyt that ideal features are not to be 
imitated, for any sane craftsman. In fact, if we take the dualistic framework described above 
seriously, ideal features belong to the subset of non-proper features that cannot be imitated in the 
cosmos, even if the Demiurge wanted to. In my reading, then, Plato is well aware of the distinction 
between proper and ideal features as, in a metaphysical imitation, ideal features play the function of 
drawing the difference between the ideal model and the physical image, whereas proper features are 
the ones that can and should be shared between the two. To substantiate my claim, however, I will 
first need to further articulate and expand Keyt’s terminology. 
 
2.1.2. Ideal, physical and proper features 
 
The terminology I am proposing is an elaboration of Keyt’s and focuses on sets of features that 
define the dualistic framework. Proper features, as we established, are those that we would expect 
the Demiurge to bring about in the creation of an image, as they define the specificity of the model. 
Opposed to proper features we have a broad category of non-proper ones, which includes those that 
are not relevant to the imitation and those that cannot possibly be imitated: in Keyt’s example of a 
mundane imitation, we cannot possibly make the copy of a painting being as old as the painting 
itself. My taxonomy of non-proper features is not intended as exhaustive, as the focus will be on 
two sets of non-proper features that play the distinctive function of ontological difference-markers 
in Plato’s dualistic framework. These are ideal and physical features.  
 
71 “Provided that, for Plato, being is better than the alternative ontological standings, the demiurge makes his creation 
better in making it changeless in this way, just as he makes it better in making it as unified and as unique as possible 
[…]. The demiurge, then, in making the world as unified, unique, and changeless as is possible for it, is not acting 
merely on the grounds that his model possesses those features” (Berman 2016, pp. 189-190). 
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As mentioned above, Plato’s ontological dualism, as it is set up at the beginning of the 
Timaeus, admits of two fundamentally different kinds that are at first introduced as contradictory 
opposites, i.e. the two kinds are exhaustive of what there is, and they are exclusive, so that any item 
belongs to either one or the other. The opposition is set up by means of ideal and physical features, 
as the two kinds are consistently presented via one or more features of one set while contrasted with 
one of the other set, establishing fixed pairs of opposite features.  
Here are the pairs of contradictory features in the order they first appear in the cosmogony, up 
to Plato’s account of time: cognition via intelligence coupled with argument, as opposed to via 
opinion coupled with unreasoned perception (28a1-2, 29b5-c3, 37b1-c7,τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ 
λόγου περι ληπτόν, τὸ δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν), ‘always being identical to itself’ is 
opposed to ‘coming into being’ and ‘being destroyed’ (28a2-3, 28a6-b2, 29a1-2, 29a6-b1, 37b1-c7, 
38a3-5, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὄν, γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον), ‘always being’, and also ‘everlasting’ are 
opposed to ‘come to be’ and ‘begotten’ (29a3-6, 36e5-37a2, 37c6-7, 37e5-38a6, ἀίδιον, γεγονός and 
γεννητός), ‘intelligible’ is opposed to ‘visible’, ‘tangible’, ‘perceivable’ and ‘corporeal’ (28b7, c1, 
30c7-31a1, 31b4-6, νοητόν, ὁρατόν, ἁπτὸν, αἰσθητόν, σῶμα ἔχων), motionlessness is opposed to 
having motion (38a2-6, ἀκινήτως, φερόμενον, κίνησις).72 With more than one pair, the 
nominalisation is an explicit reference to the fundamental kind they describe (e.g. τὸ ἀίδιον). 
However, even as simple adjectives attached to particular items (e.g. νοητῷ ζῴῳ, 39e1), physical 
and ideal features characterise them in terms of their ontological constitution, usually to draw a 
contrast with an item of the opposite fundamental kind. 
Either the set of physical features or the set of ideal ones listed above defines the ontological 
constitution of each item in Plato’s ontology presented up to that point in the dialogue, so that for 
any predicated feature of the set, the other features would normally also apply. An example of a 
similar entailment is given when Timaeus asks whether the cosmos had an origin or always existed. 
His conclusion is that it had an origin, thereby being begotten, in virtue of its visible and corporeal 
nature. In fact, he argues, everything of that sort is an object of opinion and perception and, thus, 
one that becomes and is subject to generation (γιγνόμενα καὶ γεννητὰ, 29b7-c2). All the physical 
features listed above, I would argue, are predicated of the cosmos, as those are also defining its 
constitution as a physical object. As we will see in Section 2.3 and 2.4, this is evident in the 
definitional section, where coming into being and motion belong together with the cosmos, just as 
everlastingness and the absence of motion with its model. 
 
72 Later restatements of this ontological opposition by means of ideal and physical features can be found, for example, 
at 48e6-49a2, 50c5-d and finally at 92c7. Examples of the ontological dualism appear throughout the Corpus 
Platonicum and I will limit my list to a few examples: Phd. 75d, 78b-79e, 106d-107a; R. 484b4, 485b2, 500c2-3, 527b5, 
7, 585c1-2, 611e3; Phlb. 59a7. As for my translation of ἀίδιος as ‘everlasting’, see fn. 34. 
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Admittedly, Plato’s fundamental ontology is eventually more complex than the dualistic 
framework presented above. At 48e2-49a6 and later at 52d2-4, Plato does include a third 
fundamental kind, the receptacle, for the purpose of grounding the sensible kind. Its ontological 
constitution is defined by a set of features which groups together some ideal and physical features, 
i.e. it is not generated, but it is in motion (52d4-53a3). However, this additional kind does not 
endangers the exclusive and exhaustive nature of each pair of ideal and physical features, for two 
reasons: (1) the ontological constitution of the receptacle is characterised by either one or the other 
feature in the pair of opposites (e.g. it is always in existence, thereby not subject to generation nor 
destruction, τρίτον δὲ αὖ γένος ὂν τὸ τῆς χώρας ἀεί, φθορὰν οὐ προσδεχόμενον, 52a8-b1). So, 
although, unlike for the other two kinds, the receptacle is not defined by either sets of features as a 
whole, it still holds true that each pair is exhaustive and any item is qualified by either one or the 
other.  
Moreover, (2) the status of the receptacle is significantly different from the sensible and the 
intelligible kind, insofar as, beyond its ontological constitution, it is rather defined by 
featurelessness (50a4-51b5): we could describe the specificity of the receptacle as that of having no 
proper features but only physical and ideal ones. The featurelessness of the receptacle is in fact 
what warrants its function in grounding the sensible kind as that in which it is instantiated. It is not 
surprising, then, that the receptacle cannot bear any metaphysical imitation with the other two 
kinds, as it rather enables the imitative relation between the other two. As such, the receptacle has 
no bearing in Keyt’s discussion of the metaphysical imitation and its relevant features, since, by its 
very nature and function, it cannot take part in it.73 
 
2.2. The place of the creation of time within the cosmogony 
 
Before setting out to examine the definitional section in light of my classification of features, the 
relation between the account of time and Timaeus’ speech as a whole should be addressed in one 
more respect, namely the significant position of the creation of time in the cosmogony, and how it 
ties in with what precedes and follows. The question hasn’t received much attention in the 
 
73 A further question is how the immortal part of the soul should be classified in this framework. Gábor Betegh 
convincingly argues against the claim that the soul ultimately belongs to the physical domain, being a special kind of 
body (Carone 2005) and against interpreting it as a third fundamental kind (Fronterotta 2007). Betegh argues that the 
account of the soul in the Timaeus builds on the previous enquiry in the Phaedo, and that, among other things, we get a 
final verdict on the affinity argument (78b-79e), inasmuch as the original mixture described at 35a1-b3 is a composite 
of the sensible and intelligible kind, thereby being intermediate between the two (τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ 
ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὖ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς; Betegh 2018 pp. 125-128). If so, souls are a unique 
case of a metaphysical composite, as contrasted to composites of things belonging to the same fundamental kind. Such a 
mixture would then reasonably share in many features of physical objects (e.g. it is generated and possibly destroyed, in 
motion, shaped in a circle), while also lacking others, such as visibility and, possibly, tangibility. 
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literature.74 However, I would argue that addressing the point is important because, just as with the 
dualistic framework, the account of time builds on the progress made in previous stages of the 
cosmogony. In particular, at the beginning and the end of the account there is a special emphasis on 
clarifying the stage of the cosmogony Timaeus is moving to and from, suggesting that the position 
in the narrative provides important preliminary insight into how Plato conceives of time. I will 
show that Plato highlights the continuity between the creation of time and the creation of the cosmic 
living being, providing prima facie reason to take time as the imitation of a proper feature. 
The account of time seemingly comes after the conclusion of the first stage in the cosmogony. 
By the beginning of the account, despite not yet having any living being within itself, the cosmos is 
already the sort of living being that can comprehend all the physical, visible living beings, in virtue 
of the completeness it shares with the model (see Section 3.1). It is self-sustaining and sempiternal: 
as seen in Chapter 1, it starts a divine life by unceasingly revolving in accordance with the circles of 
the cosmic soul (36c4-37a2).75 The circular living motion of the cosmic soul is moreover presented 
as a systematically exerted cognitive activity towards everything within the cosmos and ‘outside’, 
i.e. the ideal kind (37a2-c5).76 I will refer to the goal of bringing to completion the cosmic living 
being per se as stage 1 in the cosmogony, as opposed to stage 2, i.e. the creation of the four species 
of living beings within the cosmos that are also prescribed by the model. The account of time sits 
between stage 1 and 2, leaving ambiguous something significant, namely whether time is part of the 
creation of the living being constituting the whole, of the living beings that are parts, or something 
entirely different, as the imitation of ‘eternity’. 
The account of time opens with the description of the Demiurge contemplating the cosmic 
living being. The cosmos is already “alive and set in motion” (κινηθὲν καὶ ζῶν, 37c6) when the 
Demiurge decides to make it even more like its model, and thereby creates time. It is plausible that 
the initial emphasis on the stage of completion of the cosmos aims to show that time could not have 
been brought about without a living cosmos in circular motion, thus presenting stage 1 of the 
cosmogony as a precondition for the creation of time. This implication is reasonably connected with 
what is captured in the ἅμα relation touched upon in Section 1.1: there could be no time without a 
cosmos, as they necessarily coexist from their generation to their counterfactual destruction.  
 
74 The only author touching on the subject matter is, as far as I am aware, Karel Thein. His claim is that the planets, as 
instruments of time, are the living beings that connect cosmic and human nature, and this has a bearing in the fact that 
the creation of time is introduced after the cosmic living being is completed, and yet before the mortal species of living 
beings become the subject matter, as planets have an intermediate function in relation to both (Thein 2015, p. 10-14). 
75 The cosmos does not need any of the living beings within it as organs for its own preservation. See Section 3.1. 
76 As pointed out by Thomas Johansen, in the Timaeus a literal identity is postulated between the regular rotations of the 
cosmic soul and its thinking activity, as the outward and inward manifestations of the same activity (Johansen 2004, p. 
139). This will be important in the continuation of the chapter, because the circular motion of the cosmos, crucially 
involved in the creation of time, just is the unfolding of cosmic life, as consisting in a purely intellectual activity. 
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However, if the order of succession between the accounts is meant to present the cosmos as a 
precondition for time, the ἅμα relation is not symmetrical as we would expect: the cosmos, as a 
living being, does not require time in order to be brought about, since the decision to create time 
follows stage 1. Based on the narrative order alone, we could imagine a flawed Demiurge 
withdrawing before the creation of time, and still leaving behind a single, self-sustaining, cosmic 
living being. In addition, the identity claim presented at 39d1 between time and the planetary 
revolutions – discussed in Section 1.1 – rather suggests that Plato’s account of time belongs to stage 
2 of the cosmogony.  
In order to reconcile the ἅμα relation with time belonging to stage 2, Brague hypothesises that 
the cosmos under discussion in the account of time is no longer the empty cosmic living being 
described up to that point, but the οὐρανός filled with the heavenly species of gods, so that such a 
cosmos would necessarily coexist with time, as time is identified with the planetary revolutions.77 
Nonetheless, I would argue that there is significant evidence against Brague’s solution, given how 
time is incorporated in the cosmogony, and that a different solution is available.  
The cosmos, in the account of time, pace Brague, clearly is not yet the one filled with 
heavenly gods. In fact, if it were as Brague hypothesises, the term ‘cosmos’ would already include 
the planets and their revolutions, which are identified with time, so the ἅμα relation between the 
cosmos and time would be too weak. Instead, the ἅμα relation is presenting two distinct, although 
not independent, terms, which in principle might not coexist: the cosmic living being and time, 
identified with the planetary revolutions. That same distinction is presented in the concluding 
summary at 39d8, where the planets are described as traversing the heaven (δι’ οὐρανοῦ 
πορευόμενα), which therefore means ‘the cosmic living being within which they move’.  
Additionally, there is textual evidence suggesting that the creation of time rather belongs in 
stage 1, as part of the creation of the cosmic living being. In fact, at the beginning of the definitional 
section, Timaeus claims that the creation of time stems from the Demiurge’s judgement in 
contemplating the cosmic living being, thinking it could be even more like the model (ἔτι δὴ μᾶλλον 
ὅμοιον πρὸς τὸ παράδειγμα ἐπενόησεν ἀπεργάσασθαι, 37c8-d1) and in the following sentence the 
creation of time is presented as completing the creation of the universe (τὸ πᾶν…ἀποτελεῖν, 37d2). 
The entire passage, then, seems to highlight a continuity with stage 1 rather than a departure from it.  
Certainly, stage 2 of the cosmogony is also a stage whose goal is to make the cosmos ‘even 
more like its model’. Importantly, however, the goal of creating the four species of living beings 
within the cosmos is not introduced until after the conclusion of the account of time, despite the fact 
 
77 Brague 1982, p. 52. Πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν, 40c2-3. Brague, together with 
most interpreters, holds that all the heavenly gods are equally involved in the creation of time. I will argue in Section 
5.1 that the planets (and the Earth) have a distinctive function as instruments of time. 
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that the planets belong to the heavenly kind: “now the other respects already, as far as the 
generation of time (Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἤδη μέχρι χρόνου γενέσεως), had been made in a resemblance 
that conformed to the model; but it was still unlike the model in that it did not yet comprehend all 
living beings generated within it (τὸ δὲ μήπω τὰ πάντα ζῷα ἐντὸς αὑτοῦ γεγενημένα περιειληφέναι). 
This remaining task he went on to perform, casting the cosmos into the nature of its model”.78 The 
goal of the creation of the planets, then, should be kept distinct from the one of filling the cosmos 
with the four species of living beings. 
It seems plausible to assume, then, that, before the creation of time, the cosmos as a living 
being still falls short of the model, as, despite being self-sustaining, it is not yet the living being it 
should be. In fact, unlike the model, the cosmos is not yet αἰών-ly. Only at this point the planets are 
introduced, as instruments to accomplish that goal, but this is compatible with the claim that they 
are still needed to complete stage 1 of the cosmogony. Their creation, in fact, is entirely contingent 
on the contrivance of the Demiurge to create an αἰών-ly image, and does not correspond to a 
prescription from the model, whose αἰών-ly feature is predicated of the whole, not the parts. In this 
sense, then, albeit not terminologically correct, Brague’s observation correctly assesses the planets’ 
role in completing the cosmic living being, via the creation of time.79 Time is in fact an essential 
feature of that living being, hence explaining the ἅμα relation, as we will see in sub-section 4.2.2. 
The above reading is supported by two further pieces of evidence. Firstly, the description of 
the beginning of cosmic circular living motion, which marks out the completion of stage 1 of the 
cosmogony, already includes a reference to time: “And, rotating within itself, it initiated a divine 
beginning of unceasing, intelligent life for all time (πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον)”.80 As pointed out 
in Section 1.2, the expression resembles the later one at 38c2, where it is compared with ‘for all 
αἰών’. Then, Timaeus gives the reader an anticipation of what comes next, to highlight that to live 
‘for all time’ is thought of as an essential feature of the cosmic living being: a cosmos whose life is 
not qualified as ‘for all time’ would be a deficient cosmos.81 
Secondly, in the concluding recapitulation (39d7-e2), the planets are presented as moving 
along their circular trajectories so that this (ἵνα τόδε, 39d8) – where ‘this’ is, although not explicitly, 
 
78 39e3-40a2. Zeyl’s translation phrases the passage as if time already were part of stage 2, thus translating “prior to the 
coming to be of time” (Zeyl 2000, p. 26). The contrast between the two passages above, however, seems to speak 
against his reading. 
79 It is true that the fixed stars’ function is also for the sake of the whole, insofar as they decorate the cosmos 
(νείμας περὶ πάντα κύκλῳ τὸν οὐρανόν, κόσμον ἀληθινὸν αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθ’ ὅλον, 40a5-7). I would argue, 
however, that the planets play a distinct function in relation to the cosmos, namely they are cooperating in the creation 
of time, whereas the fixed stars contribute to the completion of the cosmos by simply filling it as required parts. 
80 36e4-5.  
81 Thein takes this mention of time to mean ‘time as flow’, as opposed to the measurable time that is created afterwards 
(Thein 2015, p. 9). It doesn’t seem a viable interpretation to admit a twofold notion of time for the same reason we 
would reject Proclus’ twofold time interpretation (see Section 1.1), namely that Plato never even suggest a polysemic 
use of χρόνος, nor any of the early sources reads it that way. 
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the universe, just as at 39e9 – becomes most like (ὁμοιότατον) the intelligible and complete living 
being chosen as a model, by way of imitating its διαιώνια nature. The planets are here presented 
implicitly (and explicitly at 41e5 and 42d5), as instruments deployed towards a goal, the creation of 
time, which ultimately concerns the cosmic living being they are in. Correspondingly, the διαιώνια 
nature, is not predicated of anything in the model, but of the model as a whole. 
If my reading is correct, then the intermediate position in the cosmogony is expressive of the 
uniqueness of time, which does not fully fit with either stage. It does not belong to stage 1 insofar as 
it already involves the creation of other living beings within the cosmos. However, those living 
beings are instrumental to the creation of time, a feature needed to complete the cosmic living being 
per se, hence not fitting with stage 2 either. As such, the creation of time would seem to be an 
intermediate, third stage of cosmogony, sharing some features with both stages.  
For the remainder of the analysis, however, it is of special importance that time is seemingly 
introduced, in continuity with stage 1, as an essential feature of the cosmic living being per se. In 
fact, this shows that we should expect time and αἰών to be accounted for in the definitional section 
as proper features of the cosmic living being and its model respectively. Yet, the reading of αἰών as 
‘eternity’ is still on the table, contending that while time is essential to the cosmos, it is not qua 
living being, but rather qua imitation of an ideal feature, as it makes the cosmos form-like. This 
latter reading is addressed in the next section. 
 
2.3. Introducing αἰών (37c6-d4) 
 
Now when the father who had begotten observed it [i.e. the cosmos] set in motion and alive, a 
thing that had come to be as an idol of the everlasting gods (τῶν ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα), 
he was well pleased, and in his delight he thought of making it more like its model still. So, as 
the model was itself an everlasting living being (ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν), he sought to bring the universe 
to completion in such a way that it also was like that (τοιοῦτον ἀποτελεῖν), so far as it might be. 
Now it was the living being’s nature to be αἰών-ly (ἡ τοῦ ζῴου φύσις οὖσα αἰώνιος), but it is not 
possible to bestow it completely upon anything that is begotten (τῷ γεννητῷ παντελῶς 
προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν). 
 
The first half of the definitional section introduces the αἰών-ly nature of the model as that which is 
to be imitated next in the cosmos. In so doing, the section aims to introduce the cause characterising 
the works of intelligence, namely the purpose for which time is created by the Demiurge.82 That this 
is the approach chosen by Plato is shown by how the metaphysical definition of time, to be 
discussed in the next section, focuses exactly on the purpose of the creation of time, namely to 
 
82 For an extensive analysis of the role of causes and auxiliary causes in the works of intelligence, with a particular 
focus on the gift of sight by the lesser gods, see Johansen 2004, pp. 106-116. 
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imitate αἰών. As the first step towards that definition of time, the overarching metaphysical 
imitation that defines the cosmogony is brought once more to the foreground, via the ἄγαλμα 
metaphor. In particular, the recapitulation focuses on a specific pair of physical and ideal features: 
‘begotten’ and ‘come to be’ on the physical side, contrasted with ‘everlasting’ on the ideal side.83 
 The opposition of those features is presented twice. It first occurs as part of the ἄγαλμα 
metaphor. The ἄγαλμα is the cosmos and it had come to be as an idol of the everlasting gods (τῶν 
ἀιδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα).84 Moreover, it was begotten by the Demiurge, as its father (ὁ 
γεννήσας πατήρ). I won’t address the longstanding debate concerning the meaning of ἄγαλμα and 
the connected problem of identifying the gods in detail. For the purpose of my reading, it is 
sufficient to point out that, when taking the context and previous theoretical commitments into 
account, the interpretation that takes the ‘everlasting gods’ to refer to the heavenly gods is 
implausible.85 
 Two objections can be moved to that interpretation. Firstly, the recapitulation aims to describe 
the result of the cosmogony up to that point, but the heavenly bodies have not been mentioned 
before. Secondly, the passage contrasts the ἄγαλμα and the gods by opposing their respective 
physical and ideal features, whereas the ontological constitution of the cosmos and the heavenly 
gods is the same – both are physical gods. On that basis alone, we should rather expect the gods to 
be identified, in a metaphorical sense, with ideal objects (ἀίδιος is used in that sense both at 29a5 
and 37d1). 
 The precise identity of the gods, however, can only be reconstructed tentatively. It should be 
noted that ἄγαλμα is used elsewhere in Plato’s work in a metaphorical sense derived from its 
traditional function as an idol. For instance, in Laws, Book XI, dishonouring parents is compared to 
dishonouring the gods, presenting parents as the most important ἀγάλματα of the gods. The function 
of an ἄγαλμα, then, is that of a stand-in for the gods, as an indirect visible manifestation.86 If so, a 
metaphor involving ἄγαλμα and gods would fittingly represent the cosmos’ metaphysical imitation 
 
83 See fn. 34 for my translation of ἀίδιος as ‘everlasting’. 
84 ‘Idol’ captures the imitative as well as votive aspect of ἄγαλμα: “an image or similitude of a deity or divinity, used as 
an object of worship” (OED s.v. ‘idol’). 
85 Most of the scholars, from Cornford onwards (Cornford 1937 pp. 99-102; Brague 1982, pp. 50-51; Broadie 2012, fn. 
pp. 73-74), seem to agree that the everlasting gods are the heavenly gods, hence understanding ἄγαλμα as a ‘shrine’ for 
them. The main textual support given to the reading is at 40b5, where the heavenly gods are effectively described as 
‘everlasting’ (ζῷα θεῖα ὄντα καὶ ἀίδια). However, as seen in my discussion in Section 2.1.2, that is the only instance of 
‘everlasting’ that does not employ ἀίδιος as an ideal feature synonym of ‘always being’ and hence opposed to 
‘begotten’ and ‘come to be’ (see sub-section 2.1.2). For a more comprehensive criticism of the ‘heavenly bodies’ 
reading, see Karfik 2004, pp. 123-126. Moreover, see Joachim Kraaij’s recent proposal to revise the Greek text of the 
passage, providing contextual arguments for why the generally accepted version might be corrupted (Kraaij 2016). 
86 Tοὺς μὲν γὰρ τῶν θεῶν ὁρῶντες σαφῶς τιμῶμεν, τῶν δ’ εἰκόνας ἀγάλματα ἱδρυσάμενοι Lg. XI, 930e3-931e6. 
Moreover, ἄγαλμα also appears in the same metaphorical sense in the Epinomis, at 984a2, to present the relation 
between the heavenly bodies and the divine souls moving them; in the Symposium, at 222a4, to present instances of 
virtue as ἀγάλματα of virtue; and in the Phaedrus, at 252d7, where a man is made an ἄγαλμα of his proper god. 
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of the model, since an everlasting living being, as the model is, would rightly be manifested as a 
metaphorical god by the cosmic ἄγαλμα. 
 However, the cosmos is an idol of the gods, plural. As far as I can see, there are two options 
to account for this plurality. Either (1) ‘gods’ refers to the model, which has a plurality of 
intelligible living beings within it (mentioned at 30c2-31a5), or (2) it refers to both the model and 
the Demiurge – here referred to as a father (37c7) and earlier as a god.87 As far as I am aware, this 
second hypothesis has not been considered in the debate.88 However, the Demiurge is often 
presented as ‘always existing’: for instance, at 37a1-2, as the best of the intelligible and always 
existing things (τῶν νοητῶν ἀεί τε ὄντων ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀρίστου), or earlier, at 34a8, as the god that 
always exists (ὄντος ἀεὶ λογισμὸς θεοῦ). The ideal feature ‘always existing’, as we have seen in 
sub-section 2.1.2, is presumably synonymous with everlasting, as both are contrasted with the same 
physical feature, i.e. having come to be. Presenting the Demiurge as an everlasting god would also 
be warranted, then, when we consider the cosmos as a manifestation of the Demiurge’s craft that 
bears resemblance to him, being a physical god.89 
 My reading of the ἄγαλμα metaphor also matches the second and most important contrast 
between ‘everlasting’ and ‘begotten’, at 37d1-4. As seen in sub-section 1.2.1, the reference to the 
model as a living being that exists everlastingly (ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν) is an important intermediate step 
to present that same model as αἰών-ly. Moreover, in the final sentence of this sub-section, the 
universe cannot be completely αἰών-ly because it is begotten (τῷ γεννητῷ), i.e. not everlasting. The 
emphasis on the pair of features underscores, once more, the ontological opposition between the 
model and the image introduced at the beginning of the cosmogony, even though their connection 
with the αἰών-ly nature remains to be determined. 
 As we have seen in sub-section 1.2.1, contemporary scholars take αἰών-ly, interpreted as 
‘eternal’, to be an ideal feature. It is then either a synonym for or a feature entailed by ἀίδιος, 
everlasting. Their reading is accompanied by the translation of τοιοῦτον in 37d2 as ‘in that respect’ 
or ‘that character’, so that the object of imitation chosen for the cosmos is the everlastingness of the 
model per se.90 However, this needn’t be the case. The pronoun τοιοῦτον can in principle be 
 
87 The first option is defended by Karfik (Karfik 2004, p. 123). However, a similar worry to the one concerning the 
heavenly gods could be raised, insofar as the other intelligible living beings haven’t been a direct object of imitation in 
the cosmos yet. 
88 This option has been suggested to me by Thomas Johansen in conversation. 
89 Plutarch also recognises the importance of describing the Demiurge not just as a maker, but as a father, given that the 
resulting cosmos is alive and divine, just as the Demiurge is (Plu. Plat. Quaes. II, 1001B1-7). As Broadie points out, the 
question of whether the Demiurge and the intelligible living being are intended to be the same entity is a separate 
question, as in the Timaeus the two are consistently presented as if they were distinct entities, fulfilling two different 
functions (Broadie 2012, p. 27). 
90 Cornford, for example, translates “so as that pattern is the living being that is for ever existent, he sought to make this 
universe also like it, so far as might be, in that respect” (Cornford 1937, p. 97), and Zeyl “so, as the model was itself an 
 
 
40 
 
referring to either (a) ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν or (b) ἀίδιον, and the choice does not hinge on the syntax 
alone. While option (b) would suggest reading αἰών-ly as an ideal feature, option (a) would suggest 
reading αἰών-ly as a proper feature. Let us examine the plausibility of each option in turn. 
 If τοιοῦτον refers to the ἀίδιον character, the object of imitation would already be narrowed 
down. The following sentence, introducing the αἰών-ly nature of the model, would then be either 
redundant or puzzling. It would be redundant if αἰών-ly and everlasting were synonyms, as no 
information would be added in the second sentence. It would be puzzling if ‘everlasting’ entails 
αἰών-ly as distinct ideal feature. If the Demiurge finds its object of imitation in an ideal feature, 
such as ‘everlasting’, the αἰών-ly nature derived from it would also be an ideal feature. From what 
we established in sub-section 2.1.2, it is reasonable to assume that all ideal features go together in 
defining the ontological constitution of ideal objects, so it is not clear what the introduction of the 
αἰών-ly feature as an object of imitation via the imitation of the everlastingness of the model would 
add. 
 Moreover, in the definitional section, the model is explicitly presented as relating to the 
intelligible and everlasting living being employed throughout stage 1 of the cosmogony (ζῷον, 
37d1; τοῦ ζῴου, d3). The same emphasis is present in the final recapitulation of the account of time 
(τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ, 39d10-e1). However, if αἰών-ly were an ideal feature following from 
‘everlastingness’, the emphasis on it being part of a living being’s nature would be unnecessary, and 
we would rather expect a generic reference to the everlasting model, as in 29a5 (τὸ ἀίδιον). In fact, 
having an ideal feature as an object of imitation while stressing that the model is a living being 
strikes me as odd (see Section 2.2). 
In addition to these contextual objections, the main criticism I have against reading αἰών-ly as 
an ideal feature is connected with my reconstruction of Plato’s dualistic framework in Section 2.1. 
My objection runs like Keyt’s criticism. What τοιοῦτον refers to as an object of imitation cannot be 
the ἀίδιον character of the model. In fact, in Plato’s dualistic framework, having a share in an ideal 
feature for a physical object like the cosmos is impossible, as the cosmos’ ontological constitution 
is defined by the set of physical features, even the Demiurge is powerless, in that respect. As seen 
above, ‘everlasting’ is paired with its physical opposites ‘come to be’ and ‘begotten’. The latter two 
are the one predicated of the cosmos – even in this very passage. If my reconstruction is correct, 
there is no intermediate state between ‘begotten’ and ‘everlasting’ since they are contradictory 
pairs. So, if the αἰών-ly nature were synonymous with or followed from the everlastingness of the 
 
everlasting Living Thing, he set himself to bringing this universe to completion in such a way that it, too, would have 
that character to the extent that was possible” (Zeyl 2000, p. 24). Cornford and Zeyl’s translations both strongly suggest 
that the intention of the Demiurge is to make the universe resemble the everlasting living being as being everlasting, but 
this is in no way implied in the Greek text. 
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model, i.e. if it were an ideal feature, the physical, and hence begotten cosmos could not possibly 
become αἰών-ly.91 
Instead, if we read τοιοῦτον as referring to ζῷον ἀίδιον ὄν, where ‘everlasting’ and ‘living 
being’ are equally necessary conditions for the model to have an αἰών-ly nature, αἰώνιος, unlike 
ἀίδιον, would be a feature specific to the everlasting living being chosen as a model, i.e. a proper 
feature. In this reading, moreover, Timaeus would appropriately use ‘everlasting’ and ‘begotten’ to 
underscore once more the ontological opposition between the model and the cosmos, while 
maintaining that it is possible for the cosmos to become αἰών-ly, albeit not completely (τῷ γεννητῷ 
παντελῶς προσάπτειν οὐκ ἦν δυνατόν, 37d4).92 
 Note that my reading acknowledges the importance of the everlasting-begotten opposition for 
the introduction of αἰών. Having an αἰών-ly nature or being completely αἰών-ly is only possible for 
an everlasting living being. The ontological constitution, therefore, does get in the way of a flawless 
imitation in the begotten cosmos. As we will see in the next section, a contrivance of the Demiurge 
works around the ontological constraints inherent to the cosmos, so that similarity with the model is 
retained.93 The need to shift the focus back to the metaphysical imitation, then, arises from the 
peculiarity of αἰών, that is a proper feature of the model while also being grounded in its ontological 
constitution. The connection αἰών bears with everlastingness, life and completeness will be 
accounted for in full in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. For the time being, although its meaning remains 
indeterminate, αἰών-ly is presented in the definitional section as a proper feature of the model, and, 
because of that, the Demiurge proceeds to craft a cosmic image – although not without difficulty. 
  
 
91 As seen in sub-section 1.2.2, Patterson agrees that the ontological constitution is fixed. However, he still claims that 
αἰών, as ‘eternity’, is imitated via sempiternity, i.e. the endlessly ongoing persistence of the cosmos. Sempiternity, he 
argues, is the physical version of αἰών. In my reading, however, the sempiternity of the cosmos cannot be the 
ontologically intermediate state between αἰών itself and no imitation. Even if αἰών-ly was synonymous with 
‘everlasting’, to be everlasting, in Plato’s understanding, is to be entirely free of generation or destruction, which is a 
condition that cannot be attained nor approximated by anything physical, precisely because of its physicality. As the 
Demiurge points out at 41a7-b7, the ontological constitution of the physical gods remains the same as that of any 
physical item, as what makes them quasi-indissoluble and quasi-immortal is the external good will of the Demiurge, not 
the bonds they are constituted by. Their intrinsic nature cannot be altered, as they belong to the physical kind. 
92 I will further address the claim that αἰών-ly is a specific feature of the model in Section 3.1, and there I will argue 
that, in addition to being everlasting and a living being, the model is also characterised by its completeness 
(κατὰ πάντα τελέῳ, 30d2; τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ, 31b1). This is significant because the adverb qualifying the αἰών-ly nature 
of the model, that cannot be achieved in the cosmos, is παντελῶς. 
93 The special emphasis on the artificiality of time, as an image of αἰών, when compared with the natural αἰών-ly 
condition of the model is also evident in the use of the verbs presenting the creation of time in the definitional section: 
διακοσμῶν (37d5), ἐπενόει…ποιῆσαι (37d5), ποιεῖ (37d6), συνισταμένῳ (37e2) and μηχανᾶται (37e3), which is later 
employed to describe the arrangement of the planetary revolutions (μεμηχάνηνται, 47a6). 
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2.4 Time as a cosmic phenomenon (37d5-e3) 
 
And so he began to think of making a moving image of αἰών (εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος): and, in 
the very act of ordering, he made the heaven an αἰών-ly image, proceeding according to 
number, of αἰών, abiding in unity (καὶ διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ 
κατ᾽ ἀριθμ-ὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα). This, of course, is what we now call ‘time’. For before 
the heaven came to be, there were no days or nights, nor months or years. But now, together 
with framing the heaven, he devised their generation (ἅμα ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν 
αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται). 
 
In the second half of the definitional section the focus shifts again from the model to the image, i.e. 
the cosmos, or heaven. In fact, once the αἰών-ly nature of the model is established as the object of 
imitation, the Demiurge plans to make a moving image of αἰών, which I labelled ‘metaphysical 
definition of time’. As mentioned earlier, however, there are two versions of the definition of time, 
the second being the cosmological one (37d5-7). In this section I will argue that the two are not 
only compatible, but the latter is just a complete version of the former. In fact, Plato introduces 
them one after the other to highlight two concurring aspects of the overall explanation of time and 
its creation.  
On the one hand, as seen in Section 2.3, the metaphysical definition focuses on the purpose 
that time fulfils (i.e. to imitate αἰών in a different medium), that for the works of intelligence is also 
the most crucial explanation. On the other hand, the metaphysical definition is not complete, in 
itself, as it does not address how the moving image of αἰών is made. The cosmological definition, 
instead, retains the information provided in the first definition while also making explicit, in a 
comparison with αἰών, the sort of arrangement of the cosmos time consists in, thus focusing on the 
auxiliary causes the Demiurge deploys to obtain such a result. This latter aspect is only hinted at in 
the definitional section, but it is covered extensively in the later account of the creation of the 
planets and their revolutions, as we will see below.94 
 Before we discuss the details of this sub-section, however, let us look at the first sentence, 
which, as noted by Brague, presents a puzzle. Brague argues that the image (εἰκὼ τινα αἰῶνος, 
37d5; αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, d7) Timaeus refers to must be the cosmos, as, after all, the cosmos has been 
described as an image throughout the cosmogony. Hence, the alleged metaphysical definition of 
time would not be a definition of time at all, but rather a description of the newly acquired imitative 
relation of the cosmos. In Brague’s reading, time, understood as an intelligible and invisible aspect, 
 
94 Thee order of exposition of definitional section of the account of time can be fruitfully compared with the account of 
sight, where first we have an elaborate explanation of the auxiliary causes by means of which sight takes place (i.e. 
how) and then we learn the intended purpose of sight (i.e. why), that is the good for which it is made (see Johansen 
2004, pp. 106-110). However, in the case of time, unlike in the case of sight, the auxiliary causes of time, i.e. the 
planets, are also directed by the intelligence of the heavenly bodies, as we will see in Section 5.3. 
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is rather manifested through, and not identified with, the moving image of αἰών which the cosmos 
becomes.95 
 However, if we look beyond the definitional section, there is strong evidence that time itself is 
described as that which imitates αἰών in the cosmos (χρόνου αἰῶνα μιμουμένου, 38a7). Moreover, 
time later explicitly qualifies the existence of the cosmos, in the same way as αἰών qualifies that of 
the model (πάντα αἰῶνά […] τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, 38c1-2). Hence, I won’t follow Brague’s reading 
in this respect, but understand the imitative relation as it has been traditionally understood: as a 
relation between time and αἰών on the one hand, and the cosmos and the model on the other, so that 
the image of αἰών would be time, just as the cosmos is the image of the model.  
 However, Brague’s rightly highlights the fact that the two imitations cannot be conceived as 
separate ones, as one entails the other. In fact, as I argued in Section 2.3, the αἰών-ly nature is 
introduced as a proper feature of the model to be imitated in the cosmos. Given the transition from 
the imitation of the αἰών-ly nature to the imitation of αἰών, we can hypothesise that the two 
ultimately mean the same. A definition of αἰών is given at 37d6, as ‘remaining in unity’ (μένοντος 
αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ), and, if my reading is correct, ‘remaining in unity’ applies to the model, via the 
adjective αἰών-ly. Then, the relation between the model and αἰών is one between an object and its 
proper feature, and we should expect the same relation to hold between the cosmos and time. 
 If my reading is correct, we can draw a distinction between the moving image of αἰών and the 
αἰών-ly image without taking these to be separate imitations. While the αἰών-ly image refers to the 
cosmos once it imitates the model qua being αἰών-ly, the image of αἰών singles out the specific 
creation required to make the living being αἰών-ly. Hence, both ultimately are used to introduce 
time, although, to be precise, the αἰών-ly image rather describes the cosmos once time is created as 
part of it (see next sub-section). Either way, time cannot exist apart from the cosmos because it is 
conceived by Plato as an essentially cosmic feature. Finally, the imitation, as presented in the 
metaphysical definition requires further specification, as Plato has not yet defined αἰών, and by the 
same token, time. The last two sentences of the above passage are aimed at clarifying this. 
Before addressing those lines, however, one last aspect of the metaphysical definition of time 
should be addressed: namely, the image of αἰών being qualified as ‘moving’ (κινητόν).96 Once 
 
95 “Le découpage habituel de 37d5 ss. fait attribuer le mouvement ordonné selon le nombre au temps, et non au ciel. 
Une fois privé de son ordre propre, celui-ci ne peut plus apparaître que comme un corps sensible brut, qui devra 
recevoir son ordre de l‘extérieur”, Brague 1982, p. 53. “Ainsi, nous avons vu que ce sont les astres en leur mouvement 
régulier qui sont image. Il est d’ailleurs bien plus naturel, nous semble-t-il, de nommer image le ciel visible plutôt que le 
temps, inaccessible aux sens”, ibid., p. 55. 
96 Plato attributes the ἀκίνητον nature to the intelligible kind only once in the whole account of time: “that which is 
always unmoving (ἀκινήτως) in its uniformity cannot become either older or younger in the course of time” (38a3-4). 
Although some translate κινητόν as ‘movable’, Plato doesn’t seem interested in drawing a distinction between actually 
being in motion and being the sort of thing that is movable – at least not in the Timaeus. 
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more, after the everlasting/begotten pair, ideal and physical features are employed to distinguish 
between αἰών itself and its replica, time: the κινητόν qualification anticipates the opposition 
between μένοντος and ἰοῦσαν in the next sentence, where the former defines the static nature of the 
model’s αἰών, and the latter presents the kinetic one characterising the αἰών-ly image. 
The ‘moving’ qualification already foregrounds the peculiarity of time as a cosmic feature. 
Time is not a feature realised once and for all via the demiurgic operations, but a feature articulated 
in motion via the planetary revolutions. Although I will clarify the role of the planets in the creation 
of time at the end of the section, we can already glimpse why time is best described as a cosmic 
phenomenon. ‘Phenomenon’, as I observed in the Introduction, highlights that, while time belongs 
to the physical domain, as an essential component of the created cosmos, it is not itself a physical 
object, or a feature like its spherical shape. 
Like a feature, time is grounded in a physical object, namely the cosmic living being and the 
planets within it. However, unlike the spherical shape, time is constituted by cosmic motion, both in 
the succession of its parts and as a whole. It is, therefore, comparable to other physical phenomena 
of a natural or artificial origin, like a storm or a musical piece. Time, as we will see in the next 
section, resembles the musical piece more than a storm, insofar as time is also defined in structural 
terms, and that structure requires the Demiurge’s artifice as much as the planets’ collective effort. 
Below, I will further discuss time and its definition in two respects: in 2.4.1, I will show how time is 
a cosmic phenomenon that imitates αἰών, by focusing on the comparative definitions of αἰών and 
time; in 2.4.2, I will argue that the operation by which the Demiurge creates time is the arrangement 
of planetary revolutions, so the ἅμα relations between time and the cosmos should be read in that 
light. 
 
2.4.1. The cosmological definition of time 
 
At 37d5-7, we find the perhaps most discussed passage of Plato’s account of time: καὶ διακοσμῶν 
ἅμα οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ μένοντος αἰῶνος ἐν ἑνὶ κατ᾽ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. Once more, 
Brague’s remarks on the syntax should be considered before drawing conclusions about the content. 
In opposition to the traditional reading, which takes οὐρανὸν to be part of the subordinate clause 
with διακοσμῶν, thus being separated from the second half of the sentence by ἅμα, Brague argues 
that it would be more natural to read καὶ διακοσμῶν as a subordinate clause separated from ἅμα 
οὐρανὸν, as the latter would be already part of the main clause. While Brague accepts that οὐρανὸν 
is still the object of διακοσμῶν (‘in ordering it [i.e. the heaven]’), in his reading the heaven is 
primarily the object of ποιεῖ, instead of αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. 
 
 
45 
 
 His reconstruction rests partially on the word order that and renders it more in line with the 
majority of syntactic constructions in the rest of the dialogue and in Plato’s work generally.97 
According to Brague’s reading, the main sentence can be analysed in a number of ways that result 
in a similar enough translation: the cosmos is put in order by the Demiurge, and thereby he crafts 
the cosmos as an αἰών-ly image proceeding according to number.98 In this reading the two clauses 
connected by ἅμα are better connected than in the traditional reading, insofar as they revolve around 
the same object – οὐρανὸν –  and not distinct ones – οὐρανὸν and αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. As we have seen 
above, the problem of the double imitation is solved by taking αἰώνιον εἰκόνα as a description of 
the cosmos once time has been created as its feature, i.e. the moving image of αἰών. If so, οὐρανὸν 
is the object of both activities attributed to the Demiurge (ποιεῖ and διακοσμῶν), the two describing 
the same activity under different respects. The first aspect (διακοσμῶν) clarifies the sort of 
operation needed for the result to come about, while the second (ποιεῖ), already anticipated by the 
verb in the previous sentence (ποιῆσαι), foregrounds the result of the operation. So, Taylor’s 
translation of ἅμα (‘in the very act of ordering’) is far more fitting than Cornford’s ‘at the same time 
that he ordered’.99 In this sub-section I will focus on the resulting αἰών-ly image, while the 
διακοσμῶν operation will be discussed in relation to the setup of the planetary revolutions in the 
next sub-section. 
 Let us now turn to the resulting definition of time as a cosmic phenomenon, which I will refer 
to as the ‘cosmological definition’. Firstly, by following Brague’s reading, οὐρανὸν, in the guise of 
the κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, is identified with time, as it is the most plausible referent 
of τοῦτον and the definiens of time.100 Note, however, that the identification is only partial, since 
the αἰών-ly image refers to οὐρανὸν as it instantiates the αἰών-ly feature, i.e. as it proceeds 
according to number. If so, ‘the cosmos as an αἰών-ly image proceeding according to number’ is the 
 
97 Brague 1982, p. 43-46. 
98 “Il serait difficile de comprendre οὐρανὸν ποιεῖ (…) εἰκόνα comme un double accusatif à sens résultatif, au sens de 
“il fit du ciel une image”, car il faudrait l’article devant οὐρανόν, même si celui-ci peut exceptionnellement manquer. 
On peut aussi supposer qu’un accusatif simple est précisé par une apposition, auquel cas la présomption est forte que le 
complément soit le ciel, réalité corporelle. Ou bien encore, et c’est la solution que nous préférions, on peut comprendre 
l’apposition en un sens plus relevé que de simple précision, comme exprimant “un effet ou un résultat provenant de 
l’action exprimée dans la phrase”, ce qui d’ailleurs la rapproche pour le sens du double accusatif. Dans ce dernier cas, 
l’apposition ne se contente pas de juxtaposer deux termes équivalents; elle indique, en une sorte de phrase spéculative, 
que le ciel est constitué comme image de l’âion” (Brague 1982, p. 46). Although Brague’s first and third hypotheses fit 
best with my reading, I don’t see any reason to favour one over the other in virtue of syntactical considerations alone. I 
take the general aim of the main clause to be a presentation of the αἰών-ly image as the heaven once the creation of time 
has been accomplished. For a more recent discussion of the syntax of the passage following Brague, see Johns 2014, p. 
13. 
99 Taylor 1928, pp. 185-186; Cornford 1937, p. 102. It should be noted that the philosophical upshot of Brague’s 
syntactical hypothesis, does not ultimately depend on syntax. Even if his reconstruction is rejected, the content 
expressed by the subordinate and main clause connected by ἅμα could be still interpreted in a similar way. 
100 As Brague acknowledges, the referent could be the αἰών-ly image, and τοῦτον is in the masculine form due to 
attraction from οὐρανὸν (Brague 1982, p. 66).  
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definition of time. This second version of the definition brings the metaphysical definition and 
Plato’s cosmological conception together, explicitly incorporating the latter into the former and 
successfully presenting time as a phenomenon built into the cosmos. As such, we should consider 
this definition, more than the metaphysical one, as the complete definition of time. 
 Secondly, the definition of time above (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα) is outlined in a 
comparison with αἰών itself, defined as μένοντος ἐν ἑνὶ.101 Hence, while ἰοῦσαν refers to the 
circular motion of cosmic life, μένοντος describes the static life of the everlasting living being 
employed as a model. The two terms present the ontological component of the definition in terms of 
physical and ideal features, thus underscoring the difference between αἰών and time. However, in 
order for there to be an imitation, there needs to be resemblance too, and while time cannot 
resemble αἰών ontologically, it structurally succeeds in doing so. In fact, the resemblance is mainly 
underscored by the structural components of the definition, ἐν ἑνὶ and κατ’ ἀριθμὸν.102 As we will 
see in Chapter 6, number and unity bear a resemblance to one another insofar as number, despite 
being a plurality, is composed of units. This analysis of the two definitions is inevitably provisional, 
as it leaves many aspects unclarified. I will return to discuss the passage in light of the framework 
of content and structure in Section 4.1, after a thorough examination of the meaning of αἰών in 
Chapter 3. 
 Nonetheless, we can already conclude that the above reconstruction of Plato’s definition is 
more plausible than Zeyl and Thein’s reconstruction. Although Zeyl and Thein differently 
characterise what the view entails, they agree that time is eventually identified with ἀριθμὸν rather 
than with κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν αἰώνιον εἰκόνα. For instance, in Zeyl’s translation the τοῦτον is 
rendered as “this number, of course, is what we now call ‘time’”.103 While the view is syntactically 
 
101 Proceeding according to number is not one among many features presenting what an αἰών-ly image is, as Cornford 
seems to read it (Cornford 1937, p. 102). The participle ‘κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν’ should be read as an apposition of 
αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, just as μένοντος ἐν ἑνὶ is for αἰών, so that it has the function of explicating what constitutes an αἰών-ly 
image. “‘Temps’ est le nom que donnent les hommes à ce qui, dans le langage des dieux, recevrait le nom de ‘ciel-mû-
selon-le-nombre’” (Brague 1982, pp. 61-62). 
102 Consider, as a contrast, the Cratylus in the way it presents the imitation between the motion of bodies and that of 
certain letters. The imitation is physical and takes place because there is a similarity between the letters and the motion 
they want to imitate (διὰ τούτου τοῦ γράμματος τὴν φορὰν μιμεῖται, 426d7). For instance letter ‘r’ is used ‘as a tool’ to 
imitate motion because the name-giver saw “that the tongue was most agitated and least at rest in pronouncing this letter 
(οἶμαι τὴν γλῶτταν ἐν τούτῳ ἥκιστα μένουσαν, μάλιστα δὲ σειομένην, 426e4-5)”. The relevant similarity lies in ‘being 
in motion’ despite the fact that the motion of the tongue cannot be structurally similar with the ones it represents. 
103 Zeyl 2000, p. 24. Thein argues that “time as number – a mathematical structure – is not identical to this image, but it 
enables the planets themselves, as living beings whose motions express the appropriate number, to maintain the ordered 
regularity of their motion” (Thein 2015, p. 4-5), whereas Zeyl describes time as “a supervenient aspect of that [i.e. 
cosmic] motion”, Zeyl 2000, p. xlii fn. 80. The reading first appears in Brague, who remarks, though, that the 
hypothesis has a more uncertain status than what he argued for up to that point. He suggests that αἰώνιον could be taken 
together with ἀριθμὸν, hence having an αἰών-ly number, i.e. time. He argues for this hypothesis following the line of 
reasoning that brought Cornford to propose an emendation of αἰώνιον (see fn. 40): “il fait le ciel, image (…) dont la 
marche se règle sur un (ou : le) nombre aïônios, et c’est bien ce nombre que nous appelons temps. S’il est ainsi, ce qui 
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tenable, it is not exegetically so, for the following important reason. As seen above, αἰών is defined 
by two components – the ontological and the structural. Hence, we should expect time, as the 
cosmic phenomenon corresponding to αἰών, to be likewise defined by both components (κατ’ 
ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν), and not simply identified with ἀριθμὸν. The ontological component of αἰών 
(μένοντος), as we established, refers to the static life of the everlasting living being αἰών is 
associated with (ἡ τοῦ ζῴου φύσις οὖσα αἰώνιος). Likewise, time must be defined by the 
corresponding ontological component in the cosmos, i.e. circular living motion. 
 This hypothesis is further confirmed by the metaphysical definition of time, where time is 
defined as moving (κινητόν), and by the later re-statement of the cosmological definition of time, at 
38a7-8: “the generated forms of time that imitates αἰών and revolves according to number (χρόνου 
αἰῶνα μιμουμένου καὶ κατ’ ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου)”. There, the circular motion (κυκλουμένου) 
characterising cosmic life is explicitly included as part of what defines time, thereby confirming 
that time, in Plato’s definition, is a cosmic phenomenon ‘according to number’ and not merely the 
supervenient ‘number’. 
 
2.4.2. The ἅμα relations and the role of the planets 
 
The ἅμα relations between time and cosmos first introduced in Section 1.1 can now be interpreted 
in light of what has been established with the cosmological definition of time. The first ἅμα 
relation, as I argued above, is between the act of bringing about order (διακοσμῶν) and the result 
that it yields, i.e. making the cosmos an αἰών-ly image. While I discussed the result in the previous 
sub-section, the specificity of διακοσμῶν as a demiurgic operation must still be accounted for.  
Διακοσμεῖν, although it originally had a military sense of ‘marshalling’ and ‘arraying’, is 
consistently employed in natural philosophy with a more general sense of setting up order and 
regularity.104 In Plato’s dialogues, the term often captures the establishing of well-ordered 
arrangements, as for instance in the passage on the cosmological role of nous in Anaxagoras (Phd. 
97c2, 98c1). In particular, two passages compare well with the definitional section in light of the 
explicitly cosmological context and of their reference to the planets and parts of time. In the 
Philebus, nous is responsible for arranging the visible spectacle displayed by the cosmos, the Sun, 
the Moon, the heavenly bodies and the motion of the whole (πάντα διακοσμεῖν αὐτὰ φάναι καὶ τῆς 
ὄψεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης καὶ ἀστέρων καὶ πάσης τῆς περιφορᾶς  28e2-6); 
similarly, in the Laws, at 886a2-5 those heavenly bodies are associated with the articulation of the 
 
est aïônios n’est pas l’image (le ciel), qui appartient au domaine de ce qui naît, mais le nombre sur lequel cette image se 
règle en son mouvement” (Brague 1982, p. 66). 
104 LSJ s.v. διακοσμέω.  
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seasons, months and years (πρῶτον μὲν γῆ καὶ ἥλιος ἄστρα τε καὶ τὰ σύμπαντα, καὶ τὰ τῶν ὡρῶν 
διακεκοσμημένα καλῶς οὕτως, ἐνιαυτοῖς τε καὶ μησὶν διειλημμένα).105  
The two passages show that the term is chosen carefully by Plato to present the operation of 
ordering the cosmos as the arrangement of a multiplicity of heavenly bodies, i.e. the planets. As we 
have seen in Section 2.2, making the cosmic living being αἰών-ly still reflects the goal to complete 
that living being, despite the fact that its creation involves other living beings, i.e. the planets, as 
instruments. Now we have further evidence aligning with that conclusion in that the result of the 
Demiurge’s work is the creation of a cosmic phenomenon, and yet this is accomplished by setting 
up planetary revolutions. 
The connection between the ordering of the cosmos and the creation of time that διακοσμεῖν 
introduces is further specified in the second ἅμα relation, which immediately follows the two 
definitions discussed above as prima facie evidence for the cosmological definition of time (γάρ).106 
The creation of days, nights, months and years collectively referred to as parts of time (μέρη 
χρόνου, 37e3) are presented by Plato as evidence that his definition of time hits the mark. In fact, 
before the generation of the cosmos there were no parts of time, but once the Demiurge framed the 
cosmos, together he also contrived the generation of those parts (τό τε ἅμα ἐκείνῳ συνισταμένῳ τὴν 
γένεσιν αὐτῶν μηχανᾶται, 37e2-3). The question, once more, is how best to understand ἅμα in the 
context. The conjunction is between the two activities, framing and contriving, which are bringing 
about the cosmos and the parts of time respectively. An analogous relation is presented in the third 
ἅμα relation, at 38c6-7 (Χρόνος δ’ οὖν μετ’ οὐρανοῦ γέγονεν ἵνα ἅμα γεννηθέντες ἅμα καὶ 
λυθῶσιν), which, as we have seen in Section 1.1, additionally considers a hypothetical joint 
destruction.107 
Given that in sub-section 2.4.1 I presented the relation between time and the cosmos as that of 
an essential feature to a feature-bearer, the two passages above can be read similarly. They present 
that same relation in the form of a necessary conjunction (ἅμα). In fact, if, as I argued, time is a 
proper feature of the cosmos, the generation of a true cosmos necessarily entails the generation of 
time with it. However, as we have seen in Section 2.2, there is an implicit asymmetry in the ἅμα 
 
105 There are five other instances of διακοσμεῖν in the Timaeus: at 24c5, where the goddess is described to set up the 
social order; at 53a7, where it refers to the setting in order of the universe; at 69c1, where it describes the operation of 
shaping the four elements and twice at 75d7, where the design of the mouth is under discussion. 
106 Including this small passage (37e1-3) in the definitional section is, I think, consistent with the re-reading I proposed 
so far. The question about how Plato’s account of time should be divided is not trivial, as any choice is guided by one’s 
interpretation. I take the passage to be first evidence provided in favour of the definition of time just put forth, before 
the start of a new section of the account of time. After the digression on tense (37e3-38b6), the ἅμα relation is restated 
at 38c6. 
107 As I pointed out in Section 2.2, the heaven is used by Plato as a synonym of the cosmic living being, and I take it 
that until  stage 2 of the cosmogony has begun, it still refer to the cosmic living being without other living beings as its 
parts.  
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relation: while an incomplete version of the cosmic living being could exist without time, time 
simply could not, by definition, exist in absence of the cosmos and its living motion. So, the ἅμα 
relation is symmetric only because it is teleologically fixed. Compare it with the same relation in 
the model: the conjunction between αἰών and the model is fixed by nature (ἡ τοῦ ζῴου φύσις 
ἐτύγχανεν οὖσα αἰώνιος, 37d3), whereas the Demiurge is ultimately responsible for retaining the 
same conjunction in the cosmos. The Demiurge’s goal to make the best possible imitation of the 
model is what really accounts for the ἅμα relations. 
Finally, in my reading, to contrive (μηχανᾶται) the nights and days, months and years just 
consists in setting up the planets in the cosmos. That operation is spelled out thoroughly from 38c3, 
in four steps: 1) the creation of the bodies of the planets and their positioning on the circles of the 
cosmic soul (38c7-e3); 2) making those bodies alive and intelligent, so that they are then instructed 
by the Demiurge of the task they should carry out (38e3-39a3); 3) the planetary revolutions are 
identified with time, and in particular, Timaeus describes the creation of the parts of time via the 
revolutions of the Sun, Moon and other five planets (39a4-d7); 4) in the concluding recapitulation 
of Plato’s account of time, the planetary revolutions, i.e. the heavenly bodies that have turnings and 
travel across the heaven (39d7-8), are presented as responsible for the best possible cosmic 
imitation of the complete and intelligible living being, with respect to its διαιώνια nature (πρὸς τὴν 
τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως, 39e1-2).108 Hence, given the identity Plato postulates between time 
and the planetary revolutions, the necessary conjunction presented by the ἅμα relation is ultimately 
a relation between the cosmos and the planetary revolutions set up within it, as we will see in Part 
III. 
 To wrap up, the close analysis of the definitional section proposed in this chapter lays out a 
provisional outline of Plato’s cosmological conception of time. Time, in my reading, is conceived 
as a cosmic phenomenon resembling αἰών that revolves according to number. Moreover, that 
cosmic phenomenon is identified with the planetary revolutions set up by the Demiurge. However, 
the analysis proposed has not yet addressed the components of Plato’s definition of time in detail, as 
that will be the goal of Parts II and III of my thesis. In Part II, I will further explore the connection 
between the cosmos, life, αἰών and time, whereas in Part III, I will focus on the function of the 
planets and their relation to the κατ’ ἀριθμὸν qualification which defines the temporal structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
108 For a brief discussion of the significance and hypothetical origin of διαιώνιος, see Section 3.2, p. 63. 
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PART II – AἸΏΝ AND TEMPORAL LIFE 
  
“Quod igitur interminabilis uitae plenitudinem  
totam pariter comprehendit ac possidet,  
cui neque futuri quicquam absit nec praeteriti fluxerit,  
id aeternum esse” 
(Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae V 6, 8) 
 
 
The conclusions reached in Part I solicit a more detailed enquiry into the connections Plato draws 
between the cosmos, life, αἰών and time. The main claim I argued for is that in the definitional 
section time is defined as a cosmic phenomenon, constitutive of the cosmic living being, as one of 
its proper features. In particular, time and αἰών’s definitions state that they are constituted by the 
living motion of the cosmos and the living stillness of the model respectively. This conclusion 
already suggests that in Plato’s conception there is a close connection between time, αἰών and life. 
My enquiry in Part II of the thesis aims at providing a better grasp of the complex background to 
that conception (Chapter 3) in order to look into the details as they are presented in Plato’s account 
of time (Chapter 4). 
In Chapter 3 I will first discuss the intelligible living being chosen as a model for the cosmos. 
My claim is that both the cosmos and its model are living beings defined by completeness, which I 
read as a term highlighting beauty and plenitude. Completeness, I argue, is important in guiding our 
understanding of Plato’s conception of time and αἰών, as proper features of the two living beings. 
Plato’s conception is further explored by examining the semantic history of αἰών, and, in particular, 
the semantic shift recognisable in natural philosophy between the 5th and 4th century. I will argue 
that the traditional notion of αἰών, as a temporally delimited lifespan, comes to be associated with 
divine and paradigmatic life. In fact, αἰών comes to describe the totality of life that is supra-
temporal, as it applies only to living beings which are everlasting and unchangeable, hence with no 
temporal beginning or end to their life. 
In Chapter 4, I will return to Plato’s account of time to analyse the comparison between αἰών 
and time in terms of a structure-content dichotomy. My claim is that, in Plato’s conception, αἰών 
and time are structured totalities of life, to be analysed as the compound of content and structure. 
Whereas the content of time and αἰών differs, because of the different ontological constitution of 
the cosmos and its model, their structures bear resemblance to one another: while time is structured 
as a complex and kinetic totality of parts, progressing ‘according to number’ towards completion, 
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αἰών consists in a totality without parts, i.e. a complete and undivided unity of life. Finally, I focus 
on time as a totality of life, to show how both the parts and the whole of time are based on the 
articulation of the periods of the cosmic soul. In this way, the parts of time, in my reading, are best 
understood as stages of cosmic life, whereas the complete year is interpreted as a finite cosmic 
lifespan, endlessly repeating itself. 
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Ch. 3: Cosmos, lifespan and completeness 
 
To explore the connection Plato draws between time, αἰών, life and the cosmos we first need a brief 
overview on the central role life plays in the Timaeus’ cosmogony. Because ζωή is a far wider 
notion than the one we are familiar with through the lens of contemporary biology, ‘living being’ 
(ζῷον) equally applies to gods, humans and animals.109 As we have seen in Chapter 2, if we take 
Plato at face value, there are living beings in the intelligible domain too: the model chosen for the 
creation of the cosmos is an intelligible living being, and the Demiurge is presented as a god, at 
least suggesting that he might also be included among the living beings.110 
Leaving aside the issue of accounting for the life of intelligible living beings, there seems to 
be a trait d’union between all forms of physical living beings, and that is the better or worse 
instantiation of intelligence in the body. In fact, all physical living beings are composed by the 
‘immortal’ part of the soul and a spherical body. The life led by the compound is ultimately a 
cognitive one, as the exercise of wisdom and intelligence (30b1-6, 37a2-c5). This cognitive life, as 
we have seen in Section 2.2, consists in the circular motion of the two circles of the soul (the Same 
and the Different), in harmony with the motion of the body (34a1-5, 34b3-35a1, 36d8-37a2).111 
While the life of mortal living beings is a far more complex phenomenon, requiring a 
tripartite soul (69d-71a), the life of physical gods is free from any other task except for those 
involving its cognitive function, as they do not need organs for their own self-preservation in virtue 
of their excellency, and quasi-immortality and indissolubility (see sub-section 1.2.2). At the other 
end of the spectrum we have animals, whose life is flawed, as they cannot function properly qua 
intelligent beings because of the disrupted circles of their souls (91e-92c) and, in an intermediate 
position, humans, capable of imitating either gods or animals (90a-d).  
 
109 See Sattler 2019 for an extensive discussion of the variety of living beings in Plato’s Timaeus. The case of plants 
works as an interesting borderline case for Plato’s notion of life. Plants are said to be alive by Plato, and thus admittedly 
among the ζῷα, insofar as the term describes an ensouled body. However, the plants’ soul is of the kind corresponding 
to the inferior part of the mortal living beings’ soul, i.e. the appetitive one. Hence, plants lack the intellective and 
immortal part which the other living beings all share and that makes them capable of self-motion (77a-c). Overall, it 
seems that for Plato, being composed by that divine part of the soul is a crucial criterion to determine whether one is a 
proper ζῷον (42e6-43b2), hence excluding plants from the category. 
110 It has been argued that the Demiurge does not count as a living being, insofar as it does not seem to have a soul (see 
Sattler 2019 fn. 10). However, in the Timaeus the claim that a living being is an intelligent ensouled body likely holds 
true only for physical living beings. The Demiurge and the model could be examples of ideal, or purely intelligible, 
living beings, to be compared with Aristotle’s divine unmoved movers, as in Metaphysics, XII 7 (see Section 3.3 for a 
brief outline of Aristotle’s account). 
111 Plato’s notion of life has been labelled as ‘embodied intelligence’ by Amber Carpenter (see Carpenter 2008 pp. 39-
47). I would qualify her claim as ‘life in the physical domain is embodied intelligence’. When discussing physical gods, 
I assume an identity between the purely intelligent life and the harmonious circular motion their body and soul share. 
See Sattler 2019, pp. 8-10 for a discussion of the identity between circular motion and intelligent activity. 
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Moreover, the creation of divine life is the result of a process of ordering, as order is 
considered intrinsically better than disorder (εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας, 30a5). 
Presumably ‘τάξις’ is here intended in the double connected sense of bringing about a hierarchical 
organisation in the universe, granted by the rule of intelligence over the body, while also making the 
universe mathematically structured.112 The latter sense, as we have seen in sub-section 2.4.1, is 
crucial for my analysis of time and αἰών in Plato’s account, as both are defined by their structure as 
much as by their connection to the life of a living being – the intelligible living being for αἰών and 
the cosmos for time. Before returning to the structural aspect of time, in Chapter 4, we will need to 
clarify the biological components involved in Plato’s cosmological definition of time: the cosmic 
living being (Section 3.1) and αἰών (Sections 3.2 and 3.3). 
 
3.1. On the cosmic living being 
 
I argued in Chapter 2 that time, in Plato’s account, is a cosmic phenomenon, hence it is essential to 
the creation of a cosmic living being. The definitional section, however, does not explain why time 
bears an essential connection with that living being in particular.113 The relation is simply posited, 
as perhaps a self-evident one, in Plato’s assessment. Nonetheless, an attempt should be made at 
making explicit the relation Plato leaves implicit in order to have a better understanding of his 
conception of time. With that goal in mind, we need a firmer grasp of what is characteristic of the 
cosmic living being, in Plato’s view. There has been insightful work produced on the topic, and two 
aspects defining the peculiarity of the cosmos will be the starting point to put forth a more general 
thesis about its nature. 
Firstly, as argued by Sarah Broadie, the cosmic living being is, for all intents and purposes, 
entirely independent from the intra-cosmic living beings. They are parts just in the sense that they 
are in the cosmos, but they don’t play a function in the preservation of the whole, as cells do in an 
organism. So, whereas the intra-cosmic living beings are not independent from the cosmic living 
being – as it constitutes their ‘environment’ – cosmic life continues entirely on its own, without any 
support needed from within (the planets are ‘organs’ in a different sense, for which see Section 
5.3).114 What is driving this configuration of life in the physical world, then, is not a concern for the 
 
112 The arrangement of mathematical structures in the universe is the recurring theme of Plato’s cosmogony, as only in 
that way is the Demiurge’s work excellent and most beautiful, becoming a divine living being. See Sub-section 6.1.2 for 
an overview of some of the passages where the said structures are crafted by the Demiurge. 
113 According to Cornford, all the celestial gods have a temporal life, hence also partaking in αἰών (Cornford 1937, p. 
102). In my reading, everything in the cosmos is also in time, in that they always have a determinate temporal 
‘location’. However, time is not constitutive of what they are as it is for the cosmos. 
114 Broadie 2016, pp. 165-166.  
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preservation of cosmic life per se but rather the Demiurge’s intention to make the cosmic living 
being an all-comprehensive container of living beings, as required by the chosen model (39e3-
40a2). Attaining completeness in that regard (εἰ μέλλει τέλεος ἱκανῶς εἶναι, 41b7-c2), by not 
leaving any kind of living being out, even trumps what would be best for individual intra-cosmic 
living beings: the Demiurge decides to withdraw from creating all the living beings within the 
cosmos, as they would all be like gods, hence leaving the cosmos deprived of the species of mortal 
living beings.  
Secondly, the cosmic living being stands out among living beings for its function as a 
supreme paradigm of life in the physical domain, as argued in 47a4-c4 and 88c7-89a6. The cosmos 
has this paradigmatic role for us because, as pointed out by Gábor Betegh, there is a fundamental 
isomorphism between our heads and the cosmic living being.115 The cosmos, in fact, leads the finest 
and most self-sufficient of lives (33d1-34a1, 34b4-9, 36e3-5), hence being a paradigmatic 
instantiation of cognitive life, as opposed to the flawed version led by humans: while the rotations 
of the human soul are affected internally and externally by bodily particles, thus leading to a 
constant distortion of cognition, the cosmos, does not have non-cognitive parts of the soul, nor 
anything external affecting it.116  
In my reading, both of the above outstanding aspects characterising the cosmic living being 
are accounted for by the overarching notion of completeness (τέλος). Completeness, in fact, is not 
predicated of the cosmos in the generic sense in which it does lack anything as a living being, 
composed of, like any other physical god, an excellent body-soul compound that engages in a 
single, intelligent activity – i.e. its cognitive life. Rather, completeness seems to ascribe unique 
features to the cosmos, which makes it stand out among living beings, because of its conjoined 
beauty and plenitude. ‘Plenitude’ here highlights the fact that in every respect, the cosmos does not 
leave any part out – in terms of living beings within it, as much as the composition of its own body, 
and, as we will see, life. Beauty, moreover, highlights how that plenitude makes it inherently 
choiceworthy as a living being. 
As mentioned above, the completeness that defines the cosmos is brought about in imitation 
of the model, and to the model we should turn once more. As seen in Section 2.1, the Demiurge at 
the beginning of the cosmogony makes a number of choices to select the best possible model for the 
cosmogony. The first two demiurgic choices are for an everlasting model and, among those of that 
 
115 The cosmos is taken as the model for making the human head, at 44d3-6, having a soul arranged in the circle of the 
Same and the Different, at 43d-44a. See Betegh 2018, pp. 125-128 and 133-137, for a recent discussion of that relation. 
116 For the cosmos’ freedom from organs and from external disruption (33a-d, 34a). Note that, while the cosmos shares 
the lack of internal disruption with the other physical gods, it stands out even among them, because its cosmic body is 
made of all the stuff available. Moreover, it also differs from them by not having any other motion other than intelligent 
rotation around itself (33d3-34a1).  
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kind, for one that is a living being. However, at 30c2-31a1 the Demiurge makes a third choice 
between two species of intelligible living beings – the complete and the incomplete, or partial: 
When the maker made our cosmos, what living being did he make it resemble? Let us not stoop 
to think that it was any of those that have the natural character of a part, for nothing that is a 
likeness of anything incomplete (ἀτελεῖ) could ever turn out beautiful. Rather, let us lay it down 
that the universe resembles more closely than anything else that living being of which all other 
living beings are parts, both individually and by kinds (οὗ δ’ἔστιν τἆλλα ζῷα καθ’ ἓν καὶ κατὰ 
γένη μόρια). For that living being comprehends within itself (ἐν ἑαυτῷ περιλαβὸν ἔχει) all 
intelligible living beings, just as our cosmos is made up of us and all the other visible creatures. 
Since the god wanted nothing more than to make the cosmos like the most beautiful of the 
intelligible things, complete in every way (τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ καὶ κατὰ πάντα 
τελέῳ), he made it a unique visible living being, which has within itself  (ἐντὸς ἔχον ἑαυτοῦ) all 
the living beings whose nature it is to share its kind.117 
I read the passage in the following way: (1) the intelligible living being is chosen as a model by the 
Demiurge in virtue of its completeness (30c5, and at 30d2 and 31b1). Hence, I will refer to the 
chosen model as the complete intelligible living being (CILB).118 (2) Choosing the CILB as a model 
results in the creation of a beautiful universe as its image (as already stated at 29a1).119 (3) The 
completeness of the CILB entails that all the other intelligible living beings are its parts, thereby 
making it all-comprehensive with regard to intelligible living beings, and analogously, the image, 
i.e. the cosmos, will contain all visible living beings, in order to be itself complete and beautiful.120  
(4) A further inference, at 31a1-b4, allows to derive the uniqueness of the cosmos from the all-
comprehensiveness of the CILB. The argument is a reductio and intends to show how completeness 
(and hence all-comprehensiveness) necessarily entails uniqueness. Timaeus, then, presents two 
 
117 Emphasis added.   
118 The model is repeatedly characterised in terms of completeness throughout the dialogue. A few lines later the 
intelligible living being is again defined as the all-complete living being (τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ, 31b1). Finally, at the very 
end of the account of time, the model is once more referred to as “the complete and intelligible living being (ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ 
καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ)” (39e1). Special emphasis on the cosmic completeness is given at 41b-c, where it is said by the 
Demiurge himself that without the other species within it the universe would fall short of completeness, while, once it 
has them, it would be adequately complete (τέλεος ἱκανῶς). Again, in the concluding summary of the second part of the 
speech, at 68e, the cosmos is described as the self-sufficient and most complete god (τὸν αὐτάρκη τε καὶ τὸν 
τελεώτατον θεὸν). Finally, at 92c3-9, completeness appears again in a list of optimal attributes describing the cosmic 
living being: “A visible living being containing visible ones, perceptible god, image of the intelligible living being, its 
grandness, goodness, beauty and completeness (τελεώτατος) are unexcelled. Our unique heaven, indeed the only one of 
its kind, has come to be”. 
119 The connection between beauty and well-crafted structure is also posited in the Philebus (26b, 51c, 64e, 66b). 
120 ‘Περιέχειν’ can be translated in a variety of ways and very often it is taken as a ‘comprehending’ relation, which is 
the opposite of the ‘in’ relation. That the two relations are expressing the two sides of one asymmetrical relation seems 
evident for example in the Parmenides (138a-b, 144e-145e) where it is also made evident how ‘comprehend’ and ‘being 
in’ are a pair of mereological relations: “‘Each of the parts is surely in the whole, and none out of the whole.’— ‘Just 
so.’— ‘And are all the parts comprehended in the whole?’ — ‘Yes’” (145b7-c1). The same mereologically-related use 
appears in the discussion on place in the Physics (207a35-207b1). The relation of comprehension, I hold, is entailed by 
completeness, without merely being a synonym of it. In fact, not every feature of the cosmos consists in a relation with 
the other living beings or follows from that relation. Examples of special features that involve plenitude in different 
respects are the complete body of the cosmos and time itself, as we will see at the end of the section. 
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special features characterising the CILB – all-comprehensiveness and uniqueness – in order to 
account for the structural similarity of the cosmos. The cosmos is unique because it is made “like 
the all-complete living being in respect of uniqueness (κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ 
ζῴῳ)”, and likewise for all-comprehensiveness. 
Now, my reading of the CILB takes a stance in a longstanding debate on the exegesis of the 
passage above. The crux of the discussion is whether the features discussed in the passage are ideal 
or proper features (see Section 2.1). In fact, in the reading I endorse, first proposed by Richard 
Parry, the CILB is defined as the paradigm-case of a species of living being, as opposed to the 
incomplete ones.121 In this reading, completeness, and the entailed features of all-
comprehensiveness and uniqueness etc. are proper or specific features, defining the CILB as a 
distinct kind of living being. The opposite position, supported by Mohr and others, takes the CILB 
as just the genus ‘living being’ and consequently they understand completeness and connected 
features as ideal and thus generic features, defining it qua form.122 
Two separate objections can be moved against the second reconstruction. A first objection 
follows Richard Patterson’s remark, arguing that the all-comprehensiveness and uniqueness of the 
cosmos are not of the kind that would follow from imitating a genus. It follows, then, that Plato is 
not thinking of the CILB in those terms. The cosmos, i.e. the image, does not simply need to 
include within itself all four species, as if the imitation of the CILB simply required all the species 
to be instantiated.123 Such a conception would in fact still allow for multiple cosmoi to exist, as long 
as each cosmos has all the four species of living beings within them. Instead, the text presents as a 
strict prescription for the imitation of the model that the cosmos contains not only all species of 
living beings, but all the individual visible living beings within itself. If so, the relation between the 
CILB and the other living beings is not like one between genus and species, and reading the CILB 
as itself a paradigm-case of the species fits the textual evidence more adequately. 
 
121 In other words, the CILB is not an F-ness of any kind but a paradigmatic representative of F. Following John 
Malcolm’s distinctions regarding the various options concerning the classification of forms, in my reading Plato’s 
account takes forms as non-univocal representatives of F-ness, hence relevantly different from the sensible instances of 
F in virtue of the different ontological standing (Malcolm 1991, pp. 92-105). For my discussion of the ontological 
constitution as a difference-maker, see sub-section 2.1.2. For a discussion of the sense in which the CILB is alive, see 
pp. 74-75. 
122 Parry remarks that “the IWA (the intelligible world animal) is not a genus because it is a Form for a distinct animal, 
our cosmos. If we think in term of instantiation, we can see the difference. The genus ‘animal’ is instantiated only in its 
various species and does not have a separate instantiation distinct from the species” (Parry 1991, p. 26). According to 
Mohr’s interpretation, however, the ‘comprehending’ and ‘comprehended’ relations, are just a way of describing 
hierarchical relations between genera: ‘x comprehends y’ is, in that reading, just a relation among more and less specific 
genera, and is the converse of the relation ‘y partakes in x (Mohr 1985, p. 27-33). For other supporters of the ‘genus’ 
interpretation, see fn. 176. 
123 Patterson 1981, p. 115. 
 
 
57 
 
Secondly, if we accept that the relation between the CILB and the other living beings is just a 
relation between genus and species, we should expect that the Demiurge does not create the cosmic 
living being in addition to all the other species of living beings. In fact, the genus ‘living being’ 
would be already instantiated in all the species, in the same way as in the Sophist, at 219c-d, the 
species of the genus ‘acquisition’, ‘mutual exchange’ and ‘taking possession’ equally instantiate 
acquisition. Following Keyt’s objection, it is not clear why ideal features concerning the relation 
between the genus and species should come into play in making the universe alive. On the other 
hand, if, as the supporters of the view hold true, the Demiurge recognises an independent worth in 
additionally bringing about the genus ‘living being’ together with its ideal features in the physical 
world, we could wonder why the same procedure is not followed in all cases of metaphysical 
imitation in the cosmogony. After all, if those are ideal features, they would define any intelligible 
model.  
It suffices to consider the other notable case of metaphysical imitation described in the 
Timaeus as a term of comparison, i.e. the four elements, to show that in that case the Demiurge does 
not instantiate the genus in addition to the species: we know there are only four species of elements 
instantiated in the universe to resemble the same number of forms. Moreover, we know that the 
total amount of each is unified in one cosmic body (31b-32c), but that body is not itself a fifth 
element, meant to resemble the genus ‘bodily element’.124 If, as Mohr suggests, making an 
instantiation of the genus in addition to all the species is choice-worthy for every metaphysical 
imitation, the Demiurge acts inconsistently on it.125 It is more plausible, then, that the alternative 
reading is correct: the CILB is the most choice-worthy model, not only among the intelligible living 
beings, but, in absolute terms, as the most beautiful and worthy of intelligible things 
(καταξιώσωμεν, 30c4; τῷ γὰρ τῶν νοουμένων καλλίστῳ, 30d1-2) in virtue of its proper features of 
outstanding completeness.126  
To conclude my analysis, I return to where I started the section, to show how the 
completeness of the CILB is the reason for the making of specific outstanding features in the 
cosmic living being. Let us consider the three reasons given for having the cosmic body made out of 
 
124 Karel Thein argues that the CILB, much like the cosmic body, is not a distinct intelligible living being over and 
above the other species of living beings. Rather, it is simply a way of describing the compound of all the intelligible 
species of living beings. The decision to make a further, cosmic living being, is not due to the prescription of the model 
but an independent contrivance of the Demiurge (Thein 2006). His reading, however, is not tenable precisely because 
Plato, as seen above, presents the model as one chosen among intelligible living beings. 
125 The unity of the cosmic body, composed by the four elements, is created through a harmonious proportion, which 
allows for friendship and bond between the elements (Ti. 31b5-32c5). 
126 Brad Berman in his reading opposes the completeness of the CILB and its choice-worthiness in an unwarranted way 
(Berman 2016, p. 171). Completeness, as it emerges from Plato’s considerations, is inherently choice-worthy, as it is 
intended as plenitude tied with beauty, just as beauty is tied with goodness (87c4-5). The universe is made like the 
CILB because it is the best possible model, so the goal of making the universe the best possible cannot diverge from 
bringing about that metaphysical imitation. 
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the whole amount of the four elemental bodies as a case in point. The first reason is that “as a living 
being it should be as whole and complete as possible (ἵνα ὅλον ὅτι μάλιστα ζῷον τέλεον) and made 
up of complete parts” (32d1-2). Of course, as the cosmic living being is composed of a body and a 
soul, they both must be complete, hence prescribing the use of the whole amount for each of the 
bodily elements available. The second reason appeals to the all-comprehensiveness of living beings 
that follows from completeness, which requires that there is no available body outside. This reason 
is distinct from the first, despite leading to the same result. In fact, in this case, any ‘material’ left 
out of the cosmic body is here considered as a potential body for a living being existing outside the 
cosmos, so that the cosmos would not be any longer comprehensive of all the other physical living 
beings, as the CILB.  
Finally, the third reason concerns the preservation of a single cosmos from external threats, 
which once more leads to the result of not leaving anything external to the cosmic body (33a4-b1). 
The third reason is usually put in contrast with the first two, as it is taken to be a teleological 
consideration independent from the imitation of the CILB.127 However, it does not have to be the 
case: the goal which the reasoning is aiming for, I argue, is the uniqueness of the cosmos. 
Uniqueness, in the physical domain, requires not only that there is just one cosmos at the moment of 
creation, but also that it will be the only one ever created, by making it impossible for its body to be 
damaged by external bodies. That is, after all, what has been inferred from the model earlier on 
(“our universe came to be the one and only of its kind, is so now and will continue to be so in the 
future”, 31b2-3).128 
The completeness of the CILB later dictates the shape of the cosmos and, as a consequence of 
the reasons listed above, its unique kind of motion, i.e. a rotation around itself that is entirely free 
from wandering. 129 Clearly, then, its completeness has also the result of making the cosmos an 
exemplary living being, explaining its paradigmatic role for human beings seen at the beginning of 
the section. The further claim I put forth, in line with this reading and with the conclusions drawn in 
Section 2.3, is that the αἰών-ly nature attributed to the CILB in the definitional section (37d3) 
 
127 Conford, for instance, takes it to be an ad hoc response to previous philosophers that argued that, if the cosmos were 
unique, it would have been threatened by outside bodily elements (Cornford 1937, pp. 52-53). 
128 Berman points out that the model is not mentioned in the passage, so the reasons are not necessarily driven by 
imitation of the model (Berman 2016, pp. 169-170). However, the three reasons clearly mirror the three features 
inferred before, as completeness, all-comprehensiveness and uniqueness. Moreover, Berman’s reading of completeness 
aims to render the possession of a complete body conceptually reducible to having a body that is well-balanced in terms 
of its constituents. In this way, his reading would explain away completeness as means to the end of preserving that 
unified body (Berman 2016, pp. 176-178). However, the two aspects of the creation of the cosmic body are separately 
discussed in the text (31b-32c; 32c-33a), showing that they are independent from one another: establishing a proportion 
of the sort Plato describes must be possible even when not all the material stuff is involved, just as a body can be 
unified while not being the body suitable for the image of the CILB. 
129 Although its shape would be spherical regardless, qua living being, it is significant that it is also introduced as a 
complete and excellent shape (33b1-4). 
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should be considered one of the outstanding structural features that fall under the qualification 
‘complete’. If that were the case, we would have an explanation at hand for why time is an essential 
feature specific to the cosmic living being. 
A first hint supporting this reading is the adverb παντελῶς (37d4), that draws a distinction 
between the αἰών-ly nature of the CILB (also τῷ παντελεῖ ζῴῳ at 31b1) and the flawed αἰών-ly 
image that the cosmos becomes. It would seem that the deficiency of time in comparison with αἰών 
is a matter of completeness (and lack thereof). To further interpret αἰών as a feature stemming from 
the outstanding completeness of the CILB, however, we first need to address the meaning and role 
played by αἰών in the definitional section. In fact, we established in Section 2.3 that ‘eternity’ is an 
inadequate translation, since αἰών is presented as a proper feature of the CILB, there referred to as 
an everlasting living being. In the remainder of the chapter, a more general enquiry into the 
meaning of αἰών will give substance to the connection with life and completeness the term bears in 
Plato’s Timaeus. 
 
3.2. Aἰών as lifespan 
 
The main claim I intend to propose in this section is that, throughout its semantic history, αἰών can 
be interpreted as a term expressing a particular connotation of the word ‘life’. In particular, I will 
argue that the peculiarity of αἰών lies in the fact that it presents life as a totality, traditionally 
delimited by birth and death, translatable as ‘lifespan’ or ‘lifetime’. That notion of life can thus be 
distinguished from βίος and ζωή that are more often used for the activities one engages in in one’s 
life, or the very condition of being alive, as opposed to being dead. What changes in the course of 
αἰών’s semantic history is its increasingly paradigmatic function to describe a supra-temporal 
totality of life, which is only available to immortal and everlasting living beings. This new meaning 
of αἰών, I surmise, also informs Plato’s use of the term in the account of time. This reading has been 
previously defended systematically by Heleen M. Keizer, whose work I mainly follow in my 
analysis.130 
 
130 “We have seen that lexicons agree in giving ‘life’ as the first meaning of aiōn: the life of a human. But Greek also 
has the words zōē and bios to designate life. Briefly put, the word zōē refers to the state of being alive (not yet in 
Homer), and bios to the ways and means of maintaining this state” (Keizer 1999, p.16). All scholars agree on the 
traditional meaning of αἰών as lifespan or lifetime (Degani 2001, pp. 15-19; Festugière 1971, pp. 254-255; Keizer 1999, 
p.1-2; Ramelli – Kostan 2007, p. 5). However, Festugière and Degani also argue that the word detaches significantly 
from that meaning in later iterations and especially in Plato’s work, so that it can take the meaning of ‘eternity’. Not so 
Keizer, who highlights a continuity in the core semantics of the term, following and expanding on the insights from 
Brague and Böhme (Degani 2001; Festugière 1971; Keizer 1999; Brague 1982; Böhme 1974). I will use ‘lifespan’ 
because the compound word does not already hint to time rendering not trivial the connection αἰών bears with time. 
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The traditional meaning of αἰών is already found in Homer, where it alternates with a more 
general sense of ‘life’ or ‘life force’.131 In particular, αἰών is used in both the Iliad and Odyssey to 
refer to the life-force of mortals, thus naturally departing from them in the moment of death. It is 
said that the αἰών abandons Sarpedon, as later Odysseus expresses the desire to reach his homeland 
before he dies, namely before losing αἰών.132 Aἰών, in this sense, refers to life as a condition which 
can be either possessed or lost, close to the predominant use of ζωή  in later Greek literature. 
However, there is a second way of referring to αἰών, already found in Homer, that more explicitly 
describes αἰών as the whole span of one’s life, delimited by its birth and death. In this latter 
understanding one would not lose αἰών in death, but rather come to the completion, or end, of their 
whole lot of life.133 The latter conception, more than the former, is the one that is later 
predominantly employed in the history of the term and thus I will refer to it as the traditional 
meaning of αἰών, although this is not meant to suggest that the first use completely disappears in 
later authors. 
Life, in the traditional sense of αἰών, is conceived as a totality. Consequently, already in 
archaic literature and up to Plato’s times, mereological and quantitative terminology is often 
employed to qualify αἰών, as well as value-judgements.134 The attribution of a finite magnitude 
(either long or short) to αἰών persists from Homer to the tragedians like Euripides, and to later 
authors, like Xenophon (E. Med. 429-430; X. Ages. 10, 4; 11, 15).135 Plato himself uses the term in 
the traditional sense in various dialogues, although never in the Timaeus, and usually in passages 
with a high and poetic register. For example, in the Laws, it is used to describe the lifespan of the 
titans: they are said to “reproduce the character of the ancient Titans of the story, and thanks to 
getting into the same position as the Titans did, they live a wretched lifespan (χαλεπὸν αἰῶνα) of 
endless misery” (III 701c3-4).136 
 
131 Degani observes that in Homer a durational (as in ‘lifespan’) and non-durational (as in ‘life-force’) use of αἰών is 
equally present, and that we should not assume that the two appear as successive historical stages of the term’s 
semantics. “La ‘forza vitale’ non si rivelava, all’esperienza, che nella sua ‘durata’ – e l’una e l’altra erano la stessa 
cosa” (Degani 2001, p. 18). LSJ s.v. αἰών.   
132 Il. V 685-6, Od. VII 224-5 
133 Examples of this use of αἰών can be found at Il. IV 478-9 and IX 415-6 where respectively a short αἰών is attributed 
and a long one is predicted. 
134 Aἰών can be tearless, enjoyable or treacherous, in Pindar (O. II, 66-69; I. VIII, 14). 
135 An interesting fragment from the pseudo-Hesiodic Melampodia displays all the three terms for life at once without 
redundancy, showing that αἰών, despite being a life-related term, plays out a distinct function from the other two, being 
connected with the magnitude of life, as a totality: “you, who ordained me to have a long lifespan of life (μακρόν αἰῶνα 
βίοιο) and to live (ζώειν) for seven generations of men” (Hes. Fr. 276, 1s. M. – W). 
136 Plato’s use of the traditional sense of αἰών is mostly connected with a poetic nuance intended in the speech, or 
directly as a quotation of famous poets (Keizer 1999, p. 41). Other cases are in the Gorgias, where it is used in 
describing the lifespan of a skilled and experienced person, as opposed to an inexperienced one (448c6), and in the 
Protagoras, where he is quoting the verses of Simonides (345c7). Finally, in the Republic we find it in a colourful 
expression, describing the afterlife for the whole time as μέθην αἰώνιον, ‘life-long drunkenness’ (363d2). 
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Now that the traditional meaning of αἰών has been outlined, we can briefly look at the relation 
it bears with time. A paramount example of this close connection is the poetic depiction of Aἰών as 
son of Xρόνος in Euripides’ Heraclidae. The passage is telling as it presents the subordinate 
hierarchical position that αἰών has, in relation to time, opposite to the one we have seen in Plato’s 
definitional section.137 Herodotus illustrates this relation more clearly, as he articulates the Solonian 
doctrine of the ten ages that sets a limit on the human lifespan. As he presents it, the lifespan is not 
individual, but collective – measured in a fixed number of days, nights, months and years.138  
The passage employs αἰών, as much as ζωή and  βίος, to refer to the life measured in temporal 
terms: “In a long span of time (ἐν γὰρ τῷ μακρῷ χρόνῳ) it is possible to see many things that you 
do not want to, and to suffer them, too. I set the boundary of a man's life (οὖρον τῆς ζόης ἀνθρώπῳ) 
at seventy years. These seventy years have twenty-five thousand, two hundred days, leaving out the 
intercalary month […]. To me you seem to be very rich and to be king of many people, but I cannot 
answer your question before I learn that you ended your life well (τελευτήσαντα καλῶς τὸν αἰῶνα). 
The very rich man is not more fortunate than the man who has only his daily needs, unless he 
chances to end his life with all well (πάντα καλὰ ἔχοντα εὖ τελευτῆσαὶ τὸν βίον)”.139 Time, as a 
sum of years, months and days, measures the magnitude of a lifespan, and thus the date of its 
coming to an end, or completion (τελευτάω). Aἰών is here described as being measured by a certain 
amount of time. 
Interestingly, Aristotle’s definition of the traditional meaning of αἰών lays out a connection 
with time similar to the one outlined by Herodotus: “that name [i.e. αἰών] has been divinely uttered 
by the ancients. For the completeness which comprehends the time of everyone’s life (τὸ γὰρ τέλος 
τὸ περιέχον τὸν τῆς ἑκάστου ζωῆς χρόνον), that cannot be exceeded according to nature, has been 
named each one’s αἰών”.140 In Aristotle, just as in Herodotus, we find that αἰών is connected with 
ζωή and χρόνος. Aristotle, however, introduces a new term – τέλος, completeness –in connecting 
αἰών with time and life. As we have seen, αἰών puts an emphasis on the structural aspect of life, as a 
 
137 E. Hclid. 898-900. 
138 Already in one of Solon’s fragments on the doctrine of the ten ages we can find terminology involving measure and 
completion, albeit with no direct reference to αἰών and time: “if one by completing the tenth attains the measure 
(τελέσας κατὰ μέτρον ἵκοιτο) […]” (Sol. 27 v. 17 W.). 
139 Hdt. 1, 32, 2-5. As Keizer remarks, the life-terms are not used indifferently in the wider context of Herodotus’ work, 
in which βίος finds its particular use with reference to the ‘means of life’ (Keizer 1999, p. 13). In Sophocles’ Trachiniae 
the same point is made again and rendered uniquely with αἰών: “there is an ancient saying among men, once revealed to 
them, that you cannot know fully well a mortal’s men αἰών before one is dead, neither whether he has a good nor 
whether he has a bad one” (Trach. 1-3). Aristotle, around a century later, is discussing again the same Solonian puzzle, 
but his formulation of the complete lifespan does not involve αἰών, preferring βίος appropriately qualified: “having a 
complete span of life (λαβοῦσα μῆκος βίου τέλειον)” (EN X, 1177b25), and also at I, 1100a5 (βίου τελείου), and again 
at I, 1101a16, where there is a comparison between time, as a partial measure, and the complete life (μὴ τὸν τυχόντα 
χρόνον ἀλλὰ τέλειον βίον). This interchangeability shows the semantic closeness between the two and how the τέλειος 
qualification is crucial for paraphrasing αἰών, just as τέλος is crucial for Aristotle’s definition of αἰών. 
140 Arist. Cael. I, 279a23-24. 
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totality of life. Completeness, then, is fittingly employed in defining the term, especially since for 
Aristotle wholeness and completeness are almost synonyms, as they both present an item in 
mereological terms.141 In this way, Aristotle argues that αἰών is a form of completeness, delimited 
by the amount of time one’s life lasts for, or, as I put it, a temporally delimited totality of life. 
From what I argued so far, it is clear that my reading resists the interpretation of Aristotle’s 
definition and, more generally, of the traditional use of αἰών as a temporal notion.142 In my reading, 
rather, αἰών captures from the very beginning life as a totality, that is in mereological terms. So, 
while αἰών is thought as having a certain magnitude, measured in temporal terms, it also retains its 
qualitative aspect as a life-term that grounds it as a form of completeness: the temporal 
measurement corresponds to a totality of life, defined by the beginning and end of the living being’s 
existence.143 In my reading, however, time remains the fundamental term by which to define αἰών, 
as time both measures and encompasses the traditional αἰών. The relation between αἰών and time 
will persist, although turned upside down, with the semantic shift that αἰών undergoes in natural 
philosophy, as we will see in the next section. 
Before analysing the shifted meaning of αἰών, I will briefly linger on the fixed expressions δι’ 
αἰῶνος and πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα (and its variations), since they seem to stretch the traditional meaning 
of αἰών in a significant way, which might be the origin of the more systematic semantic shift taking 
place in natural philosophy. For instance, the rhetorician Isocrates – contemporary of Plato – 
repeatedly uses the formulation τὸν σύμπαντα αἰῶνα as well as ἅπαντα τὸν αἰῶνα and πάντα τὸν 
αἰῶνα to express a totality that clearly does not amount to a merely human lifespan, but to one of 
unfathomable length.144  
This extended use of αἰών does not show that the term develops a separate, abstractly 
temporal meaning that is detached from the traditional meaning of ‘lifespan’. I agree with Keizer 
that such fixed expressions show a hyperbolic re-elaboration of the traditional semantics of αἰών, so 
that it captures an amount of time of indefinite or even limitless length.145 It is plausible to assume 
 
141 “‘Complete’ means: That outside which it is impossible to find even a single one of its parts; e.g., the complete time 
of each thing is that outside which it is impossible to find any time which is a part of it” (Metaph. V, 1021b13-14). 
“Anything which has no parts beyond itself, however, is complete and whole […] (‘Whole’ and ‘complete’ are either 
utterly identical or very similar in nature)” (Ph. III, 6 207a8-9). 
142 Degani 2001, p. 28-29. 
143 I am here using Keizer’s distinction, which will become clearer when I will discuss the divine αἰών in Section 3.3: 
“Time is quantitative, the aspect with which the infinite motion of the outermost heaven presents itself as measurable 
and countable to the soul; aiōn is qualitative, and the total and perfect form (telos) of the durational extent of the 
outermost heaven” (Keizer 2016, p. 151). Admittedly, there is a derivative use of αἰών in the plural form that employs 
αἰών as a temporal unit, found for example in Empedocles and Aeschylus. Aἰών stands here as a generic unit of 
measurement, close to the temporal use of ‘generation’ (γενεά). For example, Empedocles states that the man of 
exceptional knowledge “easily saw each of the all things which are in ten or twenty αἰῶνες (ἀνθρώπων αἰώνεσσιν)” 
(DK 129B, 5-6). See also fn. 135. 
144 Isoc. Paneg. 28, 46; De Pace 34.  
145 Keizer 1999, p. 39-40. 
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that the traditional term lends itself to not simply indicate a lifespan of length commensurate to 
human standards, but a temporal stretch beyond human conceivability, that captures a more 
universal totality, in the same way the English language allows an idiomatic meaning of the fixed 
expression ‘for life’ as ‘forever’. The emphasis on αἰών as a totality of sort (πάντα) shows an 
important continuity in meaning with the traditional notion referring to a complete lifespan. 
However, a clear distinction between the hyperbolic use of αἰών and the infinity of time will only 
be laid out explicitly from Plato onwards, as we will see in Section 3.3 and 4.1. Notably, Plato uses 
the phrase ‘for all αἰών’ (πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα, 38c1-2) in his account of time to characterise the 
tenseless life of the CILB, highlighting that it is mirrored by and yet profoundly differs from ‘for all 
time’, predicated of the cosmos (τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, 38c2, and beforehand, τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον, 
36e5). 
As for δι’ αἰῶνος – throughout a lifetime – the expression appears several times in Aeschylus’ 
tragedies, in Empedocles’ philosophical poetry and, later, in Xenophon’s prose, proving to be 
widely employed regardless of the literary genres. In this formulation, αἰών refers to someone’s 
lifespan (e.g. in Sophocles, Elect. 1024) just as easily as to an endless (temporal) totality (e.g. in 
Aeschylus, Suppl. 574-582) and its emphasis, once more, is on the whole (‘throughout’).146 
Although this formulation does not appear directly in Plato’s account, an intriguing, albeit 
inevitably speculative hypothesis proposed by Keizer is that the apparent neologism διαιώνιος, used 
twice in Plato’s account, is a contracted version of the above-mentioned expression, presumably 
employed to emphasise the paradigmatic character of the αἰών-ly nature of the model, as opposed to 
the αἰών-ly image.147 
 
3.3. The semantic shift and the divine αἰών  
 
Given my reading of αἰών, an explanation is needed of why Plato is attributing an αἰών-ly nature to 
the CILB, presented in the definitional section as an everlasting living being and contrasted with the 
begotten nature of the cosmos (see Section 2.3). As it is generally acknowledged, there is a special 
use of αἰών among natural philosophers, that leads to a significant shift in the semantics of αἰών, 
such that it does not correspond any longer to the traditional notion of a lifespan delimited by birth 
and death.148 However, I claim, following Keizer, that the shift can be accounted for as a special use 
that retains the core meaning of ‘lifespan’, insofar as it captures life as a totality.  
 
146 DK 31B110, 3; X. Cyr. 2, 1, 19; Ages. 10, 4; 11, 5. The only occurrence of αἰών in Thucydides is at I 70, 8. 
147 Keizer 1999, p. 71.  
148 Festugiére 1971, p. 258, Keizer 1999, pp. 3-5, Ramelli-Konstan 2007, p. 6, fn. 4. 
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What changes is that, by using αἰών primarily for a paradigmatic and divine sort of lifespan 
that has no birth or death, philosophers envisage the traditional meaning of αἰών as describing a 
deficient totality of life, by comparison. The semantic shift is most clearly highlighted by the 
hierarchical inversion in the relationship between αἰών and time: in fact, the traditional αἰών is a 
totality only in a qualified sense, insofar as it is temporally delimited, whereas the divine αἰών is a 
supratemporal totality of life. I will show how this reading can be applied consistently to 
occurrences of αἰών in Empedocles, Plato (besides the Timaeus) and, most importantly, Aristotle. 
 
A) Empedocles 
Empedocles mainly employs αἰών in the traditional sense.149 However, there are two passages in 
which a shift is noticeable in both the scope of application and meaning of αἰών. The first passage 
(DK 31B26, 10-13) compares the divine condition of existence and that of mortal living beings, 
highlighting how the latter’s αἰών is deficient, whereas the second passage (DK 31B16) refers to 
cosmic and divine powers, describing their alternate activity as taking place throughout αἰών. The 
attribution of αἰών to physical gods, which Plato considers only possible in a qualified sense, does 
not make Plato’s use of αἰών incompatible with Empedocles’. Their disagreement is driven by a 
different understanding of the ontological constitution of physical gods: for Empedocles at least 
certain physical gods are forever in existence, whereas in Plato they are created and their 
sempiternity relies on the good will of the Demiurge.150 
The first passage contrasts the mortal and divine aspect of the intermingling of the four 
elements: “Insofar as they are wont to grow into one out of many, and again divided become more 
than one, so  far they come into being and their αἰών is not stable (γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὔ σφισιν 
ἔμπεδος αἰών); but in so far as they never cease changing continually, so far are they evermore, 
immovable in the cycle (αἰὲν ἔασιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον)”. The implicit subject of the sentence 
are the four elements, and they are looked at in two different ways, in accordance with what it has 
been said in the previous lines of the poem about mixing and dissolving many from one and vice 
versa. In the first half of the sentence, the elements are considered inasmuch as they compose 
 
149 See fn. 143, 146. 
150 The fundamental cosmic constituents retain the names of traditional divinities, like Zeus, Hera, Aidoneus and Nestis 
(DK 31B6). As Sedley points out, their naturalistic explanation of the world is not detachable from divine entities, and 
thus there is no reason why we should not take Empedocles seriously when he is using a theological lexicon to account 
for the fundamental components of the world (Sedley 2007, pp. 1-8). Another example of Empedocles’ understanding 
of the divine can be found at DK 31B115 where an ancient and everlasting decree of the gods (θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, 
ἀίδιον) sets the rules of reincarnations of mortal beings. However, at least some physical gods, will being qualified as 
‘immortal’, are not existing forever (see Long 2017 for an extensive discussion). 
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corporeal mixtures that live mortal lives.151 In the second half of the sentence the same elements are 
thought of as those persisting in the endless cycle of mixing and separating out that produces and 
destroys mortal life. 
Aἰών, despite retaining its traditional meaning of a temporally delimited lifespan of mixtures, 
e.g. men and all the other mortal creatures, is qualified in a way that emphasises its deficiency, as 
not stable or continual (ἔμπεδος). In order to have a grasp on the reasons for this remark we should 
focus, as Festugière suggests, on the contrast articulated in the passage between the ontological 
status ‘generated’ leading to ‘without stable αἰών’ and ‘changeless’ or ‘without motion’, which is 
associated with ‘always being’.152 The text might be suggesting, by means of poetic homophony, 
that, the elemental gods, insofar as they are always changeless in the cycle of various generations of 
mortal beings, do have a ‘proper’ αἰών, i.e. αἰὲν ἔασιν. Aristotle is perhaps thinking of this passage 
when he argues in De Caelo that the etymology of αἰών is ‘always-being’ (ἀεί εἶναι).153 
An interesting upshot comes from this reading, as it anticipates Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
treatment of αἰών: ‘always being changeless’ seems the adequate condition to have one’s life 
referred to as a proper αἰών, and vice versa, while ‘being generated’ is the condition that makes 
one’s αἰών deficient. A first, notable feature of the semantic shift, then, is that the attribution of 
αἰών hinges on ontological grounds, namely whether the living being is of the kind that undergoes 
generation (and consequent destruction) or, on the contrary, it continues forever. As we have seen 
already in Section 2.3, the definitional section showcases a passage where the begotten nature of the 
cosmos is the reason for its inability to be completely αἰών-ly, contrasted with the model, that is 
αἰών-ly in virtue of being an everlasting living being. The same claim appears in Aristotle, as we 
will see below. 
The second passage shows that in Empedocles αἰών is connected with a cosmic lifespan, 
perhaps anticipating Plato’s description of the cosmos as an αἰών-ly image. The passage focuses on 
Love and Strife, the two divine powers responsible for the successive zoogonies endlessly taking 
place in the cosmos: “For they are, as they were before and will be, nor do I think that an 
unspeakably great αἰών will ever be empty of these two”. A plausible conjecture supported by both 
Festugière and Degani takes αἰών to be the lifespan of the cosmos, as within it takes place the 
endless alternation of the rule of Love and Strife. In fact, the two are invoked to explain not only 
micro-processes, but the very arrangement of the cosmos, most notably when under the power of 
 
151 Ibid. vv. 5-6. 
152 Festugière 1971, p. 256. 
153 Arist. Cael. I 279a27.  
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Love it becomes the sphairos.154 The qualification of the cosmic αἰών, unlike the unstable one in 
the previous passage, is ἄσπετος, unspeakably great, which can either describe an endless αἰών, or 
one of great length that is endlessly repeated, along with the alternation of divine powers.155 
 
B) Plato 
Besides the Timaeus, in Plato there is only one occurrence of αἰώνιος that falls under the shifted 
meaning of αἰών. The term appears in the Laws, book X, when the Athenian guest discusses 
metempsychosis as a cosmic process of putting together and separating out body and soul, in a clear 
parallel with Empedocles’ doctrine of mortal living beings as mixtures of unperishable elements.156 
The passage describes the divine activity of arranging mortal souls in successive lives, and their 
proper allocation at each new generation: “our king saw that all actions involve soul, and there is 
much virtue in them, but also much vice, and that, having come to be, soul and body are 
indestructible but not αἰών-ly, like the gods that exist according to the law (ἀνώλεθρον δὲ ὂν 
γενόμενον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αἰώνιον, ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καθάπερ οἱ κατὰ νόμον ὄντες θεοί) – for there 
would never have been coming into being of living beings if either of these two had been 
destroyed”.157  
If we look at the above passage bearing in mind Empedocles’ comparison between mortal and 
divine beings with regard to αἰών, we can adjudicate which is the most promising reading of the 
ambiguous reference of καθάπερ. The possible readings are the following: 1) the gods are 
indestructible but not αἰών-ly, just like the soul and the body of men, or 2) the gods, unlike their 
counterpart, are indestructible and αἰών-ly. I take that the second reading is the most promising one, 
since gods must be introduced in contrast with mortal living beings, whose components are indeed 
indestructible and yet live several lives together while being periodically separated in between. 
Because of the periodical separation they are not αἰών-ly.158  
 
154 As pointed out by Festugière and Degani, the sphairos is considered a god, and therefore it could be its lifespan 
under the two divine powers that is considered here (Festugière 1971, pp. 258-59, Degani 2001, p. 32). While it cannot 
be denied that αἰών is used in the passage to capture a definite or indefinite time-measure, we should also ask why 
Empedocles uses αἰών instead of χρόνος. After all, the latter is preferred on other occasions to describe the endless 
succession of cosmic cycles between elements (31B17 v. 38, 31B30 v. 6). A viable alternative reading is that the 
unspeakably great αἰών could still correspond to a temporally finite span of life, although unfathomable. In particular, 
the totality that is discussed could be the cosmic lifespan that ends when the elements are completely unified, under the 
rule of Love, and the cosmos becomes a sphairos, or when it is again dissolved in the various elements by Strife. 
155 For the cosmic connection of ἄσπετος, see Il. 8.558 (LSJ s.v. ἄσπετος).  
156 In Plato’s remark, just as in Empedocles’, the components persist throughout every new mixture without being 
destroyed (see DK 31B17, 26-35). Moreover, already in the immediately prior attempt to give an explanation of the 
process of metempsychosis, the Athenian guest proposes an account that closely resembles the one-to-many and many-
to-one processes that take place between the elements in Empedocles. 
157 Lg. X, 903d3-904b1. 
158 For a wider discussion of the exegetical issues raised by the passage, see Keizer and Mayhew (Keizer 1999, p. 63-
64; Mayhew 2008, pp. 173-184). 
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Once more, at the core of the passage is the criterion of generation, or lack thereof: successive 
lives, in which the body and soul persist through several births and deaths, ward off the αἰών-ly 
qualification, despite the indestructibility of the components. The interruption provoked by birth 
and death denies to mortal living beings the αἰών-ly qualification. Aἰών, in its new meaning, only 
applies to divine life, as the traditionally everlasting one, hence taken to be without generation or 
destruction. I will refer in the remainder of the chapter to the shifted notion of αἰών as ‘divine 
αἰών’. 
 
C) Aristotle 
Aristotle is chronologically the closest philosopher to Plato who explicitly defines αἰών in De 
Caelo, both in the traditional and divine sense, moreover consistently using the term in the latter 
sense in other works. As such, Aristotle’s work provides crucial insight into the new meaning of 
αἰών, which makes it a crucial term of comparison for Plato’s treatment of αἰών in the Timaeus. In 
De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle distinguishes between two sorts of living beings: “some are 
ungenerated and imperishable for all αἰών (ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα), but 
others partake in generation and perishing. The former are excellent beyond compare and divine, 
but less accessible to knowledge”.159 The fixed expression ‘for all αἰών’, already discussed in 
Section 3.2, is employed by Aristotle to draw a distinction between fundamentally different forms 
of life: the divine and mortal one. 
The former sort of living beings is not the focus in that work but is discussed in Metaphysics 
and De Caelo. In Metaphysics, book XII (1072b25), Aristotle discusses the case of the unmoved 
mover – a god – that is said to always (ἀεί) be in an optimal and blessed condition, as opposed to 
us, who are in that condition occasionally (ποτέ). Furthermore, he clarifies that this optimal 
condition consists in a purely intellectual activity, and that such an activity is life (ζωὴ, b26). To 
conclude the discussion of the topic, Aristotle adds that the god is an excellent and everlasting 
living being (ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον), and the direct consequence of this is that the god has “life and 
αἰὼν that are continuous and everlasting (ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ 
θεῷ)”.160 ‘Zωὴ καὶ αἰὼν’ is a hendiadys, and αἰὼν an additional way of presenting the life of that 
god that is not captured by ζωὴ alone. 
Although nothing conclusive concerning the divine αἰὼν can be inferred from the passage, the 
connection the term bears with divine life is confirmed, and in particular with its everlasting 
qualification (ἀίδιον), also mentioned in Plato’s definitional section. This passage, together with the 
 
159 PA I, 5 644b22-24. 
160 Metaph. XII, 7 1072b28-30. See also 1073b-c. 
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one above, shows the other side of the ‘generation condition’ previously discussed. While in Plato 
and Empedocles’ passages we have seen that generation either wards off the αἰών-ly qualification 
from a living being or it entails that their αἰών is deficient, in Aristotle we find the contrapositive 
claim: only an everlasting, and hence ungenerated and imperishable life can be truly described as 
αἰών.161 
To gain further insight into how to conceive of a divine and everlasting αἰών, however, De 
Caelo I, 9 279a16-b3 is the crucial passage to examine. We already touched upon the passage in 
discussing Aristotle’s definition of the traditional meaning of αἰών, in Section 3.2. Aristotle, 
however, introduces that definition only to account for the shifted meaning of αἰών he is employing 
throughout the passage and beyond. I divide the passage in three parts: (a) from 279a16 onwards, 
Aristotle introduces αἰών into the discussion by referring to what is outside the heaven. ‘Those-
over-there’ do not belong in the physical world, as “they continue for their whole αἰών 
(τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα) unalterable and unaffected, living the best and most self-sufficient of lives”. (b) 
At a22 the focus turns to αἰών, first in the traditional definition discussed in Section 3.2, whose 
meaning is then extended in a second definition of the αἰών of the whole heaven. (c) Finally, at a28, 
either what is outside the heaven or the heaven itself is portrayed as the divine thing from which life 
and being within the heaven derive – outlining a relation of dependence between the traditional and 
the divine αἰών. 
The understanding of the divine αἰών outlined so far is confirmed by section (a): “Therefore, 
those-over-there, are not such as to be in place (Διόπερ οὔτ’ ἐν τόπῳ τἀκεῖ πέφυκεν), nor does time 
cause them to age; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost 
motion (τῶν ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐξωτάτω τεταγμένων φοράν)”. Such things are said to have the most self-
sufficient life in their inalterability (ἀλλ’ ἀναλλοίωτα καὶ ἀπαθῆ τὴν ἀρίστην ἔχοντα ζωὴν καὶ τὴν 
αὐταρκεστάτην), and to continue for all αἰών (διατελεῖ τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα) – adopting once more the 
expression also employed in De Partibus Animalium.162 Notably, this sort of divine life is possible 
 
161 Keizer remarks that Aristotle is at ease in attributing a ‘temporal’ qualification to a transcendent god, such as ἀίδιος, 
since he also repeatedly applies the term to physical entities, like motion, time and the heaven (Keizer 2016, p. 139). 
However, as far as I can see, nothing indicates that ‘everlasting’ is used as a ‘temporal’ term by Aristotle, if time, just as 
other things, is considered everlasting. As we have seen already in Section 2.1 and 2.3, Plato consistently uses ἀίδιος as 
the contradictory feature of ‘come to be’ and ‘begotten’ and Aristotle seemingly employs the term in the same way, by 
applying to the motion of the heaven and to the unmoved movers despite the fact that their relation with time is different 
(for which see below). Admittedly, Aristotle also uses ‘imperishable’ (ἄφθαρτον) and ‘ungenerated’ (ἀγένητον) as 
contradictory opposites of ‘being subject to generation and perishing’, but it is also the case that the two entail ‘being 
everlasting’ (see Cael. I, 10; 12 282a30-b7). 
162 The accusative form plus the verb διατελέω is found in the Corpus Platonicum in association with βίος, as for 
example in the Apology, where Socrates is commenting that without him they would “spend the rest of their life in 
slumber (τὸν λοιπὸν βίον καθεύδοντες διατελοῖτε)” (31a5-6). 
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only outside the heaven, where there is no matter, change and hence time.163 It would therefore 
seem natural to identify ‘those-over-there’ with the plurality of unmoved movers described in the 
Metaphysics, as the majority of scholars do.164 
However, before discussing Aristotle’s definition of αἰών in (b), we must address the 
exegetical puzzle arising from the attribution of αἰών first to ‘those-over-there’ and secondly to the 
whole heaven (τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ).165 In fact, it would seem that in the digression on αἰών, the 
focus shifts back and forth between those-over-there, outside the heaven, and the heaven itself, 
while αἰών is associated with both. To solve the puzzle we should either reject the thesis that the 
beings beyond the heaven or the heaven are directly associated with the divine αἰών or accept the 
claim that both meet the preconditions associated with αἰών. My solution is the latter, but in order to 
vindicate it, we should first consider what ‘the whole heaven’ refers to in the passage. In the 
discussion that leads to the digression on αἰών three distinct meanings of οὐρανός are 
distinguished.166 Excluding a reference to the part of the heaven where the stars and planets move, 
both (1) the whole body comprehended by the outermost sphere (τὸ περιεχόμενον σῶμα ὑπὸ τῆς 
ἐσχάτης περιφορᾶς) and (2) the substance of the outermost sphere itself (τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς 
ἐσχάτης τοῦ παντὸς περιφορᾶς) are viable candidates. 
While the emphasis on wholeness would suggest that Aristotle is thinking of (1), the immortal 
and divine qualification (ἀθάνατος καὶ θεῖος, 279a28) cannot be attributed to the entirety of the 
physical world, as this includes the sublunar part, where generation and destruction take place. The 
sublunar part of the universe is in fact associated with mortal life, characterised by a traditional 
αἰών and contrasted with the divine one in (c), confirming that the dichotomy crucial to the entire 
digression is between being in or outside the heaven, and is expressed by the comprehending-
comprehended relation we already encountered when we analysed Plato’s account of the cosmos in 
Section 3.1.167  
 
163 Aristotle maintains, both in De Caelo (279a12-16) and the Physics (218b21-219a9, 251b11-28), that there is no time 
without change and motion. 
164 Simplicius, despite being inclined to interpret this plurality as unmoved movers, points to a dispute on the issue 
between various ancient interpreters, considering whether such things are the unmoved movers or the outermost sphere 
of the universe or the heavenly bodies (In Cael. 287,20-288,9). That debate is still ongoing. For instance, whereas 
Keizer tends to read ‘those-over-there’ as analogues of the unmoved movers Aristotle treats in the Metaphysics (Keizer 
2016 p. 135-139), Degani takes them to be heavenly beings (Degani 2001, p. 43). A more comprehensive outline of the 
debate can be found in Keizer 2016, pp. 135-138. 
165 For a more thorough discussion of the details concerning the passage, see Broadie 2009 and Keizer 2016. 
166 “We call ‘heaven’ the substance of the extreme circumference of the whole or that natural body whose place is at the 
extreme circumference […]. In another sense, we use this name for the body continuous with the extreme circumference 
which encompasses the moon, the sun, and some of the stars; these we say are ‘in the heaven’. In yet another sense we 
give the name to all body comprehended within extreme circumference, since we habitually call the whole or totality 
‘the heaven’” (278b10-20). 
167 The question setting out the whole digression on αἰών is whether there is any more body that is outside the extreme 
circumference of the heaven, hence not being included in the whole that the circumference contains (τὸ ὅλον τὸ ὑπὸ 
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Moreover, at the beginning of Book II, the heaven is said to be “one and everlasting with no 
beginning or end of all αἰών, but embracing and comprehending in itself the unlimited time (ἀλλ’ 
ἔστιν εἷς καὶ ἀΐδιος, ἀρχὴν μὲν καὶ τελευτὴν οὐκ ἔχων τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος, ἔχων δὲ καὶ περιέχων ἐν 
αὑτῷ τὸν ἄπειρον χρόνον, 283b26-30)”. The passage shows that what Aristotle means when he 
refers to ‘heaven’ in connection with αἰών is rather (2) i.e. the substance of the outermost sphere 
enclosing the entirety of the physical world, rather than anything within it. In fact, that substance 
constitutes the limit of the physical world, and has been previously referred to as the seat of all that 
is divine.168 Most importantly, however, it differs ontologically from the physical world it contains, 
characterised by physical features such as change, time and place. That substance does not undergo 
change, is not located anywhere and, most importantly, comprehends the unlimited time. As such, it 
deserves, together with ‘those-over-there’, to be identified as ‘non-physical’ in its ontological 
constitution.169  
If my hypothesis is correct, the αἰών of the whole heaven refers to the divine sort of αἰών that 
is common to the heavenly substance and the unmoved movers, as they are both divine and non-
physical living beings.170 In (b), Aristotle defines the divine αἰών by deriving it from the traditional 
notion, seen in Section 3.2: “the completeness of the whole heaven, the completeness which 
comprehends all time and infinity, is αἰών” (τὸ τοῦ παντὸς οὐρανοῦ τέλος καὶ τὸ τὸν πάντα χρόνον 
καὶ τὴν ἀπειρίαν περιέχον τέλος αἰών ἐστιν, 279a25-27).171  
Once more, αἰών is defined as a form of completeness. However, what changes is the 
relationship between αἰών and time, as it is here turned upside down: whereas in the traditional 
definition, αἰών comprehends a finite time – thereby being also measured in temporal terms – the 
divine αἰών comprehends all time and infinity. The divine αἰών is a totality that is not temporally 
measured and, as such, it is appropriate for living beings outside the physical world, where change 
 
τῆς ἐσχάτης περιεχόμενον περιφορᾶς, 278b22-23). For the connection between αἰών and the limit between the physical 
world and what remains outside, see Keizer 2016, pp. 137-138. 
168 “We recognize habitually a special right to the name 'heaven' in the extremity or above (τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ ἄνω), 
which we take to be the seat of all that is divine (ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ θεῖον πᾶν ἱδρῦσθαί φαμεν)” (278b14-15). In the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle recognises that “the divine is that which comprehends the entire nature” as a truthful and 
divinely inspired doctrine of the ancient theologians (XII, 8 1074b3). 
169 In the Physics’ account of place, the heaven is taken not to be anywhere because no body comprehends it, while it 
comprehends every other body (IV, 5 212b7-22). 
170 Thomas Johansen, among others, argues convincingly that in De Caelo the reference to divine beings entails that the 
heavenly bodies and beyond are said to be alive and ensouled (see Johansen 2009, pp. 18-24). Importantly, Johansen’s 
argument in favour of this reading does not rely on the passage I am currently discussing, but on teleological 
considerations which are necessitating the presence of a soul as in 285a27-30, 286a7-12, 292a18-21. Ursula Coope 
suggests that even the heavenly bodies might be grouped together with the outermost sphere and the unmoved movers 
beyond heaven, insofar as their existence will also forever continue unaltered (Coope 2005, pp. 150-153). However, 
Aristotle describes them as being bodies in the heaven (see fn. 166), thus suggesting that in the contrast he is 
highlighting, they rather belong within the physical world. 
171 I read the καὶ in the definition epexegetically.  
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and time belong.172 The divine αἰών is also different from the endless duration described by ‘time 
and infinity’, since infinity is defined in the Physics as ‘always incomplete’. As such, it never 
comprehends, and is rather comprehended by completeness, as the divine αἰών does.173 The divine 
αἰών, however, is a supratemporal totality, rather than an atemporal one. In fact, the heaven and 
those-over-there comprehend all time in their divine αἰών, just as the traditional αἰών comprehends 
part of it, so that the relationship with the temporal dimension remains crucial to defining both.174 
If my reconstruction is correct, Aristotle’s conception of the divine αἰών displays three crucial 
features that find a correspondence in the use of αἰών in Plato’s account of time: (1) it confirms that 
even in Aristotle αἰών acquires an extended, paradigmatic sense that is predicated of divine and 
non-physical life, and displays a semantic continuity with the traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’ and 
its mereological focus on completeness, which I rendered as ‘totality of life’. The translation of 
αἰών as ‘eternity’ fails to capture that persistent meaning. (2) The divine αἰών is a supratemporal 
totality of life, in the precise sense that, unlike the traditional αἰών, it is not measured by time, but 
transcends it. In Aristotle, unlike in Plato, there is no imitative relation between αἰών and time, but 
there is a comprehending-comprehended relation, highlighting the pre-eminence of αἰών’s 
completeness over the incompleteness of time. (3) The divine αἰών, grounded in certain 
ontologically defining features of the living being, like immortality, unchangeability and 
everlastingness, does not belong in the physical world, but outside it. To be a physical living being, 
in fact, entails generation or, at least, change, i.e. features that impair the possession of the divine 
αἰών. 
Given the picture presented in this section, Plato’s use of αἰών in the definitional section bears 
clear similarities with the philosophical elaboration of the notion of divine αἰών before and after 
him, as it continues in Aristotle’s work and perhaps had its origins in Empedocles. In particular, 
point (1) and point (3) apply straightforwardly to Plato’s notion of αἰών: in the Timaeus, αἰών is 
associated with a living being, albeit an ideal one, and it is grounded in its ontological constitution. 
The living being is in fact everlasting, and hence without generation. The originality of Plato’s use 
lies in the attribution of the αἰών-ly nature to a form of a living being – the CILB discussed in 
Section 3.1 – which is paradigmatic in the loaded sense of being used as a model for the cosmos. 
 
172 In the Physics Aristotle states that “anything that always is, insofar as it always is, is not in time: it is not 
encompassed by time, nor its being is measured by time (τὰ αἰεὶ ὄντα, ᾗ αἰεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ). This is also 
indicated by the fact that it is not affected at all by time either” (IV, 221b3-6). Similarly, in De Caelo: “in the case of 
that which always is, there is no time for such a capacity of not being, whether the supposed time is finite or infinite; for 
its capacity of being must encompass the finite time since it covers infinite time” (I, 281b29-31). See Broadie 2009, p. 
36, for a similar reading. 
173 In the Physics, Aristotle argues that “a quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside what has 
been already taken. On the other hand, what has nothing outside is complete and whole” (III, 6 206b33-207a32). 
174 Despite his analysis of αἰών in Plato, Festugière puts forth the same claim about the use of αἰών by natural 
philosophers up to Plato (Festugière 1971, p. 260). 
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On the one hand, the completeness defining αἰών is seemingly associated with the completeness of 
the CILB. On the other, since the CILB is αἰών-ly, αἰών is not simply taken to be complete in a way 
that time is not (37d4), but it is also the paradigmatic term of comparison for the creation of time. 
With these new insights in place, we can return to Plato’s account of time to develop the 
‘biological’ level of analysis that the divine αἰών introduces. 
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Ch. 4: Aἰών and temporal life in the Timaeus 
 
In Chapter 3 I argued that the ostensible novelty of Plato’s use of αἰών as a paradigm for time is 
grounded in the development of the notion of a divine αἰών in natural philosophy. The divine αἰών 
is a totality of life – a lifespan – that is not bound by temporal delimitations, and as such, the living 
being it is predicated of requires a specific ontological constitution, i.e. to be everlasting and 
without generation, as it is typical of divine beings. The same notion, I argued, can be found in 
Plato’s account of time in the Timaeus, although in this case the αἰών-ly nature is predicated of an 
ideal living being, characterised by completeness, I named CILB (Complete Intelligible Living 
Being).  
In Section 3.1 I argued that the CILB is not a genus of living being and suggested that it 
rather is the paradigm-case of the all-complete species of living being. However, this poses a 
question regarding the sense in which the CILB is a living being. Sarah Broadie distinguishes two 
ways in which we can conceptualise the intelligible living being as the paradigm for the cosmic 
living being: (1) as itself a living being, hence committing to a self-predicative conception of forms 
in the Timaeus or (2) as a ‘practical quiddity’, that is just as a ‘recipe’ to make a visible living being 
that does not share significant features with the living being that results from it. While in the latter 
reading ‘living being’ simply defines its function as a παράδειγμα, in the former that function does 
not exhaust the CILB is, as it is itself a special kind of living being.175 
Given my interpretation of αἰών as a paradigmatic totality of life proposed in Chapter 3, 
reading (1) should be preferred. However, insofar as the reading is committed to self-predication, 
opting for it requires at least a brief discussion of how to understand that the CILB is alive.176 We 
might in fact doubt that the CILB resembles the way in which any physical living being, the cosmos 
included, is alive, namely as body-soul compounds revolving around themselves. In fact by the very 
description of living beings I outlined in sub-section 2.1.2, since the CILB is not in motion it cannot 
have any metabolism or be animated by a soul as all other living beings do. 
However, it is dubious whether life requires the motion of a soul or metabolism. While such 
a dependence is upheld in the Sophist, at 248e1-249d4, it might be that the claim applies only to 
 
175 Broadie 2012, pp. 67-74.  
176 For evidence that Plato was committed to self-predication even post-Parmenides, see for instance Robert 
Heinaman’s discussion of the Sophist (Heinaman 1981). For a recent interpretation that defends self-predication as not 
self-defeating, see Apolloni 2011. Moreover, see Barbara Sattler’s argument that the intelligible living being is like the 
form of the beautiful, which is itself a paradigm of beauty (Sattler 2019, fn. 39). Her view opposes to the reading put 
forth by Cornford and Sedley that the intelligible living being simply is the genus ‘living being’ and thus an abstract 
essence that is not itself alive (Cornford 1937, pp. 39-43; Sedley 2007 p. 108 fn. 36), which I rejected on independent 
ground already in Section 3.1. 
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sensible living beings, and does not say anything about the possibility of intelligible life.177 The 
difference between the CILB and the sensible living beings is after all explainable in virtue of their 
ontological constitution, as we have seen in Section 2.3. Additional contrivances are needed to 
make the cosmos in remblance of the paradigm of living being: we could include most of the works 
of the Demiurge, but first and foremost, it seems that the creation of a soul is required by the fact 
that the universe is a body, with the goal of making it intelligent (30b4-5). 
Even so, since Plato does not characterise in any positive way the ‘alive’ status of the CILB, 
any claim in that sense is inevitably speculative. Nonetheless, the CILB could be profitably 
compared with the Demiurge, as the other main candidate in the dialogue as an intelligible living 
being. If my interpretation in Section 2.3 is correct, the model and the Demiurge are presented as 
everlasting gods manifested in the ἄγαλμα. This would suggest a similarity between the two, qua 
everlasting gods, while remaining distinct in function. Although the Demiurge is never said to be 
alive, it is repeatedly said to be a god (30a2, 30d3, etc.) while also being included among the 
intelligible things (37a1). Given that Plato in general considers gods as living beings, he would 
perhaps be reluctant to say that the Demiurge is not alive once he has been included among them, 
albeit as one separate from the physical world.  
Moreover, the ordering work of the Demiurge is also presented as νοῦς persuading necessity 
(48a1-2) and described throughout the speech as involving theoretical as much as practical 
judgement, without thereby including motion. To make something intelligent, however, is also the 
ultimate goal in making the universe alive (30b1-3) and this might suggest that the CILB is of an 
akin nature to the Demiurge just as to the cosmos, and thus, as the other two, it also has a form of 
intellectual life. Finally, both the CILB’s αἰών and the natural condition of the Demiurge, once he 
finished his work, are characterised as a condition of remaining, or abiding (μένοντος αἰῶνος, 37d6; 
ἔμενεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ κατὰ τρόπον ἤθει, 42e5-6). This might suggest that they share a similar way of 
existing as living beings despite the different function they have, as model and cause respectively. 
Be that as it may, as we will see below, in discussing αἰῶν and time Plato clearly focuses on the 
ontological and structural underpinnings of the CILB, more than the content of its life, and that is 
perhaps why the intelligible life is not further enquired about.178 
 
 
177 Despite not being decisive evidence for the Timaeus, Aristotle’s divine unmoved movers are presented as being alive 
despite not partaking in motion or anything physical, showing that purely intellectual life without a soul-body 
compound is at least a conceivable possibility (see Section 3.3). 
178 See fn. 188 for my distinction of life in the generic sense as opposed to the specific explication of what such life 
consists in. 
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4.1. Time and αἰών as structured totalities of life 
 
In Section 2.4 I offered a provisional analysis of Plato’s definition of time and αἰών, and of their 
similarity and difference. Given the insights from Chapter 3, however, we are now in a position to 
complete that analysis, in its connection with life and completeness. As anticipated then, Plato’s 
definitions of time and αἰών are best analysed in terms of a structural and ontological component. In 
this section, these two components will be interpreted with the help of the dichotomy of content and 
structure, as originally thematised in Verity Harte’s work.  
This choice requires justification. While in my previous reading the ontological component 
was opposed to the structural, I also highlighted how the ontological component was grounded in 
the living beings of which time and αἰών are essential features. In other words, the ontological 
constitution of the cosmos and the CILB is part of the definitions of time and αἰών. After Chapter 3, 
we have a better grasp of why the two living beings are grounding time and αἰών respectively, 
given that the last two are now understood as totalities of life. The content-structure dichotomy is 
especially fitting for an analysis of the relation between the mereological structure (i.e. the totality) 
and ontologically antithetical lives. Before addressing the special application in the case of time and 
αἰών, however, the dichotomy needs to be introduced in general terms.  
Based on an analysis of Plato’s late dialogues, Harte takes both structure and content to be 
primitive items in his ontology, and crucial to his analysis of mereological objects.179 Moreover, she 
holds that the content-structure framework is applicable to all sorts of mereological objects, both 
concrete, i.e. physical objects, phenomena and events, and abstract ones. My focus will be mainly 
on the former, since time, as argued in Part 1, is classified by Plato as a cosmic phenomenon, and is 
hence grounded in the physical constitution of the cosmos. ‘Structure’ refers to the arrangement, 
mathematical or otherwise, that informs mereological objects, defined by parthood and wholeness, 
or totality, whereas ‘content’ is that which instantiates the structure.180  
Harte explains the application of the content-structure framework with the example of a 
dinner party. To have a dinner party we need both a structure, that is a certain seat pattern with slots 
for a number of guests distributed by gender, and content, that is a selection of people to be 
 
179 Harte 2002, p. 270. 
180 Aristotle’s matter-form dichotomy is in many respects analogous to the content-structure one, when we consider its 
application to the physical world. However, there are some important differences which will emerge in the presentation 
of the content-structure dichotomy. First of all, ‘form’ in Aristotle seems to apply to a wider number of aspects than 
‘structure’ in Harte’s distinction, for instance when he uses the notion with regard to perception (de An. II, 12 424a17-
24). Plato’s main concern in his late dialogues are mereological structures, and in particular, the mathematical ones (in 
Section 6.1.2 I present an overview of the pervasive presence of enumerable structures in the Timaeus). Moreover, 
content does not always match with matter, insofar as Plato’s ontology differs, including souls among that which is 
content to be structured, despite the fact that they are not bodily or perceivable. The clearest example in this respect is 
provided by the arrangement of the cosmic soul. 
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arranged as guests at the dinner. The structure, that is the seat arrangement, while being 
distinguishable from the unstructured content, is not itself an additional part of the dinner, but 
rather, the content, i.e. the guests, constitutes parts of the whole, i.e. the dinner party, by displaying 
the seat pattern. In fact, until the structure is instantiated by the people invited to the party, the 
people are not yet guests (i.e. parts), nor is there a dinner party (whole) yet.181 The example, then, 
clearly shows that, while structure and content are dichotomic notions, they are also defined in 
relation to one another and they are both necessary components for the existence of structured 
objects and phenomena. In fact, structure in the physical domain is always instantiated structure, or 
structured content, as opposed to the abstract one. 
Following Harte’s framework, then, we have at hand a specific terminology to analyse 
physical objects and phenomena that are structured. If a physical object or phenomenon is 
conceived as structured content (i.e. as the compound of structure and content), the condition 
precedent to the instantiation of structure will be referred to as unstructured content. This latter is 
not identical with structured content, despite having all and the same ‘material’.182 I will describe 
the conjoining of structure and content resulting in a new object or phenomenon as the instantiation 
of structure. Moreover, the resulting object or phenomenon, because it is the compound of structure 
and content, is partially identified with both: the object instantiates structure while being 
constituted by content, thus also warranting that both should be mentioned in the definition, as it is 
the case with αἰών  and time.183 
 
181 Harte 2002, pp. 162-166. A second, Platonic example are words and sentences: “There are two aspects to the 
analysis of wholes conceived as structures in the way I have described. First, structure: in the Platonic example I 
extrapolated above, the structure of a well-formed sentence, abstractly conceived; what I have called a syntactic space. 
Second, each such whole – structure – must have some content: the content of a syntactic space is the (syntactic) entities 
that occupy positions within it, terms such as ‘man’ and ‘learns’. Content is tied to structure, as I have said: thus, the 
components of a well-formed sentence are ‘structure-laden’; ‘man’ and ‘learns’ are themselves syntactic entities. No 
less so, structure is tied to content. This relation between structure and content is implicit in the description of the 
structure of a well-formed sentence as ‘syntactic structure’” (Harte 2002, p. 177). It should be noted that, unless 
otherwise specified, the mereological terms I employ should not be interpreted as technical terms of contemporary 
mereology. 
182 It is true that in the case of time, something new, i.e. planets, is created in order to create time, so the creation of time 
does not appear as ‘just’ the re-arrangement of a given ‘material’. Nonetheless, I would argue that we could envisage 
the creation of the planets mainly as a re-arrangement of the cosmos (and indeed that is how Plato presents it at 37d6, 
διακοσμῶν ἅμα οὐρανὸν): their bodies are portions taken from the cosmic body, so the souls that make the planets alive 
are the only entirely new ‘material’ introduced in the cosmos for the creation of time. Moreover, as we will see in 
Chapter 6, making the planets alive is instrumental to the preservation of their regular motion. 
183 I am using ‘constitution’ and ‘instantiation’ in the technical sense developed in contemporary metaphysics. The 
constitution relation is often illustrated by the example of the statue and the clay. When we arrange the clay in a 
beautiful fashion, to represent say, a god, we create a new object, i.e. a statue, which is not identical with the clay. 
However, the clay still exists in the same place and time as the statue and they seem to share all their material 
components and features (e.g. weight, colour etc.). In the same way, I would argue, a structured object or phenomenon 
is constituted by content. Moreover, ‘instantiation’ highlights that, just as properties and kinds, structures can be 
multiply located, and, like a symphony, they are repeatable. See Johnston 1992 and Baxter 2001 for a discussion of the 
constitution and instantiation relations. If my analysis of Plato’s definitions is correct, we would have a clear precedent 
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Finally, it should be noted that there seems to be no absolutely unstructured content in the 
Timaeus: even when the universe is in its original condition of disorder, there are traces of the four 
elements supposedly manifesting a minimal degree of resemblance to the mathematical structures 
that later will define them.184 Be that as it may, Harte points out that in the Timaeus, Plato seems to 
conceive of the cosmos in its final stage as instantiating a variety of layers of structure, built on top 
of each other. Hence, I will always refer to the cosmos as structured or unstructured in relative 
terms, that is with respect to the highest layer of structure under consideration. At each new layer in 
the cosmogony, in fact, the unstructured content would also be structured content with reference to 
the lower layer. This is especially important in the case of time, since, as we have seen in Section 
2.2, it is created at the end of stage 1 in the cosmogony. The living motion of the cosmos, as we will 
see, is the unstructured content of time, insofar as it does not yet instantiates the temporal structure, 
while being structured in every other respect. 
With this framework in place, we can now go back to Plato’s account of time, to analyse 
both time and αἰών in terms of the structure-content dichotomy. I will focus on two crucial passages 
where αἰών and time are discussed comparatively: the first is on the definitions of αἰών and time at 
the end of the definitional section (37d6-7); the second expands on the definitions of the two, as it 
presents them as totalities integrated with the tenseless nature of the CILB and the tensed one of the 
cosmos respectively (38c1-3). 
 
4.1.1. First comparison: the two definitions 
 
The definitional section, in which the definitions of αἰών and time appear, has been discussed 
extensively in Chapter 2, so I will just offer a brief recapitulation of the main conclusions reached 
there, before bringing in the framework of structure and content. In the definitional section Plato 
introduces the notion of αἰών by referring to the αἰών-ly (αἰώνιος) nature of the everlasting living 
being serving as a model for the cosmos, i.e. the CILB. The difficulty of bringing a begotten thing 
like the cosmic living being to resemble the CILB in its αἰών-ly nature is explained in light of the 
ontological preconditions for the divine αἰών established in Section 3.3. In Plato’s framework, only 
an ideal, and hence everlasting living being does have the right ontological constitution to be αἰών-
ly in nature. Nonetheless, the Demiurge contrives a way to make the cosmos αἰών-ly too. 
Importantly, what discriminates between the model and the resulting image with regard to 
being αἰών-ly is the adverb παντελῶς, ‘completely’. As we saw in Section 3.1, similar expressions 
 
for Aristotle’s assessment of natural philosophy as that which studies both matter and form, given that the subject 
matter is a compound of the two (Ph. II, 2 194a12-27). 
184 53a7-b2. 
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are elsewhere employed to qualify the CILB (κατὰ πάντα τελέῳ, 30d2, παντελεῖ, 31b1). Moreover, 
completeness – as I argued in that very section – is what characterises the proper features of that 
living being and its αἰών-ly nature is also one of them. If so, the cosmos falls short of the 
completeness of the CILB, in relation to its αἰών-ly feature. The cosmos, however, does become an 
αἰών-ly image (37d7), through the creation of time. Following these premises, Plato’s definition of 
time is outlined in a comparison with αἰών: αἰών is defined by Plato as “remaining in unity 
(μένοντος ἐν ἑνὶ)”, while the cosmic phenomenon imitating αἰών, time, is presented as “proceeding 
according to number (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν ἰοῦσαν)” (37d6-7) and later as “revolving according to number 
(κατ’ ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου)” (38a7-8). I concluded my analysis by highlighting how each 
definition involves an ontological component (μένοντος, ἰοῦσαν) and a structural one (ἐν ἑνὶ, κατ’ 
ἀριθμὸν), and the imitation is accomplished at the structural level. 
The framework of content and structure allows for a more thorough analysis of the two 
definitions and of the structural difference between αἰών and time. In fact, if both describe totalities 
of life, the relation between life and its structure is fittingly captured by the dichotomy.  Let us start, 
however, from the beginning of the definitional section. We can read the Demiurge’s contemplation 
of the now living cosmos, followed by his decision to make it even more like its model (37c6-d1), 
as the recognition that the cosmos is appropriately structured to resemble the model except in one 
respect. This respect is the αἰών-ly feature of the CILB as, when compared to it, the cosmos is still 
unstructured content.  
Aἰών refers here to the supratemporal totality of life of the CILB. With αἰών, content and 
structure are necessarily conjoined: the content of αἰών is the static life of the CILB (μένοντος, 
37d6, ἀκινήτως 38a3) and it corresponds to the ontological component. However, there is no maker 
of αἰών, as the ontological constitution of the living being ‘naturally’ (τοῦ ζῴου φύσις, 37d3) entails 
a fitting structural component (ἐν ἑνὶ). The structural component of αἰών is defined by unity, which 
I read in accordance with Plato’s Republic, as the absolute absence of plurality.185 Hence, αἰών is 
structurally a whole without parts – what contemporary mereology would classify as a mereological 
atom.186 
Now, cosmic life is identified as the content required to create a totality of life analogous to 
αἰών, in the physical world. That life, however, is ontologically characterised by circular motion 
 
185 “You know what those who are clever in these matters are like: If, in the course of the argument, someone tries to 
divide the one itself, they laugh and won’t permit it. If you divide it, they multiply it, taking care that one thing never be 
found to be many parts rather than one (εὐλαβούμενοι μή ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια)”, 525d8-e3. 
186 Describing αἰών as having a structure does not imply that there is any complexity about it, nor that its content could 
ever be unstructured. ‘Structure’ here is a term employed to capture the formal and mathematical component of the 
definition, i.e. its being ἐν ἑνὶ. Moreover, the unity of αἰών is what dictates the creation of a complex structure 
‘according to number’ in the cosmos, so the function of the unity of αἰών is to be an ideal term of comparison to for a 
structure of the physical world. 
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(κινηθὲν αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν, 37c6; κινητόν, 37d5; ἰοῦσαν, 37d7; κινήσεις, 38a2; κυκλουμένου, 38a8) that 
is antithetical to the static life of the model. To create an image of αἰών, in the framework of content 
and structure, is to instantiate a suitable structure in the given content. As we have seen in Section 
2.3, the difference in ontological constitution of the two living beings poses a substantial constraint 
on the similarity of the two structures.187 Now we can add that the ontological component in the two 
definitions specifies the difference between the content of αἰών and time, that explains, in turn, their 
difference in structure. 
In fact, in crafting a moving image of αἰών, the Demiurge settles for the second best structure, 
i.e. a κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, or enumerable, structure. A thorough analysis of the temporal structure, and of 
its instantiation by means of the planets, requires an enquiry of its own, presented in Part III. 
However, it can be intuitively grasped how ‘number’ captures a structural complexity absent in the 
undivided αἰών, while also maintaining a structural similarity with unity: a number is composed of 
units, and because of the sameness between them, as well as the completeness that they display as a 
totality, the unity of αἰών is resembled both in the parts and in the whole. We will see in what way 
time resembles αἰών as a whole in the next comparison and later in sub-section 4.2.2, while a 
discussion of the parts as units of time will be offered in sub-sections 6.1.1 and 6.3.1. 
In what ways, then, is time a less complete version of αἰών? The answer, I would argue, is 
found in the ontological constitution of the content, which results in totalities of life which are more 
or less complete. Aἰών is a static totality of life (‘remaining in unity’), and is simple, or undivided, 
so that, as we will see in the next passage, its totality is present all at once.188 On the other hand, 
time, as a kinetic totality of life, is a totality composed of parts in succession. So, the whole of time 
is never present at once, but only in a progressive completion of past, present and future parts.189 
Moreover, time is a whole divided into a plurality of parts in two distinct senses: (1) there are 
different kinds of temporal parts dividing the whole (e.g. night-and-day, month, year, 37e1-3). The 
reason explaining this plurality is explored in sub-section 4.2.1. (2) For each kind of temporal part 
 
187 I take it that what Plato is here concerned with, when he considers the life of the two living beings, is not the sort of 
activity that their life yields (for which see my discussion above at pp. 74-75), but rather how the ontological 
constitution of that life grounds the structure it display. So ‘life’, in the account of time, is primarily discussed insofar as 
it refers to the ‘existence of a living being’, and how that is structurally characterised. Aristotle is also considering life 
in this generic, or ontological sense in De Anima: “That it (i.e. the soul) is a cause as substance is clear: for substance is 
the cause of being for all things, and living is being for living things (τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί ἐστιν), while the cause 
and principle of living is the soul” (emphasis added, 415b12-14). The generic sense of life can be contrasted with the 
more fine grained notion Aristotle presents at 413a21-25, according to which life corresponds to being actually (or 
being capable of) thinking, perceiving, in motion and rest with regard to place, nourishing, decaying and growing. 
188 I am referring to a mereological atom as a ‘whole’ because I take it that Plato, in defining αἰών in terms of 
indivisible unity also intends to stress its absolute completeness as a totality of life. In fact, in the next passage, Plato 
refers to αἰών as a totality, despite not being composed of parts. For a similar interpretation, see Proclus’ comparison 
between the complete year and αἰών as two wholes (fn. 196). 
189 Mesch underlines the ‘succession’ of time-units as the chief difference between time and the unity of αἰών (Mesch 
2009, p. 97). 
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there are many successive instances, as they are repeated in a sequence. Importantly, the instances 
in the sequence are distinguished from one another by the forms of time that have come to be 
(χρόνου γεγονότα εἴδη, 37e4), that is by distinctions of tense, as we will see below.190 
 
4.1.2. Second comparison: tensed and tenseless totalities of life 
 
The second comparison, at 38b7-c3, is a restatement of the imitative relation between time and αἰών 
first outlined in the definitional section. However, it incorporates two new aspects of the analysis: 
(1) the tenseless and tensed expressions associated respectively with the CILB and the cosmos; (2) 
the ἅμα relation between time and the cosmos, mirroring the one between αἰών and the CILB (see 
sub-section 2.4.2). The comparison is the following: “And it [the heaven] came to be after the 
model whose nature is διαιώνια (τὸ παράδειγμα τῆς διαιωνίας φύσεως), so that it might be as much 
like its model as possible. For the model is existing for all αἰών (πάντα αἰῶνά ἐστιν ὄν), while it, on 
the other hand, has come to be, is, and shall be for all time, up until completion (διὰ τέλους τὸν 
ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος)”.191 
I highlighted in Section 3.2 and 3.3 that πάντα αἰῶνά is a recurrent expression employed by 
Plato and Aristotle as a more specific expression describing the divine and everlasting life as a 
supratemporal totality. Hence, just as Aristotle predicates it of the non-physical gods living at the 
extremity of the heaven, Plato associates it with the CILB, i.e. an ideal and all-complete living 
being. In both authors, moreover, all time (τὸν πάντα χρόνον, τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον) is presented as 
being hierarchically inferior to ‘all αἰών’.192 
However, unlike in the first comparison, in the present passage time and αἰών are addressed 
only indirectly, as the focus is rather on the cosmic living being and the CILB, and the ontological 
difference in the existence they lead, stressed by the tensed and tenseless expressions. Before 
looking at the details of the comparison, we first need to briefly touch upon the section of tense that 
precedes the passage (37e3-38b5). As I pointed out in the Introduction, that section is a digression 
on tense, and as such, it concerns time only indirectly. In fact, I argued, tensed distinctions are 
presented as fundamental to the physicality of the world, as they stem from becoming and are 
associated with motion (“ ‘Was’ and ‘will be’ are properly said about the becoming that passes in 
 
190 Cornford is the first, to my knowledge, to point out the difference between time and αἰών as one between a divided 
and undivided structure (Cornford 1937, p. 102). 
191 The translation is a modified version of Zeyl’s. I will defend some of the more controversial modifications in the 
continuation of this section. For a discussion of the textual issues that have been raised concerning the passage, see fn. 
27. 
192 A similar expression, πρὸς τὸν σύμπαντα χρόνον, already appeared at 36e4-5, to qualify cosmic life. 
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time, for these two are motions”, τὸ δὲ ἦν τό τ’ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν πρέπει 
λέγεσθαι—κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον. 37e4-38a3).  
They are contrasted with the single tenseless qualification pertaining to the ideal kind, i.e. ‘is’ 
(τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστιν μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει 37e6-38a1). The contrast drawn in that 
section, then, is not between αἰών and time, but a broader one, between the sort of distinctions 
appropriate to the physical and ideal kind. Time, as a non-fundamental and created feature of the 
cosmos – its totality of life – is characterised by tensed expressions, just as any physical object or 
phenomenon. The reason to introduce tense in as a topic of discussion within the account of time 
lies in the role of time as a unique frame of reference in the physical world,. The creation of time 
renders tense more intelligible by specifying tensed distinctions with temporal qualifications, as 
explained in the Introduction. 
My reading of the relation between time and tense, I would argue, is confirmed by the 
employment of tensed and tenseless expressions in the passage under scrutiny, to contrast once 
more the ontological constitution of the cosmic living being and of the CILB as a physical and ideal 
living being respectively: tensed distinctions apply to the kinetic life of the cosmos, which in the 
analysis above has been identified as the content of time, while a tenseless present corresponds to 
the static life of the CILB – the content of αἰών. It is in fact emphasised that the cosmos has come to 
be, despite being in the present and future tense (γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος), hence existing in 
a tensed way for the totality of its life (i.e. for all time), whereas the CILB exists tenselessly (ἐστιν 
ὄν) for its paradigmatic totality of life (i.e. for all αἰών).193 Hence, tensed and tenseless distinctions 
– expressive of the ontological constitution of the two living beings – are paired in the passage with 
the appropriate totality of life – ‘for all time’ and ‘for all αἰών’. 
The relevance of the present comparison, then, lies in the confirmation that both time and 
αἰών are presented as totalities of life, as it highlights once more that they resemble each other 
because of their structure, whereas their content differs ontologically. Moreover, I would argue, the 
passage also addresses the different sort of completeness that αἰών and time attain, as totalities. In 
fact, one might worry that, given the content of time, i.e. cosmic life, which is unceasing (36e4-5), 
time, as the totality of that life, would be never-ending. If so, time would be a totality that is always 
in completion while never completed, just as in Aristotle’s understanding of time as an unlimited 
totality, touched upon in Section 3.3, and hence being antithetical to the completeness of αἰών. 
 
193 The most obvious textual reference for emphasising that the cosmos’ way of being was tensed even ‘before’ the 
making of time is at 31b2-3. Several Stephanus pages before the account of time, the cosmos has been already 
accounted for as a single living being and will remain so, displaying its tensed nature: ἀλλ’ εἷς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανὸς 
γεγονὼς ἔστιν καὶ ἔτ’ ἔσται. It should also be noted that qualifying the cosmos as existing ‘for all time’ is a restatement 
of the ἅμα relation between time and the cosmos outlined at the end of the definitional section (37e1-3) and then 
restated immediately before the present passage (38b6-7, see Section 2.4). 
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In Plato, however, time bears resemblance to the paradigmatic completeness of αἰών as an 
undivided whole, insofar as its content allows. It is for this reason, I would argue, that τὸν ἅπαντα 
χρόνον while analogous to πάντα αἰῶνά, has the further qualification, διὰ τέλους, to be rendered as 
follows: “for all time, up until the completion”.194 Despite the lack of attention received from 
commentators, the additional qualification is of great importance in establishing a link with the 
completeness of αἰών, as it emphasises that time also attains completeness, albeit in the dynamic 
sense of a final stage of the totality, or point of completion.  
If I am correct in my assessment so far, an important consequence follows. As Proclus states 
in his commentary, τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον should not be read as an infinite succession of parts, in an 
Aristotelian fashion. Rather, Plato’s account seems to present time as structured in a finite sequence 
of parts. This reading, I will argue in the next section, is further supported by Plato’s introduction of 
a complete year, as the natural conclusion of that finite process of completion.195 Time, as a finite 
totality, then, is a moving image of αἰών in the further sense of bearing a strong resemblance to the 
traditional notion of αἰών as ‘lifespan’, discussed in Section 3.2, where it was generally associated 
with mortal living beings. Just as the traditional lifespan, time seemingly is a totality which has a 
starting point and a final one, and a finite number of steps between the two. Time, then, is correctly 
described as the cosmic lifespan, in Plato’s understanding.  
There are, however, two all-important differences, which will be touched upon especially in 
sub-section 4.2.2: firstly, cosmic life does not end with the completion of time, as physical gods are 
granted an endless persistence by the Demiurge; secondly, unlike the cosmic αἰών, the traditional 
αἰών of mortal living beings is measured in time, as there is always further past and future time 
beyond a mortal lifetime. In the case of Plato’s conception of time as a cosmic lifespan, however, 
there is further time only in the sense in which that totality is endlessly repeated. 
  
 
194 Διὰ τέλους is a fixed expression, and can be also rendered as ‘through to the end’, ‘completely’, ‘throughout’, and in 
general appears to be used to describe a process directed toward a state of completion and maturity (LSJ s.v. τέλος).  
195 “It is just like in the case of divine bodies where some have different cycles from others, but all of them have been 
antecedently comprehended in the cycle of the generated divinity. This contains many cycles in which Saturn returns to 
the same point, and many cycles of the Sun and Moon, and every time exists in the single cycle of the universe […]. 
But the World Soul possesses as its measure the whole extent of time and it entire unfolding – an extension than which 
there can be no greater, unless it be greater by repeating again and again, for it I thus that time is unlimited (μέτρον ἔχει 
τὴν ὅλην ἔκτασιν τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὴν ὅλην ἐξάπλωσιν, ἧς μείζων οὐκ ἔστι παράτασις,εἰ μὴ τῷ πάλιν καὶ πάλιν)” (In Ti. 
III, 289, 10-22). Moreover, later he states that “the time that belongs to the period of the universe is complete because it 
is not a part of anything. Rather, it is universal or total in order that it may imitate αἰών […]” (IV, 92, 18-20). 
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4.2. The cosmic periods as the content of time 
 
On my reading, time is understood as structured content, where the content is cosmic living motion 
and the structure is a totality ‘according to number’. Now, to be alive for the cosmos consists in 
circular motion around itself led by the cosmic soul and articulated in the eight rotations of the 
circle of the Same and the Different (see Chapter 3, p. 54). I will refer to the eight rotations of the 
cosmic soul as cosmic periods, based on the Greek word περίοδος, that Plato consistently uses to 
refer to the circular path as well as to their living motion.196 These periods, collectively taken, 
constitute cosmic living motion, and, as such, they are identified as the content of time.  
This conception of time, I would argue, has some important upshots for the parts and the 
whole that constitute time. As we have seen in Section 4.1, content is never completely 
unstructured, in Plato’s cosmogony, and in the case of the content of time, it is already as structured 
as it should be before the creation of time, in all but one respect – the temporal one. Hence, I will 
argue, the content, already structured in eight cosmic periods serves as the basis for the temporal 
structure, both with respect to the parts and as a totality.197 In sub-section 4.2.1 I will focus on how 
the number of parts of time corresponds one-to-one to the number of cosmic periods. In sub-section 
4.2.2 I will argue that the arrangement of cosmic periods explains why time is structured as a finite 
totality. 
 
4.2.1. Life-rotations and temporal parts 
 
In this sub-section I will focus on the parts of time. In sub-section 4.1.1 I distinguished two senses 
in which time is divided in parts. I already discussed the first sense, referring to the successive 
instances of the same part that are qualified by the forms of time that have come to be. However, in 
the second sense, time is divided in different kinds of parts: nights and days, months, years and 
other five nameless ones, as we will see. My claim is that, in Plato’s account, the number of 
 
196 The Greek word περίοδος appears 23 times in the Timaeus, and the meaning the word assumes is mostly consistent 
throughout (see the Index of occurrences, s.v. περίοδος, p. 145). Plato invariantly refers with περίοδος to the cosmic 
periods and to the humans’ ones (taking place in their heads), and even the distorted ones in the lower animals are very 
defective versions of the unvarying and divine ones. As we will see in Section 5.3, in the astronomical section of Plato’s 
account of time, the term will not just refer to the cosmic periods, but also to the planets attending those same motions 
in their revolutions. The meaning of ‘period’ should be distinguished from the already temporal connotation that it often 
has in modern English. In modern physics ‘period’ retains at least one crucial aspect of the ancient astronomical 
meaning, that is indicating a repeated process in which every step starts again in the same state as the previous one 
(OED s.v. ‘period’). 
197 The discussion of the temporal structure that I will offer in this section is provisional, as I haven’t yet accounted for 
how the temporal structure is instantiated in the content, and what the instantiation of the temporal structure adds that 
was not there before. These two questions will be answered in Chapter 6. Still, significant connections can be 
established by focusing on the content of time alone. This, I take it, provides further evidence that time, in Plato’s 
account, is indeed constituted by cosmic life, as articulated in the eight cosmic periods. 
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different parts composing the temporal structure corresponds to the number of cosmic periods – i.e. 
eight. This correspondence is explained on my reading by the identification of the cosmic periods as 
the content of time. In fact, the complexity of the temporal structure is based on the complexity 
exhibited in the already structured content (cosmic life). The upshot of this claim is that Plato 
rejects the view that time is potentially divisible in infinitely many ways, hence conceiving the 
temporal structure as rigid. 
Now, in order to create time and its parts, there is a further and equally essential component, 
i.e. the planets, that I am intentionally leaving aside until the enquiry in Part III. As we will see in 
Section 6.2, the Demiurge creates the seven planets to delimit the parts of time, by means of their 
visibility. Moreover, the planets are not only tightly connected with the creation of time, but also, as 
we will see in Section 5.2, their revolutions follow the course of the eight periods of the cosmos, as 
described in the astronomical section (38c7-d4).198 Since, however, their function in relation to time 
has not yet been clarified, I will consider here only the relation between the parts of time and the 
periods of the cosmic soul. 
Only three parts of time are listed in the account of time: night-and-day, month and year. 
They correspond, one-to-one to the period of the Same, and to the first and the second period of the 
Different. Despite having a name only known by few experts (39c5-7), the other five periods should 
be treated as equally corresponding to a part of time, as planets also move along those periods and 
they are equally involved in the fulfilment of the complete year (τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων, 39d5). As a 
result, we have eight parts of time corresponding to the eight periods of the cosmic soul. On my 
reading of Plato’s account, the one-to-one correspondence has a natural explanation. In fact, if time 
is understood as the cosmic lifespan, the parts of time composing it are best understood as stages of 
that lifespan. Now, the correspondence above, on this reading, simply shows that the stages of the 
cosmic lifespan are correctly based on the periods of cosmic life. We could counterfactually 
imagine that, if the internal arrangement of the cosmic soul were simpler, e.g. made of only two 
circles, there would have been only two parts of time as a consequence. Likewise, if the periods 
were to have varying speeds, so would the corresponding parts of time ‘expand’ or ‘shrink’ in its 
length. 
If this reading is correct, we can describe the temporal structure, in Plato’s account, as rigid. 
In fact, there is an objective basis, on this account, to identify a finite number of ways to divide 
time, as the complexity of the temporal structure is only as complex as its structured content. Now, 
this feature could be seen as an obvious weakness of the account from our point of view. However, 
 
198 For example, at 39c2 and c5, the περίοδοι are clearly identified with the planetary revolutions. See Section 5.3 for 
my hypothesis on the use of the term to refer the planetary revolutions. 
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it provides a rebuttal to one of the two objections raised by Aristotle against the identification of 
time and cosmic motion (see Section 1.1).199 Aristotle wonders why only the full rotation is 
considered time, and not any of its subdivisions, but Plato might reply that, if time is the cosmic 
lifespan, the division of time is bound to be based on the fulfilment of cosmic periods, hence 
restricting the number of ways it is divisible.200 
However, even someone sympathetic to Plato’s conception of time might object along the 
same lines as Aristotle that while time is constituted by cosmic periods, and it might not be divisible 
in an infinite number of ways, it could still be divided in more than eight ways. For instance, one 
could point out that the day could be divided into two halves at noon, and the year into four parts 
with reference to the two solstices and equinoxes. Plato is arguably aware of how variegated the 
planetary revolutions taking place along the cosmic periods are (πεποικιλμένας δὲ θαυμαστῶς, 
39d2). This becomes clear, for instance, when he explicitly mentions temporal demarcations beyond 
just the eight parts of time, such as the seasons dividing up the year.201 In order to fully address why 
nights-and-days, months, years and so on have a special relevance in dividing the totality of time we 
need to understand first what a κατ’ ἀριθμὸν structure of time consists in, as expounded in Section 
6.2 and 6.3. There I will argue that, because the time has an enumerable structure, the parts of time 
corresponding to the eight periods stand out as optimal units of that structure. 
 
4.2.2. The complete year as the totality of time 
 
In this sub-section I will discuss time as a totality of cosmic life. I will defend, in particular, the 
hypothesis that time is conceived by Plato as a finite totality, corresponding to the complete year, 
and furthermore argue that the finitude as much as the extent of that totality are based on the periods 
of the cosmic soul.  
While any version of a literalist interpretation of the Timaeus will hold that what Plato is 
describing at 36e4-5 is an absolute beginning of cosmic living motion, and, with it, of time, the ἅμα 
relation at 38b6 adds that as the cosmos and time were created together, they would also dissolve 
together (ἅμα καὶ λυθῶσιν, 38b6). So, if the διὰ τέλους qualification suggests, as I read it, that time 
has a point of completion and hence a finite sequence of parts in a succession, it would seem to 
 
199 “And yet even part of the motion of the whole is, in a way, time, even though it is a part (since we took just a part of 
a rotation, not the rotation)” (Ph. IV 10, 218b1-3). 
200 Aristotle’s objection is grounded in his account of time, according to which time takes on continuity from motion, 
just as motion inherits it from spatial magnitude, hence being potentially infinitely divisible (Ph. IV, 11 219a12-14). 
201 Widening the scope of our enquiry to other cosmological passages Plato refers to other temporal demarcations which 
are potentially employable as divisions of time, like seasons, or the regular interval marked out by solstices and 
equinoxes (Ti. 47a; Phlb. 30c; Lg. X 886a, 889b).  
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entail that the completion of time brings about a cosmic dissolution. And yet Timaeus explicitly 
rejects that the cosmos will ever be destroyed: its life is unceasing (36e4) and is not affected by 
disease and old age (33a2). Moreover, its body, once unified, will never be dissolved (32c3-4), as 
all things made by the Demiurge. 
Yet, even if the extreme possibility of cosmic death is excluded in the Timaeus, there is room 
left to consider other hypotheses that are compatible with understanding time as a finite totality of 
cosmic life. One such hypothesis is presented at length in the Statesman, where it is argued that 
cosmic living motion comes to be increasingly disrupted from within, hence periodically requiring 
salvation from a near-death condition by a divine helmsman, to be restored. Importantly, the 
circumstance of the potential cosmic death is marked out, at each new iteration, by the same amount 
of time (ὅταν αἱ περίοδοι τοῦ προσήκοντος αὐτῷ μέτρον εἰλήφωσιν ἤδη χρόνου, 269c6-7; 
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πάντων τούτων χρόνος ἐτελεώθη, 272d6-7), so that we could consider that timespan to 
be identified with the cosmic natural lifespan, as after that point, cosmic life is restored ‘artificially’ 
by an external god.202 
Other aspects of the cosmic catastrophe of the Statesman could be hinting at compatible 
accounts. The measure of time mentioned in the Statesman’s myth could be fittingly connected to 
the complete year (τὸν τέλεον ἐνιαυτὸν, 39d4), as this latter corresponds to a significant event in 
cosmic life: the collective return of all eight periods of the cosmic soul to their initial position.203  
Moreover, the disruption of cosmic life in the Statesman is said to also have catastrophic 
consequences for life on Earth, killing off most human beings (273b2-e4). A similar catastrophe is 
described at the beginning of the Timaeus by the Egyptian priests to Solon. They report of a 
periodical cleansing of the Earth, due to a deviation in the course of the heavenly bodies (τῶν περὶ 
γῆν κατ’ οὐρανὸν ἰόντων παράλλαξις, 22d1; ῥεῦμα οὐράνιον, 23a8), in the form of huge fires and 
floods which brings the human population to shrink significantly. Notably, παράλλαξις is the term 
used to refer to the change of direction of the cosmos and the heavenly bodies in the Statesman (τῆς 
αὑτοῦ κινήσεως παράλλαξιν, 269e4). Moreover, the catastrophic events in the Timaeus seem to be 
also bound to a certain interval of time, in their iteration (διὰ μακρῶν χρόνων γιγνομένη, 22d2; 
πάλιν δι’ εἰωθότων ἐτῶν, 23a7). Yet, no corresponding cosmic catastrophe is ever mentioned in 
relation to the periodic cleansings of the Earth in the Timaeus, and in the way they are presented, 
 
202 “At times it is helped by the guidance of another, divine, cause, acquiring life once more and receiving a restored 
immortality from its craftsman, while at other times, when it is let go, it goes on its own way under its own power” 
(270a3-6). 
203 Van der Sluijs offers an exhaustive discussion of the complete year and its relation to the catastrophic consequences 
of the deviation of the Sun, taking into account both the Timaeus and the Statesman (Van der Sluijs 2006, pp. 60-69). 
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those cleansings seem to be an intended feature of the cosmic arrangement rather than a 
consequence of its disruption. 
Certainly, the different outlook on the perfection of the cosmos between the Timaeus and the 
Statesman demands caution in connecting the two accounts. However, it remains a possibility 
worthy of discussion, whether the Statesman is (1) an account of the cosmic lifespan that is 
compatible with the Timaeus, but intentionally kept apart, as the latter focuses on the foundational 
moment of the cosmogony and its optimal results, rather than on the subsequent history of the 
cosmos; (2) or else, the Statesman is an earlier, or even an alternative and rejected version of Plato’s 
cosmological account in the Timaeus. Certainly, in the Timaeus which is plausibly posterior to the 
Statesman, the cosmos is presented as flawless in the preservation of its own life because of its 
excellent maker, so adding to the picture a periodical decline of that life, to the point of being 
threatened by death, would attenuate the flawlessness of the Demiurge’s craft. However, even if (2) 
is more plausible, and what is presented as a cosmic catastrophe in the Statesman is conceived in 
the Timaeus as a periodic cleansing of the Earth that is part of the Demiurge’s plan, the notion of a 
finite cosmic lifespan could be still profitably compared to the complete year. 
Timaeus only briefly accounts for the complete year, as follows: “It is none the less possible, 
however, to discern that the complete number of time fulfils the complete year (ὅ γε τέλεος ἀριθμὸς 
χρόνου τὸν τέλεον ἐνιαυτὸν πληροῖ τότε) when the relative speeds of all eight revolutions have 
been accomplished together and, measured by the circle of the Same that moves uniformly, come to 
a head (σχῇ κεφαλὴν)”.204 
The interpretation of the passage hinges on whether we uphold a literal or anti-literal reading 
of the cosmogony. For instance, Cornford argues that the passage should be taken as an exemplary 
fictional passage, stating that “the hands of a perfect clock would regain at every moment the 
position at which they were twelve hours before. Since the celestial clock was never set going at 
any moment of time, there was never any original position to serve as a starting-point. The period, 
whatever it may be, is beginning and ending at every moment of time”.205 In Cornford’s reading, 
evidently, any absolutely original position for the cosmic periods to reach would be arbitrary, given 
that there is no beginning of time, nor of cosmic life. In an anti-literalist reading, then, the complete 
year is simply the amount of time it takes before the planets display again the same configuration. 
The interpretative burden, however, seems to be, as with other passages, on the anti-literalist. In 
fact, one might wonder why the complete year is presented by a number of terms that put emphasis 
on the attainment of an actual completion (τέλεος twice, πληροῖ, ἁπασῶν), stressing that an original 
 
204 39d2-7. 
205 Cornford 1937, p. 117. 
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position, displayed by the planets, is indeed necessary to determine when (τότε) the completion 
takes place.  
A literalist reading, I would argue, fits better with Plato’s careful description of the fulfilment 
of the complete year as an outstanding event in the course of time. If the cosmic periods and time 
have an absolute beginning, it follows that there is an objectively defined original configuration of 
the cosmic circles relative to each other displayed by the planets, and that configuration corresponds 
to the astronomical ‘head’ mentioned in the passage.206 If so, the final configuration is identical 
with the initial setting of all the circles and planets. Moreover, such configuration presents itself 
only once all other possible configurations have been deployed. 
Admittedly, Plato never clarifies what the planetary configuration marking out the ‘head’ 
would look like. The description of the Demiurge positioning the planets each on one subdivision of 
the circle of the Different, at 38d1-7, does not provide any detail concerning their position on the 
circle. However, we have at least one indication in terms of planetary configurations for the end – 
and hence the beginning – of the month, which is marked out when the Moon has overtaken the Sun 
(ἐπειδὰν σελήνη περιελθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς κύκλον ἥλιον ἐπικαταλάβῃ, 39c3-4). Presumably, that 
same configuration is also part of the configuration that marks out the complete year. While there 
are no sufficient clues to infer which exact position Plato has in mind for each of the planets to 
reach as their original position, it seems that sufficient ground is given in the account to hypothesise 
that such position exists and is within view from the Northern Hemisphere. It must, in fact, be 
accessible to humans observing the starry sky, if they are to form a correct notion of time (47a6). 
However, even if the literalist interpretation of the complete year is sound and the ‘head’ is an 
objectively defined configuration of the planets, given that in Plato’s account cosmic life is never-
ending, the complete year would still not correspond to a finite cosmic lifespan, or totality of time. 
In fact, once the complete year is fulfilled, if cosmic life continues, so would its lifespan, and there 
would be more time after the complete year. Therefore, the objection concludes, the complete year 
cannot be identified with the totality of time, and it rather is an outstanding part of time.207  
The objection above, I contend, does not consider a different sense of finite totality 
compatible with there being more time than a complete year. The focus, as I argued in sub-section 
4.1.2, should be on the imitation of αἰών. Time, in my reading, resembles the undivided totality of 
 
206 It is however possible, albeit not very compelling, to hold an anti-literalist view and accept the notion of a relative 
but objective original position. Proclus, for example, holds both views (see fn. 196). He however does not clarify on 
what basis the ‘head’, that is the original and final configuration of the cosmic periods, is determined. 
207 Mohr claims, for instance, that “the complete year is a unit of time which is parasitic compounding of other units of 
time. ‘The complete year’ is relevantly similar to the expression ‘a month of Sundays’” (Mohr 1985, p. 69. fn. 23). His 
take is opposed to Cherniss’ comment that, correctly, I hold, reads Plato’s notion of ‘number of time’ as always 
capturing a finite amount (see Section 6.2 for an extensive discussion of the expression). 
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αἰών, given all at once, while being a totality of parts in a sequence that progresses towards a 
completion. A completion, however, does not entail ‘destruction’: as Aristotle points out in his 
discussion of completeness, the meaning of τέλος as ‘end’ or ‘death’, is a derivative one, as it 
conflates the proper meaning of the term with specific instances of completed processes. To reach a 
τέλος is primarily to reach a stage where there is nothing missing, as in the growth of a living being 
or the crafting of an artefact, and only in this sense we consider that final stage also as the end of a 
process, even if in certain cases the end does correspond to destruction.208 
In light of the framework of content and structure, it is possible to account for a finite totality 
of time that does not entail the destruction of time. In fact, there is more time after the fulfilment of 
the complete year because of the content of time, i.e. the eight cosmic periods, that continue their 
course after having returned to their original configuration. However, the fulfilment of the complete 
year also entails the end of the temporal structure, as all the configurations of the cosmic periods 
have been displayed by the planets. What follows the fulfilment of the complete year is more time, 
but only in the sense in which the same totality is repeated, just as an entire symphony could be 
repeated in a loop: the content is different, though it instantiates, again and again, the same structure 
and marks out the stages of the same cosmic lifespan. 
To render this interpretation more intuitive, we can entertain a parallel case that shows that 
the above proposal seems natural, when we are not concerned with time. As Harte points out, cases 
analysable in the framework of content and structure are found most prominently in the Philebus.209 
I will focus on letters and the alphabet, as they provide the most straightforward analogy with time, 
in my reading. Letters are in fact intuitively parts of a whole, the alphabet, and if the whole alphabet 
is uttered, letters constitute a sequence, very much like the one that defines time in its process of 
completion.210  
 
208 “Hence, since the end is an ultimate thing, we extend the meaning of the term to bad senses, and speak of perishing 
‘completely’ or being ‘completely’ destroyed, when the destruction or calamity falls short in no respect but reaches its 
extremity. Hence, by an extension of the meaning, death is called an ‘end’, because they are both ultimate 
things”.  (Metaph. V, 1021b25-29). 
209 In the Philebus, during the long digression on the one and the many Socrates famously introduces the two most 
prominent examples of subject-matters in which to become an expert, it is crucial to discern the definite number of 
kinds of beings falling within that domain as a whole. The best examples to compare with time are the subject-matter of 
grammar –  i.e. letters, syllables, words and sentences – and of music – i.e. tunes, musical scales and rhythms (17c-e; 
18b-d). Later on, however, it is suggested by the fourfold ontology that there are many more sciences that should work 
according to similar principles in analysing their subject-matters. The study of the planets and of time, i.e. astronomy, 
could well be among these, as Plato clearly classifies the heavenly phenomena as part of the well-arranged mixtures 
(28e2-5, 30c4-8). 
210 The parallel is most evident with letters, because, unlike with musical notes, letters are limited in number, so that an 
exact repetition is necessary once all the letters are uttered. On the contrary, the Philebus’ account could allow an 
endless progression of notes following a musical scale, moving to an ever higher pitch. With time, or letters, there is no 
such endless variety of qualitatively different parts. The difference with time remains in that the alphabetical order is 
not the only whole letters compose, nor the primary one. 
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We can imagine the unlikely but illustrative scenario of an ancient Greek person assigned 
with the task of uttering all the Greek letters in the alphabetical order, and to pursue in this task ad 
infinitum (assuming such a person has no physiological limitations and an unfailing capacity to 
concentrate on the task). Presumably, the Greek person would start from α and quickly reach ω. The 
first time the alphabet is uttered, all letters are uttered already. However, since this person’s task is 
to go on uttering ad infinitum, and the letters of the alphabet are a finite number, the process of 
uttering the whole alphabet would start again, from α onward, in the same order. In this way, we 
can envisage the Greek person going on forever in repeating the same alphabet, just as cosmic life 
will go on forever, constituting the same cosmic lifespan again and again.  
We can present the repetition described in the example in terms of sameness and difference by 
referring to utterances (or mere sounds) on the one hand, as content, and letters and the alphabet on 
the other, are instantiated structure: the new α is not the same α the Greek person uttered the first 
time, as they are different utterances, or content. However, it is ultimately the same letter α which is 
uttered, insofar as the same articulation of sound is displayed in the order required by the alphabet, 
i.e. the same totality repeated over and over.211  
The same scenario can be imagined with time: the parts of time are just as the letters and the 
complete year is just as the alphabet. Once the complete year is fulfilled, the totality of time is 
accomplished, just as when the alphabet is uttered, all letters are. After, the periods of the cosmic 
soul (i.e. the content of time), continue, just as the utterances. However, the parts of time, insofar as 
they are defined by the temporal structure, are always the same ones, repeated in the same 
sequence, until the totality of the complete year is once more fulfilled, marked out by the 
configurations of the planets.212 The endless repetition of the finite totality of time is the only way 
in which cosmic life bears resemblance to the undivided completeness of αἰών, and the planets, as 
we will see in Chapter 5, are given the role of the (happy) Sisyphus in bringing about that 
completion over and over again.213 
To conclude, my interpretation of the complete year has an important upshot that supports my 
overall claim concerning the periods of the cosmic soul as the basis for the temporal structure. In 
 
211 “S: What I mean is clear in the case of letters, and you should take your clue from them, since they were part of your 
own education. P: How so? S: The sound that comes out of the mouth is one for each and every one of us, but then it is 
also unlimited in number. P: No doubt. S: Neither of these two facts alone yet makes us knowledgeable, neither that we 
know its unlimitedness nor its unity. But if we know how many kinds of vocal sounds there are and what their nature is, 
that makes every one of us literate”, 17a8-b9. 
212 This is perhaps what Aristotle has in mind when he gives us the following remark about a certain sense of sameness 
of time: “Moreover, as it is possible that one and the same motion takes place again and again, likewise a time can take 
place again and again, as with the year, Spring and Autumn” (Ph. IV, 12 220b12-14). 
213 The notion of a finite totality of (astronomical) time is appropriately captured in later Greek philosophy by the term 
‘ἀποκατάστασις’, or restoration of the original condition. Proclus remarks that just as the cosmic living being 
comprehends all the other divine souls, so time comprehends their apocatastasis. Since the apocatastasis of the universe 
comprehends all the others, it is the one that corresponds to the totality of time (see fn. 196). 
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fact, the way the cosmic periods are structured is essential to (1) having a finite totality of time, and 
hence to imitating the completeness of αἰών. Moreover, (2) their velocity determines the length of 
the totality.  
Firstly, the content of time is a suitable basis to create a finite totality of time. In fact, the 
circular path of the periods of the cosmic soul is a necessary precondition, together with the 
regularity of their motion, to have, as a result, a finite set of possible configurations for the planets. 
If that wasn’t the case, the temporal structure could in principle never reach a point of completion 
and return to the original configuration.214 Moreover, the proportionate velocities of the cosmic 
periods set up by the Demiurge (36d6) warrant that the parts of time measure out the whole, as we 
will see in sub-section 6.2.2 and 6.3.2. Again, if the parts of time of time were incommensurable, 
the fulfilment of the complete year would not be possible, since the astronomical ‘head’ would 
never be reached together by the planets. Secondly, the content of time determines the length of the 
totality of time consists in. Just as the speed of individual periods of the cosmic soul determines the 
length of their corresponding part of time, so the relative velocity of the eight periods (ἁπασῶν τῶν 
ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα τάχη σχῇ, 39d4-5) determines whether a longer or shorter totality of 
time is fulfilled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 Plato recognises cosmic rotation as the best motion, because it is free from wandering and akin to intelligence in the 
Timaeus (34a2-3). He moreover praises the structural sameness that circular motion preserves, both in the Laws and the 
Statesman (Lg. X 898a8-c1, Plt. 269d-e). Despite my rejection of Proclus’ interpretation of the account of time, his 
emphasis on the similarity in structural sameness between circular motion and the absence of motion correctly 
underscores a crucial basis for the cosmic image of αἰών to be accomplished: “The more gifted among them [i.e. the 
multitude] proceeded to a consideration of αἰών and observed that there was not merely motion in the universe but an 
everlasting motion that was orderly and circling around in a manner that was always the same” (In Ti. IV, 9, 2-7). 
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PART III – REVOLVING ACCORDING TO NUMBER 
 
“Quid mundus, quae causa Deo, ratioque creandi, 
Unde Deo numeri, quae tantae regula moli,  
Quid faciat sex circuitus, quo quaelibet orbe 
Intervalla cadant, cur tanto Iupiter et Mars,  
Orbibus haud primis, interstinguantur hiatu: 
Hic te Pythagoras docet omnia quinque figuris. 
Scilicet exemplo docuit, nos posse renasci, 
Bis mille erratis, dum fit Copernicus annis,  
Hoc, melior Mundi speculator, nominis.  
At tu Glandibus inventas noli postponere fruges” 
(Kepler – Mysterium Cosmographicum, Lector Amice Salve) 
 
 
In Chapter 4 I argued that both αἰών and time are accounted for as totalities of life. In particular, 
time is the structured totality of cosmic life (i.e. the cosmic lifespan), created in resemblance of the 
unitary and undivided life (αἰών) of the CILB. In Section 4.2 my understanding of Plato’s definition 
of time as the compound of content (the eight periods of the cosmic soul) and structure (according 
to number) has been substantiated by an enquiry into how the already structured content of time is 
the basis for the temporal structure, with regard to both the parts and the whole. 
So far, then, the focus has been mainly on the periods of cosmic life, that is on the content of 
time.215 However, in my reading time is a compound of content and structure. The focus of this part 
will be on how that content becomes structured, that is on the creation of time. In this enquiry I will 
try to answer two connected questions – the ‘how’ and ‘what’ question – about the temporal 
structure that I only touched upon in the previous parts of the thesis: how the content comes to 
instantiate the temporal structure and what is added to the content with the instantiation of the 
temporal structure. My claim will be that time, as structured content, is defined by two aspects 
appearing in the definition of time, both at 37d5-7 and 38a7-8: (1) visibility: time is a moving 
image of αἰών; (2) enumerability: time revolves according to number (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν). The two 
aspects are interdependent since the enumerability of time is brought about by means of visibility. 
 
215 In the current chapter, for expositional purposes, I will generally refer to ‘cosmic motion’, or ‘rotations’, bracketing 
the fact that the movements in question are more appropriately described as ‘periods’, i.e. a form of life and intelligent 
activity. Still, what I argued in the previous chapters about the essential relation entertained by time and cosmic life 
should be kept in mind throughout the present enquiry. 
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However, as we established in Part I, Plato conceives of time as a cosmic phenomenon, and its 
creation is accomplished via the creation of the Sun, the Moon, and the five planets (Mercury, 
Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn). To answer the ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions, then, we first need to 
focus on Plato’s treatment of those seven heavenly bodies. Gregory Vlastos correctly remarks that 
Plato never refers to the Sun and the Moon as ‘planets’, thus maintaining the traditional distinction 
between them and the other five.216 Nonetheless, for the purposes of this enquiry, I will employ the 
term ‘planet’ to refer to each of the seven, the plural form to refer to them as a distinct group of 
heavenly bodies, acting together in fulfilling a single function, and ‘planetary’ to refer to their 
revolutions, as opposed to the fixed stars’. 
Apart from pragmatic reasons, I’d argue that the terminological choice is warranted by Plato’s 
commitment to set them apart as a group from the other heavenly bodies. As we will see in more 
detail in Section 5.1, Plato distinguishes the fixed stars from the ‘wandering stars’ in terms of their 
motion and the related function and the Sun and the Moon are not different from the five traditional 
planets in either respects. The widespread preference to focus on the revolutions of the Sun and the 
Moon as temporal markers is considered a form of ignorance about the other five that only a few 
astronomers overcame (39c5-7). It is for this reason, presumably, that Plato coins a variety of labels 
to refer to them collectively: ‘the stars that have turnings’ (39d7-8), ‘the stars that wander’ (40b4-
8), ‘the instruments of time’ (42d5, 41e5). According to my interpretation, using ‘planets’ to refer to 
the seven heavenly bodies serves the purpose of capturing what is most significant about them as a 
group, i.e. their similar motion and collective function, which as we will see, are crucial to the 
creation of time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 Vlastos 1975, fn. 19. Cf. Arist. De Cael. 291b29-292a9. 
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Ch. 5: On the planets 
 
Despite being treated as a distinct group in the Timaeus, the seven planets belong to the species of 
heavenly gods. A general account of their nature as heavenly gods is provided at 40a2-40d5: they 
are one of the four kinds of living beings that inhabit the cosmos and they are defined by one of the 
four elements, which mainly constitute their body, i.e. fire. As we will see below, the fact that 
planets have fiery, and thus intrinsically visible bodies is important for the account of time.  
It is not only fire, among the elementary bodies, that manifests itself in the visible domain, as 
all the elementary bodies are visible (πῦρ δὲ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ καὶ ἀὴρ σώματα πάντα ὁρατὰ γέγονεν, 
46d6-7). Nonetheless, all the other bodies seem to depend on being mixed with fire to possess their 
visibility, as Plato suggests by stating that “nothing could ever become visible apart from fire” 
(χωρισθὲν δὲ πυρὸς οὐδὲν ἄν ποτε ὁρατὸν γένοιτο, 31b1). What is more, the fire involved in the 
making of the heavenly bodies stands out among the elements because of its visibility. Timaeus 
states that the Demiurge made the heavenly bodies “mostly out of fire, to be the brightest and fairest 
to the eye” (τοῦ μὲν οὖν θείου τὴν πλείστην ἰδέαν ἐκ πυρὸς ἀπηργάζετο, ὅπως ὅτι λαμπρότατον 
ἰδεῖν τε κάλλιστον εἴη, 40a2-4). 
In agreement with the general definition of the heavenly gods, there are several passages 
highlighting the special visibility of their bodies. The most obvious passage is the one on the 
teleologically determined function of the eyes, needed to study the heavenly bodies and the heaven 
itself, and, because of them, to the night and day, months, year, equinoxes and solstices (ἰδόντων, 
ὀφθεῖσαι, 47a4-5). Even at the end of the discussion of the heavenly bodies and their revolutions it 
is pointed out that their changing configurations, being so complex, are best studied with a visible 
model representing their visible motions (ὄψεως, ὁρα, 40d2-4). Focusing on the most visible of all 
heavenly bodies, namely the Sun, it is established that the light (φῶς, 39b4) it casts makes the Sun 
visible through most of the heaven (φαίνοι τὸν οὐρανὸν, 39b6), and the resulting daylight is 
presented as an inherently visible body, made of the purest particles of fire (τοῦ πυρὸς ὅσον τὸ μὲν 
κάειν οὐκ ἔσχε, τὸ δὲ παρέχειν φῶς ἥμερον, οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης ἡμέρας σῶμα ἐμηχανήσαντο 
γίγνεσθαι, 45b4-6; πῦρ εἰλικρινὲς, b7).217 
 
217 Cornford discusses different options for the translation of the passage and argues that by taking οἰκεῖον ἑκάστης 
ἡμέρας σῶμα together we have the most plausible reading, in which the body is the daylight as a whole, that later 
withdraws and causes nightfall. Consequently, Cornford translates the passage as follows: “such fire as has the property, 
not of burning, but of yielding gentle light, they contrived should become the proper body of each day” (Cornford 1937, 
p. 152, fn. 2). There could be additional evidence for the daylight as a body spreading in many places at once in the 
Parmenides. The young Socrates proposes the day as analogous to the forms in being one and also in many places at 
once (οἷον [εἰ] ἡμέρα [εἴη] μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ, Prm. 131b3-c8). In Reginald Allen’s reading, 
Parmenides’ objection is legitimate, given that the day is nothing else that the sunlight shining in the heaven and on 
Earth and can be compared to a sail laid down on many places (Allen 1998, pp. 131-33). 
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The especially visible nature of the heavenly bodies matters for my enquiry because the 
visibility of the planets, in particular, is crucial to their function as instruments of time. I argued that 
time, in Plato’s conception, is a cosmic phenomenon, where ‘phenomenon’ aptly captures the 
definition of time as an image (εἰκὼ κινητόν τινα αἰῶνος, 37d5, αἰώνιον εἰκόνα, d7), contrasted 
with αἰών, the intelligible and unitary life of the model. At the end of this chapter I will put forth the 
additional claim that the visible appearance of the planets accounts for time being an image. In the 
following three sections I will set out how the planets’ visible bodies and intelligent souls are 
involved in the creation of time. I first address the difference between the planets and the fixed stars 
(Section 5.1) and then discuss the account of planetary revolutions provided by Plato (Section 5.2). 
Finally, I propose an interpretation of planetary revolutions as fulfilling their function by 
conforming to the cosmic periods and, in that very activity, collectively creating a cosmic image of 
αἰών (Section 5.3). 
 
5.1 The difference between the planets and fixed stars 
 
The planets are widely recognised in the literature on Plato’s account of time as playing a crucial 
role in the creation of time (see Section 1.1). Many scholars, however, maintain that the fixed stars 
too are involved in that same creation.218 In this section I will argue that textual evidence heavily 
suggests that planets indeed have a special part to play in the creation of time, while the fixed stars 
do not.  
The separate introduction of the two groups already suggests a division of labour between the 
heavenly bodies. An entire third of the account of time is dedicated to the creation of the planets 
and the setup of their revolutions (38c3-39b2). From the very beginning it is clarified that those 
seven heavenly bodies are begotten for the sake of the generation of time: “in virtue, then, of this 
reasoning and design aimed at the generation of time, the Sun, the Moon and five other stars – 
‘wanderers’ as they are called – were brought about for the begetting of time” (ἐξ οὖν λόγου καὶ 
διανοίας θεοῦ τοιαύτης πρὸς χρόνου γένεσιν, ἵνα γεννηθῇ χρόνος ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ πέντε ἄλλα 
ἄστρα, ἐπίκλην ἔχοντα πλανητά, 38c3-6). The claim is restated a few lines later, this time stressing 
that the creation of time is a result attained through a collective effort of all the planets 
(συναπεργάζεσθαι χρόνον, 38e4-5).  
What is more, the planetary revolutions are presented as being directly responsible for the 
creation of the parts of time. The revolution of the Sun and the Moon are responsible for the 
generation of the day and night, of the month and of the year (πορεύοιτο, κεκλήκαμεν, 
 
218 Vlastos 1975, pp. 34-36, Brague 1982, p. 52. 
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περιελθοῦσα, ἐπικαταλάβῃ, περιέλθῃ  39b4-c5), and they are earlier introduced as the (most 
familiar) parts of time (37e1-3).  A few lines later, the discussion includes the other five planets, 
leading to the general claim that “time really is the wanderings of the planets” (χρόνον ὄντα τὰς 
τούτων πλάνας, 39d1). The same statement is differently put in the concluding recapitulation, when 
it is again stated that the stars that have turnings (τῶν ἄστρων πορευόμενα ἔσχεν τροπάς), namely 
the planets, are responsible, through their motion, for making the heaven as much as possible 
resembling the αἰών-ly nature of the model (ὡς ὁμοιότατον ᾖ τῷ τελέῳ καὶ νοητῷ ζῴῳ πρὸς τὴν τῆς 
διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως 39d7-e2). The last two passages, in particular, leave no doubt that the 
revolutions involved in the ‘chronogony’ are those of the planets. 
On the other hand, the fixed stars are only introduced after the account of time is concluded, 
as (by far) the greater group of heavenly bodies (39e10-40a2). Once more, Timaeus informs us that 
they are a separate group from the planets, as the latter ones are referred to as ‘the stars having 
turnings and wandering’ (τὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα καὶ πλάνην τοιαύτην ἴσχοντα, 40b6-7), while the fixed 
stars do not wander and have a single forward motion (ὅσ’ ἀπλανῆ τῶν ἄστρων). Finally, it is 
emphasised once more that the planets had a separate generation (κατ’ ἐκεῖνα γέγονεν, b7-8), at 
least insofar as the narrative is concerned.  
Just a few lines later, the Earth is mentioned too, although it does not strictly belong to either 
group, not having any forward motion. Plato clarifies that it is the eldest of all the heavenly gods 
(πρώτην καὶ πρεσβυτάτην θεῶν ὅσοι ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ γεγόνασιν, 40c2-3), and this remark, analogous 
to the one about the seniority of the cosmic soul compared to the cosmic body, suggests that we 
should take the claim that the Earth is the first heavenly body literally (38d1, d3, 39b4). Hence, the 
Earth would be the first created heavenly body, followed by the planets and, finally, by the other 
heavenly bodies. Whereas the Earth is not as essential to the project of creating time as the planets, 
it does play a part in the creation of time, as without it there would be no night alternating with the 
day, and time would be, if only slightly, differently structured (φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε 
καὶ ἡμέρας ἐμηχανήσατο, 40c1-2).219 Overall, Plato’s lengthy discussion of the disposition and 
motion of the planets, together with the mention of the Earth puts emphasis on the absence of any 
reference to the fixed stars. 
 
219 Even if the Earth seems to partake in some of the defining functions the planets carry out, the Earth plays a different 
function. I will argue that the contribution of the Earth amounts to being a fixed obstruction for the projection of 
daylight throughout the universe, hence allowing the Sun to better mark out nights and days in their alternation. The 
periodical absence of light provides us in particular with the best visible stimulus to get acquainted with number (39b2-
7). The function of the Earth, insofar as time is concerned, then, seems to be restricted to make the coming and going of 
the sunlight more apparent. The hypothesis, then, is that the contribution of the Earth does not warrant that it is strictly 
necessary for the creation of time, as it is the case for the planets, thus explaining why it is only discussed with the other 
heavenly bodies. The peculiar ‘winding’ motion of the Earth, which I won’t address here, is comprehensively discussed 
in Cornford and Zeyl (Cornford 1937, p. 120-134; Zeyl 2000, pp. xlix-l). 
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Even when one would expect the fixed stars to play as crucial a role as the planets, i.e. in 
creating a unit of measurement by moving along the circle of the Same, at 39b2-c2 there is no sign 
that Timaeus considers them as the source of that unit. The measure for the circle of the Same, i.e. 
the night-and-day, is in fact created by having the Sun casting a more intense light than any other 
heavenly body. As Vlastos points out, the Sun is not the best measure to adopt, because, unlike the 
fixed stars, it does appear earlier and later throughout the year.220 Yet, Plato introduces only the 
seven planets as candidates for that role, showing a clear intention to assign to the planets, and not 
to the fixed stars, an essential role in the creation of time. Moreover, Bowen points out that in the 
whole astronomical account proposed by Plato the focus is on the changing configurations between 
the different planets, described by Plato as a heavenly race, and not on the changing relation 
between each of the planets and the fixed stars in the background.221 
To conclude this overview, it should be noted that the function of the fixed stars is also 
mentioned as part of the account that concerns them, and yet there is no reference to the creation of 
time. The reason why the fixed stars are made and given only a single forward motion along with 
the circle of the Same is to make them as excellent as possible (ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἕκαστον γένοιτο 
ὡς ἄριστον, 40b3-4) and to truly adorn, in a wordplay, the cosmos as a whole (κόσμον ἀληθινὸν 
αὐτῷ πεποικιλμένον εἶναι καθ’ ὅλον, 40a6-7). The role of fixed stars, unlike that of the planets as 
instruments of time, consists in completing the cosmos by filling and adorning it as one of the four 
species. The difference in motion, contrasted with the ‘wandering’ of the planets, follows from a 
difference in function. 
Even when the totality of the heavenly gods is considered, in their relation to the immortal 
parts of the souls created for human beings, a division of labour between the two groups of 
heavenly bodies might be suggested. Firstly, we learn that the immortal souls are as many as the 
 
220 “Plato appears to be talking a though the period of the diurnal revolution of the sun – the solar day – were identical 
with the movement of the Same, while his theory requires it to be a little shorter: in the sun the movement of the Same 
is retarded, being counteracted by the inverse movement of the Different. Only in the fixed stars, which are totally 
exempt from the latter movement, could the period of the diurnal revolution be precisely identical with the movement of 
the Same” (Vlastos 1975, p. 100). As Vlastos points out, the usage for calendaric purposes among Greek astronomers at 
the time accepted the Sun’s daily revolution as the basic unit of measurement for comparing months and years (Vlastos 
1975, pp. 100-101). 
221 “The early Greeks distinguished stars that seem fixed in relation to one another and those that were not fixed in this 
way but appear to wander. They were also aware that these wandering stars or planets have diurnal and sidereal 
motions. But, so far as I can tell, this was pretty much the full extent of their knowledge of planetary motion. 
Symptomatic of this was, I submit, their tendency to analyze the eastward motions of the planets in relation to one 
another and not in relation to the background of the fixed stars. Their image for this was drawn from the race-course 
[…]. It is important to see that nothing in this metaphor implies or demands that Mercury and Venus make stations and 
retrogradations. That is, the imagery no more entails this than, for instance, falling behind in a footrace and then 
catching up and going ahead entails really stopping, going backwards, stopping, then racing forwards, or even 
appearing to do any of these things against the background of stationary spectators. All the image requires is a sense of 
the overall eastward direction of the race, and this itself may have been inferred from the fact that the planets rise later 
and later in relation to the fixed stars over the course of time” (Bowen 2002, p. 158).  
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number of the stars (συστήσας δὲ τὸ πᾶν διεῖλεν ψυχὰς ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς ἄστροις, 41d8) so that each 
soul is carried by a star across the universe to be taught about its nature before ever being born. 
Secondly, those immortal souls are sown in the planets and the Earth, that are collectively referred 
to as instruments of time (τοὺς μὲν εἰς γῆν, τοὺς δ’ εἰς σελήνην, τοὺς δ’ εἰς τἆλλα ὅσα ὄργανα 
χρόνου, 42d4-5).222 More will be said in Section 5.3 on the expression ‘instruments of time’ and 
how it clarifies the relation between the planets and time. For now, it is sufficient to note that the 
two steps in the cosmic odyssey of the immortal souls plausibly correspond to two groups of 
heavenly gods – the fixed stars in the first, and the instruments of time (the planets plus the Earth) 
in the second. In fact, while it is true that ‘stars’ of the first step might in principle include the 
planets, the ‘wandering’ motion and position within the cosmos distinguishing the planets from the 
fixed stars would rather suggest that even in this respect they play different roles. 
My conclusion is that there is sufficient textual evidence to claim that only the seven planets 
(with the limited contribution of the Earth) play a role in the creation of time. It is not 
methodologically promising to take Plato to implicitly suggest what he never explicitly claims in 
the Timaeus, simply because we deem the alternative to be prima facie unreasonable. The only 
support for the inclusion of the fixed stars in the creation of time is that, from our contemporary 
point of view, there is no reason why they shouldn’t play the same function as the planets in that 
regard, given that they are even more precise temporal markers of the apparent motions in the sky. 
Our interpretative effort, however, should rather entertain the opposite hypothesis, namely that there 
is something specific about the planetary revolutions that justifies, in Plato’s judgement, a distinct 
function, as the text strongly suggests. Although my whole interpretation of the account of time 
does not hinge on this conclusion, I will provide a hypothetical explanation for separating the 
planets from the fixed stars with regards to their function in Section 5.3.  
Now that I have examined the distinction between the two groups of heavenly bodies, and 
presented the evidence for the special connection between the planets and time, I will focus in the 
next two sections on the analysis of the two components by which planets are defined as a distinct 
group of heavenly bodies: their ‘wandering’ motion (in Section 5.2) and their function (in Section 
5.3). 
 
 
222 Both Cornford and Taylor identify the instruments of time with the Sun, the Moon and the other five planets (plus 
the Earth). It seems then, that the distinction in the two steps fittingly corresponds to the distinction between the fixed 
stars that lie at the extremity of the cosmos and those other heavenly gods, the Earth and the planets, which lie within 
the cosmos (Cornford 1937, pp. 142-147; Taylor 1928, pp. 255-256). Earlier in the dialogue the planets are described 
collectively as ‘instruments of times’ (41e5, ὄργανα χρόνων). Brague highlights the discrepancy between the singular 
and plural of χρόνος as a significant one, arguing that each planet is primarily attending to a certain temporal sequence, 
corresponding to the part of time associated with it. However, they are all ultimately instruments of the singular time, 
that is an enumerable phenomenon of the heaven as a whole (Brague 1982, pp. 62-63). 
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5.2 The planetary revolutions 
 
As the previous section showed, what defines the planets as a group is their motion, described as 
πλάναι, wanderings. Their collective motion, so defined, is eventually identified with time, at 39d1. 
As argued already in Section 1.1, my reading takes this claim at face value, as a genuine feature of 
Plato’s account. The wanderings of the planets are that which the definition of time describes. The 
identity claim should then be rephrased, in Plato’s own words, as follows: ‘the wanderings of the 
planets imitate αἰών and revolve according to number’; or, to use the terminology of structure and 
content developed in Chapter 4, ‘the wanderings of the planets are identified with the compound of 
content and structure, where the former consists in the periods of the cosmic soul and the latter in 
the temporal structure’. This being the thesis I am arguing for, the first step in the enquiry will be to 
discuss Plato’s account of the planets’ wanderings. 
Plato emphasises repeatedly in the Timaeus as well as in the Laws that planetary motion is not 
a real wandering in the sense that it happens by mere material necessity. The planets are gods 
exactly like all the other heavenly bodies, and their revolutions follow a regular pattern which has 
its ultimate cause in their intelligent nature.223 There is however a second, more poignant sense, of 
‘wandering’ that assesses the complexity of motion, in terms of how many directions a living being 
moves in. For instance, the sort of motion attributed to the cosmos is the only motion entirely free 
from wandering, insofar as it only rotates around itself (τὰς δὲ ἓξ ἁπάσας κινήσεις ἀφεῖλεν καὶ 
ἀπλανὲς ἀπηργάσατο ἐκείνων, 34a1-5). The fixed stars rotate around themselves, like the cosmos, 
and are also free from any of the wandering kinds of motion, except for the forward revolution 
towards the right, dominated by the circle of the Same. As such they have the minimal degree of 
wandering among the living beings within the cosmos.  
The planets’ motion is explicitly described as wandering (they are, after all, πλάνητες), so it is 
natural to assume that their motion is the closest, among the heavenly bodies, to the motion of 
mortal living beings. These move in all six directions, at different times, hence being maximally 
wandering (πλανώμενα, 43a6-b5; 44d8). In particular, the wandering of the planets consists in the 
fact that they alone among the heavenly bodies have a twofold revolution: while they are dominated 
by the circle of the Same just as the fixed stars, hence moving westward, they also have each a 
unique eastward motion along the circle of the Different on which they are placed (διὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ 
φορᾶς ἰούσης τε καὶ κρατουμένης, 39a1-2). In fact, the planets are placed by the Demiurge each on 
one of the seven sub-circles of the Different, and they move in accordance with it (κατὰ δὴ τὴν 
 
223 Ἄστρων δὴ πέρι πάντων καὶ σελήνης, ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ πασῶν ὡρῶν πέρι, τίνα ἄλλον λόγον ἐροῦμεν ἢ τὸν 
αὐτὸν τοῦτον, ὡς ἐπειδὴ ψυχὴ μὲν ἢ ψυχαὶ πάντων τούτων αἴτιαι ἐφάνησαν (899b3-6). Cf. Ti. 39c5-d2, Lg. X 822a4-8.  
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θατέρου φορὰν, 38e6). Moreover, in virtue of being associated with the motion of the circle of the 
Different, the planets are moving at different velocities, except for the Sun, Mercury and Venus 
(36c8-d7).  
Finally, the visible result of the twofold revolution is that, unlike with the constellations 
composed by the fixed stars, planets change their position in the sky relative to one another. The 
changing configurations of their visible bodies are famously described as a race at 38d4-6 
(καταλαμβάνουσίν τε καὶ καταλαμβάνονται), presenting Venus and Mercury overtaking and being 
overtaken by the Sun, and at 39a2-b2 (καταλαμβάνοντα καταλαμβάνεσθαι), highlighting that the 
overtaking between planets makes some of them appear faster than others, whereas the opposite is 
the case. Similarly, in accounting for the completion of the month, the Moon is described as 
overtaking the Sun (σελήνη περιελθοῦσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς κύκλον ἥλιον ἐπικαταλάβῃ, 39c3-4).  
However, because of the complexity of their configurations, planetary revolutions involve 
certain components which Plato describes as turnings, juxtapositions, back-circlings and so on 
(τροπάς, 39d8; τρεπόμενα, 40b6; ἐπανακυκλήσεις, προχωρήσεις, ἔν τε ταῖς συνάψεσιν, 
κατακαλύπτονται, ἀναφαινόμενοι, 40c3-7).224 These have been generally taken to describe what is 
also visible to us today, namely the peculiar trajectories of the planets across the sky. However, in 
attempting to reconcile the apparent image of planetary motion we are familiar with and Plato’s 
‘twofold revolution’ account, the literature faces several interpretative issues.225  
Vlastos, for instance, points out that while the twofold revolution is a good explanation of the 
changing position of the Moon and the Sun, it cannot explain the variations in the trajectories of the 
other five. The alternative, then, has been either (a) to take Plato to use the terminology of 
‘turnings’ and other sorts of variations as a further component of their motion, over and above the 
two regular revolutions, or (b) to assume that Plato’s account is intentionally left incomplete.226 
 
224 However, the interpretation of each of these astronomical terms associated with planetary revolutions is itself part of 
the debate and for instance, Bowen criticises the usual translation of epanakyklḗseis and prochōrḗseis (Bowen 2001). 
225 For the purposes of the present discussion, I mainly refer to Alan C. Bowen, David L. Guetter, Wilbur R. Knorr and 
Gregory Vlastos’ reconstructions of Plato’s account of planetary revolutions, and their substantial disagreements 
(Vlastos 1975, Knorr 1990, Bowen 2002, Guetter 2003). A comprehensive summary of the main exegetical issues can 
be found in Donald J. Zeyl’s commentary (Zeyl 2000 pp. xliv-xlix). Goldstein and Mendell are important sources to 
consult for an assessment of the relation between Plato and the important astronomers of his time, such as Eudoxus 
(Goldstein – Bowen 1983, Mendell 1998). 
226 Vlastos, for example, argues that Plato’s incapacity to account for all the wanderings of the planets is explained by 
the fact that Plato’s account was meant as a prototype for a more elaborate astronomical account and was not meant to 
be complete (Vlastos 1975, pp. 58-61). However, I would hold that the account as outlined in the Timaeus is only 
considered incomplete in the sense of lacking a more detailed account for each planetary revolution. It does look as if 
the author thought that all the basic theoretical commitments needed to account for the details have been already laid 
out. If Plato had been aware that his account was incapable of fully accounting for the heavenly phenomena, 
presumably he wouldn’t have outlined it with the confidence that is shown by Timaeus’ words. Timaeus only postpones 
the explanation of the details and specifies that he does so for merely pragmatic reasons (38e, 40c-d). 
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For those arguing for (a), the focus of the discussion is on two passages: (1) “The Dawnbearer 
(the Morning Star, or Venus) and the star said to be sacred to Hermes (Mercury) he set to run in 
circles that equal the Sun’s in speed, though they received the power contrary to its power (τὴν δὲ 
ἐναντίαν εἰληχότας αὐτῷ δύναμιν)” (38d2-4); (2) “For as it revolves, this movement gives to all 
these circles a spiral twist (πάντας γὰρ τοὺς κύκλους αὐτῶν στρ-έφουσα ἕλικα διὰ τὸ διχῇ κατὰ τὰ 
ἐναντία ἅμα προϊέναι), because they are moving forward in two contrary directions at once” (39a5-
b2).  
The wide consensus concerning the interpretation of (2) is that the spiral twist described has 
its origin in the twofold revolution, as described in 36d4-7.227 However, as Cornford’s ‘third force’ 
hypothesis and Knorr’s ‘wobbling’ hypothesis suggest, the twist might indicate an additional 
component to the planets’ motion, over and above the twofold regular revolution, that has its origin 
in the planets themselves. This claim is usually linked to the attribution of a contrary power, 
mentioned in (1), to Venus and Mercury, which might explain their apparent accelerations and 
decelerations.228 The uncertainty on how complete was the knowledge of heavenly phenomena of 
the Greek astronomers of the time, and thus on how complex a phenomenon they had to account for 
in the first place renders any hypothesis speculative. However, if we consider for instance the 
course of Venus and Mercury, it visibly deviates from the one followed by the Sun and, given that 
their cosmic circles are said to be uniform at 36d6 (τάχει δὲ τρεῖς μὲν ὁμοίως), the indication that 
the planets themselves have contrary powers seems significant. Plato might have intended to 
explain further complexities of planetary revolutions as due to the individual planet being 
responsible for the additional kinetic component to the overall trajectory.229 
Connected to this point, a more general exegetical question arises. There is in fact a way of 
reading Plato’s account that takes the planets to be entirely passive in their revolutions, i.e. simply 
dragged around by the regular periods of the cosmic soul. A second way of reading the passages 
takes instead the planets to be actively responsible for their course along the cosmic circles, 
independently of whether they add additional motions to the twofold revolution. The text is once 
 
227 Guetter is the only one who argues against the consensus on this passage that the use of τἀναντία in the passage does 
not mean that the circle of the Different and the circle of the Same move in contrary directions. So, he argues, for Plato 
the eastward motion is only apparent, because the circle of the Different is slower, on average, than the circle of the 
Same. It seems to me that Guetter is ignoring Timaeus’ assumption, explicitly stated at 39a1-2, that the circle of the 
Same carries with it not only the fixed stars but also the planets, and that, as a consequence, to explain their 
retrogradation, a motion in the opposite direction, i.e. eastward, is necessary, to account for the planets being ‘left 
behind’ (Guetter 2003, pp. 198-203).  
228 Cornford 1937, pp. 106-112; Knorr 1990, pp. 316-317.  
229 In the Epinomis (986e2-7), Venus and Mercury are also described as following the lead of the Sun in virtue of its 
intelligence. Moreover, their velocity is said to be almost equal to the Sun’s (τάχει μὲν ἡλίῳ σχεδὸν ἴση), but they are as 
a whole neither faster nor slower (οὔτε βραδυτέρα οὔτε θάττων τό γ’ ἐπίπαν), suggesting that they are left behind and 
then they catch up, as in the heavenly race described above. 
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more ambiguous on this, although certain hints might support the ascription of active motion to the 
planets.  
Ascribing a ‘contrary power’ to the planets themselves, as in (1), and not describing the 
phenomenon as extrinsically determined seems to imply that at least Mercury and Venus have 
autonomous agency in affecting their own trajectory. On the same note, the description of the 
planets moving in accordance with (κατὰ δὴ τὴν θατέρου φορὰν) the circle of the Different could be 
contrasted with the dominating power of the circle of the Same (κρατουμένης) that drags them 
around. In the latter case, in fact, it is the circle of the Same that is explicitly presented as the one 
responsible for the planetary revolutions along its trajectory, even teaching human beings about 
number through them (μαθόντα παρὰ τῆς ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾶς, 39b7-c1). It might well be 
that the different description entails that the circle of the Different has no similar domination upon 
them, and it is their active task to conform to the overall course of that circle in their motion. 
Finally, the planets are described as intelligent and divine living beings, devoted to 
accomplishing a specific task. That specific task is in fact taught to them, and them only, by the 
Demiurge (38e6, ἔμαθεν). Moreover, the pursuit of that task will make them guardians (φυλακὴν, 
38c6) and dancers (χορείας, 40c3) – both activities that intuitively involve actions of the body 
guided by one’s own intelligence, hence suggesting the attribution of agency.230  
However, the supporter of the ‘active’ interpretation should address at least one objection, 
stemming from the emphasis given to the fact that the planets are first described as lifeless bodies 
set in motion and only later animated by a soul. The importance of their revolutions as revolutions 
of bodies is emphasised twice in the text, when their creation is described and when they are 
animated (σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας, 38c7; δεσμοῖς τε ἐμψύχοις σώματα δεθέντα ζῷα 
ἐγεννήθη, 38e5-6). One could argue that, given the description of the planetary revolutions, it must 
be possible that they are carried out by a lifeless body set in motion by the Demiurge, at least at the 
beginning, therefore requiring that their revolutions are just the result of being subject to the course 
of the two cosmic circles. However, one could point at the same exact process taking place for the 
 
230 As Karel Thein points out, if the planets did not have a part to play, all the Demiurge would need is to fix them to 
those circles, certainly not to give them life and instructions (Thein 2015 p. 10, fn. 15). The treatment of dance in the 
Laws makes it seem as if the dancer, by learning the appropriate skills, has the capacity to make, among other things, its 
own motions rhythmic, that is, ‘according to an arrangement’, just as the planets seem to do: “Whereas animals have no 
sense of order and disorder in movement – ‘rhythm’ and ‘harmony’, as we call it – we human beings have been made 
sensitive to both and can enjoy them. This is the gift of the same gods whom we said were given to us as companions in 
dancing” (Lg. 653e3-654a1), and later on “Order in movement is called ‘rhythm’, and order in the vocal sounds—the 
combination of high and low notes—is called ‘harmony’; and the union of the two is called ‘a performance by a 
chorus’” (664e8-665a3). Interestingly, according to the Symposium, rhythm is generated when fast and slow are brought 
to a concordance from their previous discordance, in a very Philebus-like fashion (187c). 
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yet not ensouled cosmic body, at 34b, despite the later attribution of agency to the cosmic soul over 
the cosmic body and everything within.231  
Moreover, if, as argued above, the planetary revolutions are more complex than the ‘twofold 
revolutions’ account would suggest, the ‘passive’ interpretation would also struggle to explain those 
extra movements as having their origin in the two circles of the cosmic soul. In fact, it would have 
to argue either that the speed of the circle of the Different itself varies, or that the additional 
turnings of the planets are a purely ‘mechanical’ consequence of the two circles of the cosmic soul 
dragging them around.232 
In conclusion, textual evidence overall speaks in favour of the autonomous nature of the 
planetary revolutions along the circle of the Different. While my interpretation in the following 
sections relies on this claim only minimally, I would hold that the planets are responsible for their 
own motion along the circle of the Different. In fact, although planets ultimately conform to the 
period of the circle they are on, more complex patterns of motions would be more easily 
accountable for while maintaining the core of the ‘twofold revolutions’ account, as planets would 
be so instructed by the Demiurge in the pursuit of their task.233  
What remains unquestionable for Plato is that, however complex, the planets display the same 
patterns of motion again and again, succeeding in completing each revolution in exact coordination 
with the period of the Different with which they are associated. In fact, as we will see, the 
commensurability of the planetary revolutions hinges on the fact that the periods of the circle of the 
Different are all commensurable in a ratio, despite their different velocities (ἐν λόγῳ δὲ 
φερομένους, 36d6-7). If planets were not mirroring the circular motion of the cosmic circles, 
nothing would warrant the commensurability of their revolutions (39c5-7). 
My argument so far has not yet explained why Plato claims that planetary revolutions are 
identical with time. By postponing twice the enquiry into the details of the account of planetary 
revolutions to a later time, as a digression on the subject-matter (38d6-e1, 40d2-3), Plato is also 
 
231 Mohr proposes an extensive discussion on the issue of ‘setting in motion’, arguing that in the Timaeus the cosmic 
soul is not meant to have a self-moving capacity, unlike in earlier Platonic dialogues, and that its function is simply that 
of a preserver of ordered motion that has been externally originated (Mohr 1985, pp. 171-177). This could be 
generalised to all heavenly gods, and hence to the planets’ souls. 
232 The only way to justify a divergence in motion between the cosmic circles and the planets on the ‘passive’ 
interpretation would be to account for the spiral twist as originating from a turbulence caused by the contrary 
revolutions that the planets’ bodies carry out. While Knorr and Guetter’s accounts do not necessarily commit them to 
one reading over the other, their wobble-factor, or oscillation could work as an attempt at explaining the motions of the 
cosmic soul and how they determine the course of the planets (Knorr 1990, Guetter 2003). As Guetter rightly remarks, 
Plato needs the seven sub-divisions on the circle of the Different to be able to account for the great diversity of 
velocities and patterns exhibited by the planets, and as such that circle is consistently employed to explain the variety of 
motions, as opposed to the universally shared revolution along the circle of the Same (Guetter 2003, pp. 198-199). 
233 The hypothesis of cosmic circles and heavenly bodies moving at the same speed is considered redundant in 
Aristotle’s De Caelo, as he ends up arguing that the motion of the heavenly bodies is entirely extrinsic, and that they are 
at rest, fixed on the heavenly circles, and passively carried along (II, 8 289b8-290a6). 
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making the point that the details about planetary revolutions are not crucial to complete his enquiry 
on time. In order to advance our understanding of the connection between planets and time we need 
to understand why, in moving as they do, planets fulfil their function as ‘instruments of time’. 
 
5.3 The function of the planets 
 
As seen in Section 5.1, there is overwhelming evidence that the planets are introduced as means to 
accomplish a certain result, i.e. the creation of time, and they do so through their ‘wanderings’, 
analysed as a twofold revolution along the circles of the cosmic soul. To further advance our 
understanding of the specific function the planets play in relation to time, we have to consider once 
more the framework of structure and content and articulate how the planets fit in it.  
In Chapter 4, we established that the living motion of the cosmos, articulated in the eight 
periods of the cosmic soul, is the unstructured content for the creation of time. As I pointed out, 
once the cosmic living motion instantiate the temporal structure (‘according to number’) time is 
created, as the unified content-structure compound. Now, it seems that, because the planets are 
involved in the creation of time, in this reading they must, as instruments, be the ones carrying out 
the instantiation of structure in content, so that their revolutions are identified with the compound of 
the two. However, it is not yet clear how the planets would yield such a result, since their 
relationship with the structure and content of time has not been addressed. My analysis of the 
function of the planets will involve three steps: firstly, I will suggest a reading of the notion of 
‘instrument’ in Plato’s work; secondly, I will apply it to the case of the planets, as instruments of 
time; finally I will establish how their nature as instruments should be articulated in the content-
structure framework. 
There are many instances of ὄργανα in Plato’s dialogues, some analogical in meaning and 
some more straightforwardly referring to artefacts, such as musical instruments. For the purpose of 
this discussion I will present some examples that are significant in outlining the common 
characteristics defining what an instrument is in general terms. A very familiar case of the 
analogical use of the term is the use of ‘instruments’ as an the epithet for sense-organs or organs in 
general.234 The representation of a soul-body relation as instrumental is, after all, an important part 
of Plato’s dualist view, and, among the most explicit passages elaborating on it, in the Theaetetus 
 
234 The use of ὄργανον for the bodily parts responsible for sense-perception is very widespread in Plato. It appears three 
times in the Timaeus (33c4, 45a7, 45b2). Moreover, Plato already has instances in the Republic (τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις 
ὀργάνων 508b), and rather extensively in the section dedicated to perception in the Theaetetus (184a-185c). As we will 
see, however, it is also used at 33c4, implying that organs are, in general, any part of the body employed by the soul to 
interact with something external to itself, hence the reason why the cosmos is ‘organ-less’. 
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we find Socrates distinguishing between the soul, as the ultimate perceiver, and the bodily 
instruments that the soul use in order to have access to objects of perception. In this case, the 
instrument, a bodily medium for the soul to have perception of external objects, is distinct both 
from the agent, that is the soul, and from the perception, which arguably is the intended result.235 
In the Symposium, the satyr Marsyas is contrasted with Socrates: Marsyas can cast spells on 
his audience only with the aid of musical instruments, whereas Socrates just employs words to 
charm his audience. The opposition described by Alcibiades is between an agent that can only 
provide to his words their ‘spell-casting’ nature with the help of an instrument producing melodies 
and Socrates, who manages to cast a spell only with words.236 Despite the more and less literal use 
of ‘instrument’, we can see how consistently there are three components defining something as an 
instrument: the instrument is (1) a means, natural or artificial, (2) that is employed by an agent, and 
(3) has the function of achieving an intended result.237 
Given the general framework for instruments, we might wonder why planets are classified as 
instruments of time, and what are the result and the agent, in their case, such that the considering 
them as instruments is justified. The first question, concerning the intended result of the instruments 
of time, has been addressed already from the beginning of the chapter, and it is straightforwardly 
answered by the genitive χρόνου: the intended result for which the planets are made is the creation 
of time. However, it is much less straightforward to determine who would be the agent employing 
the planets to attain that result. For the moment I shall not consider what I take to be an implicitly 
widespread interpretation of the agents using the planets, which corresponds to the ‘cosmic clock’ 
interpretation discussed in Section 1.2. If we understand the planets as just a clock, the agents 
would be human beings employing the planets for the result of measuring time. I will return to that 
interpretation in the Conclusion, to highlight the difference between that interpretation and my 
reading. For the time being, I will consider the other two likely candidates. 
The first hypothesis takes the Demiurge to be the agent behind the instruments of time. If, as 
it seems natural, we take χρόνου to indicate the result yielded by the planets, as instruments, then it 
 
235 The ultimate perceiver, argues Socrates, is “some single form, soul or whatever one ought to call it, to which all 
these [perceptions] converge—something with which, through those things (eyes and ears), as if they were instruments, 
we perceive all that is perceptible (ᾗ διὰ τούτων οἷον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσααἰσθητά)” (184d1-5). 
236 215b-d. Such characterisation is maintained in other cases in which Plato explicitly refers to instruments of 
something – where the genitive makes explicit what the instrument is for, namely the result they are meant to 
accomplish. This is the case, for instance, with the instruments of war (πολέμων ὄργανα, Lg. 956a; τὸν πόλεμον 
ὀργάνοις, La. 181c-182c), referred to in the Laws and Laches. What such instruments are varies from armours to the 
suitable metals used to craft military equipment. The notion, however, suggests that those are the things that are needed 
in order for men to fight on the battlefield. 
237 Although most uses of ‘instrument’, analogical or otherwise, refer to material objects and to their use, there is a 
broader analogical function of ‘instrument’ that is potentially applicable to all sorts of means to end relations. For 
instance, in the Republic the rational part of the soul is compared to the eye as the instrument of purely intellectual 
understanding (518c), and words and arguments are the instruments of the philosopher (582d-e). 
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is also plausible to take the Demiurge as the agent using them to achieve that result. However, on 
this reading, Plato would take the Demiurge to be the agent only indirectly, in the same way as a 
craftsman would be with a mechanism that he had produced and set in motion. In fact, the result 
that the planets yield is in their wanderings, not merely by coming into existence, and, as we 
established in Section 5.2, that motion is plausibly carried out by the planets themselves. The 
instructions given by the Demiurge to the planets (38e6) and his later ‘retirement’ (42e5-6) once the 
work is done, strongly suggest that planets are peculiar sorts of instruments in that they are 
autonomously moving in accordance with the intentions of their creator. This, after all, would be in 
line with the characterisation of the Demiurge as a divine sort of craftsman, capable of crafting 
instruments that do not need an external agent, being agents themselves. 
This leads to the second hypothesis: the planets are both instruments and agents. All in all, 
given that Timaeus describes the planets as ensouled, intelligent and in the process of carrying out a 
specific task, perhaps we should not take them to be used by an external agent, but rather as 
themselves, qua intelligent souls, being the agents behind the use of their bodies as instruments for 
the creation of time. This, as we have seen in the previous section, is also supported by various hints 
that the planets are directly responsible for most of their revolutions in the sky. In this picture, then, 
the planets would be instruments and ensouled, intelligent agents, set up as auxiliaries by the 
Demiurge to help him finish his work.238 
My view is that the two hypotheses above are not exclusive, as the agents that yield the result 
in the case of the creation of time can be more than one. The plurality of agents is explained, I 
would argue, by Plato’s understanding of time as crafted and yet essentially kinetic. As I pointed 
out in Chapter 4, since time is a kinetic imitation of αἰών, it is not something that is created once 
and for all, but rather its structure is progressively displayed in motion, both in terms of its parts and 
as a totality. Hence, there are two stages to its creation: while the Demiurge is a creator of time 
through the planets because he sets up the entire ‘mechanism’, including the planets’ intelligence 
and task, it is only when the planets themselves start to attend to the progressive creation of time, by 
carrying out their revolutions, that time comes to be.239 The planets, then, are best envisaged as 
intelligent ‘proxies’ left behind by the Demiurge to bring his work to completion according to the 
 
238 Given my discussion in Section 5.2, it should be noted that the cosmic soul would also be contributing in a minor 
way as an agent, insofar as it is nonetheless responsible for the planetary revolution along the circle of the Same. 
239 Brague makes a similar point, underscoring how the planets still have a task to accomplish, once the Demiurge is 
done with his crafting, and they continue, as instruments, to generate the moving image of αἰών: “La ressemblance est 
le résultat d’un processus de conquête, et non une propriété inhérente [...]. Le ciel n’est image de l’aïôn que dans la 
mesure où il ne cesse d’engendrer le nombre par le mouvement des corps célestes qui le rendent visible” (Brague 1982, 
pp. 60-61). 
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plan he devised. And yet, as we have seen in sub-section 4.2.2, their work as instruments in the 
creation of time is like Sisyphus’, in that it never truly comes to an end. 
 
5.3.1. The planets and the content of time 
 
So far, the cosmos has been left out of the discussion, as it is neither an instrument of time, nor the 
agent (see Section 5.2). It comes to the foreground, however, when we focus on the result of the 
instruments of time, i.e. the creation of time. In Section 2.2, I argued that the creation of time is 
intermediate between stage 1 and 2 of the cosmogony in that while time is created by means of the 
planets, it is a feature of the whole cosmos. In particular, time is a cosmic phenomenon, that I 
interpreted as the structured totality of cosmic life (see Section 4.1). Cosmic life, articulated in the 
eight periods of the cosmic soul, has been identified as the content of time, to become structured in 
the creation of time. If so, however, the planets are instruments for the creation of time insofar as 
they instantiate the temporal structure into the eight periods of the cosmic soul. Then, the cosmos 
appears in the ‘instrument’ relation as that which the instruments of time modify as structure-
creators, in order to bring about time as a result. 
If the reading is correct up to this point, then, the planets’ function and their ‘wandering’ 
motion can finally be connected in an adequate way. We established in Section 5.2 that planets 
fulfil their function by carrying out their twofold revolutions along the circles of the Same and the 
Different – so much so that their revolutions are identified with time. Identity with time, however, 
entails that planetary revolutions are identified with both the content and structure of time, as time 
consists in the compound of the two. 
We should first focus on the identity with the content of time, as it gives crucial insight on the 
reason behind the ‘wanderings’ of planets. Their peculiar motion is in fact the result of a conformity 
that planetary revolutions collectively attain with the cosmic periods of both the Same and 
Different. If, say, the planets were to start moving differently from the cosmic soul and lose that 
conformity, in my reading they would also fail to be instruments of time because they would not 
succeed in making the content of time structured. 
The identification of cosmic motion and planetary revolutions is also textually supported by 
the terminology for circular motion, equally employed to refer to the periods of the cosmic soul and 
the planetary revolutions. Let us consider the following terms, and their verbal correspondents: 
περίοδος, κύκλος, φορά and περιφορά. As far as I can see, περιφορά is used exclusively for the 
rotations of the cosmic soul or for the corresponding rotations in our head: 36d1, 38c7-8, 39c1 and 
40b2 for the former, 47b8 for the latter. Analogously, it seems that φορά is mainly used in the 
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account of time to refer specifically to the revolutions of the planets, to contrast their forward 
motion on a circular path with a rotation on oneself: 38e4, 38e6, 39a1, 39a4, 39b4.240 
However, when using περίοδος and κύκλος, Plato never clarifies whether the reference is to 
the planetary revolutions or the underlying rotations of the cosmic soul. Περίοδος, in particular, is 
used at first to describe the rotations or the circles of the cosmic soul, while it is later employed to 
describe planetary revolutions in the account of time.241 The most significant passages to show the 
shift in their referent are 39b3-4 and 39d4-5, where the eight revolutions carried out by the planets 
as a group (τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς πορεύοιτο) are later referred to as the eight periods (ἁπασῶν 
τῶν ὀκτὼ περιόδων) measuring out the complete year. The passage at 47a1-c4 also shows a swift 
transition from the revolutions of the planets generating the parts of time (ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι) to the 
underlying cosmic rotations (τοῦ νοῦ κατιδόντες περιόδους), that are visible thanks to the planets. 
This suggests that the circular motion of the cosmos and that of the planets as a group are not 
distinct ones, even though for the seven planets that motion consists in a twofold revolution, 
whereas for the cosmos it is a twofold rotation: they follow the same path and complete each full 
circular motion at the same overall speed. 
This hypothesis explains not only the way the planets move, but also their number, 
corresponding to the seven subdivisions in which the motion of the circle of the Different is 
articulated (σώματα δὲ αὐτῶν ἑκάστων ποιήσας ὁ θεὸς ἔθηκεν εἰς τὰς περιφορὰς ἃς ἡ θατέρου 
περίοδος ᾔειν, ἑπτὰ οὔσας ὄντα ἑπτά, 38c7-d1). The group of seven planets, I contend, has the exact 
number and position to collectively attain, in its twofold revolution, conformity with the cosmic 
periods.242 In fact, the seven sub-circles of the Different are where the cosmic motion as a whole is 
 
240 The passage at 36c4-5 (τὴν μὲν οὖν ἔξω φορὰν ἐπεφήμισεν εἶναι τῆς ταὐτοῦ φύσεως) might support this reading, 
insofar as it defines the motion of the circle of the Same as a φορά that always takes place in the same place. 
241 Examples of the first use are 38c8, 39c2, 47b7, 47d3, 47d5 and 58a5; of the second are 39b5, 39c5, 39d5, 47a5. As 
for κύκλος, we have a number of references to either the circles of the cosmic soul themselves, and to their shape (36c1, 
36c4, 36d2, 36d5, 36e2, 37b7, 37c1, 38d3, 39a6, 39d7 and 40a6), which, when planetary revolutions are concerned 
directly, is coupled with περιέρχομαι to describe the full revolution of the planet on the circle, i.e. a cycle (39c3, c5). A 
further level of ambiguity is added by the fact that περίοδος and κύκλος can signify both the circular path and the 
motion carried out along it, implying one or the other in different contexts (LSJ s.v. περίοδος, κύκλος). The 
considerations above do not presuppose that Plato is aiming, in the Timaeus or elsewhere, to be completely consistent 
and strictly technical in his vocabulary. Nonetheless, the variety of terms employed would generate ambiguity, if Plato 
meant to keep the planetary and cosmic motion distinct. The conformity of the two is then a way to justify Plato’s 
terminological choice. 
242 The explanation concerning the motion and number of the planets needs be teleological in nature, since we are 
discussing the function for how things are arranged the way they are so that they are the best possible. Our enquiry 
starts from the visible revolutions of the planets, that are the empirically accessible phenomena, and the hypothesis of 
the corresponding eight periods of the cosmic soul follows. The teleological explanation, however, requires that we look 
at the same phenomena from the perspective of the creator, hence wondering for what function they were made for. In 
that perspective, the explanatory order goes the opposite way: the complexity of the cosmic soul comes first in both 
planning and crafting, so that the planets’ function is seen as completing the prior creation of the cosmic soul and its 
periods. Notably, Timaeus does not provide a further teleological explanation for the way the soul is divided in exactly 
seven sub-circles of the Different having different velocities, which might suggest that Plato takes those features as a 
given fact about how well-structured souls are made. 
 
 
109 
 
manifested: both components of cosmic motion, along the ecliptic and along the equator, are 
expressed in the circle of the Different, as, in addition to its own seven periods, the circle also 
moves in accordance with the period of the circle of the Same. 
Finally, the hypothesis offers a plausible reason for the exclusion of the fixed stars from any 
involvement in the creation of time, contrasted with the crucial role played by the planets. If the 
goal of the creation of the instruments of time is structuring the cosmic periods, to have those 
instruments revolving in conformity with both circles of the cosmic soul is a crucial condition to be 
structure-creators.243 Revolving along with only one of the two circles, as the fixed stars do, is not 
enough, because in that way their motion conforms only to one component of cosmic motion and 
not to the whole of it. In this way, the motion of the fixed stars is not identical with the content of 
time, as is in the case for the planets, but only with part of it.244 
 
5.3.2. The planets as structure-creators 
 
The identity between the planetary revolutions and the periods of the cosmic soul (content of time) 
is not enough, in and of itself, to make the planets instruments of time. As suggested above, the 
planets must also be structure-creators, so that their ‘wanderings’ also display the temporal structure 
(κατ’ ἀριθμὸν). The next part of the enquiry, then, should attempt to clarify how the planetary 
revolutions instantiate the temporal structure. What I propose in this sub-section is a first outline of 
my proposal, which will be developed in Chapter 6. 
My main claim is that the content of time instantiates the temporal structure in virtue of the 
visibility introduced by the fiery bodies of the planets. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, 
time is presented twice as an image (εἰκὼ, εἰκόνα), thus foregrounding its corporeal and visible 
nature as a cosmic phenomenon. To my knowledge, Remi Brague has been the first, at least among 
modern scholars, to acknowledge the crucial connection between the visibility of the heavenly 
 
243 There is a connected fact about the cognitive faculties of the two circles of the cosmic soul that might be relevant. 
The rotation of the circle of the Different is opposed in its cognitive function to the one of the circle of the Same at 
37a6-c5. Importantly, the circle of the Different’s intellection is about the things that come to be (37b2, b6-7), and 
among the aspects it enquires into there is the ‘when’ question (ὁπότε, 37b1). On the contrary, the circle of the Same 
seems to rule the whole cosmos from outside the heaven (36e2-4) and its intellection is directed exclusively to what 
remain always identical with itself, namely the purely intelligible kind (37c1-3). It seems that the epistemological 
function of the circle of the Different and its position as the inner circle of the cosmic soul (36c5) are connected so that 
to enquire into a certain object, the soul must be directly associated with it. Perhaps time must also be accessible, in 
Plato’s assessment, by the circle of the Different, in its twofold rotation (the one it carries out and the one dominated by 
the circle of the Same), as time proceeds because the planets move along with that circle. For an account of the 
interaction between the cosmic soul and its corporeal objects of cognition, see Betegh 2018, pp. 128-133. 
244 The hypothesis might also explain why Plato does not include the Earth among the heavenly bodies responsible for 
the creation of time, despite it having a part to play in the resulting visible appearance (see fn. 220). The Earth, unlike 
the planets, passively stands still at the centre of the cosmos and does not conform to the cosmic periods. 
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bodies and the definition of time as a moving image of αἰών. In fact, he correctly points out that the 
visibility of the heavenly bodies is all that the Demiurge needs to add to the periods of the cosmic 
soul, in order to create time.245  
Along the same lines, I also hold that the planets are instruments for the creation of time, 
insofar as they collectively constitute a kinetic image in their revolutions: on the one hand, that 
kinetic image conforms to the content of time in its motion, as seen in sub-section 5.3.1; on the 
other, it visibly displays a κατ’ ἀριθμὸν structure, as we will see in Chapter 6. An important 
corollary to this claim is that, through the planetary revolutions, the content of time visibly displays 
a structure that was not there yet with the creation of the cosmic soul and the start of its periods. 
The κατ’ ἀριθμὸν structure of time is a structure instantiated by means of visibility, so the invisible 
periods of the cosmic soul alone do not instantiate it.246 
This reading, I will argue, fits with Plato’s own definition of the planets’ function at 38c5-6: 
“these are called ‘planets’, and they came to be in order to delimit and guard the numbers of time 
(εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονεν)” (38c5-6).247 I did not address the passage 
earlier in the chapter precisely because of its focus on the function the planets play in relation to 
κατ’ ἀριθμὸν structure of time (i.e. numbers of time), which first required a clarification on the 
significance of their ‘wanderings’, and their relation to the content of time.248 However, with what 
has been established so far, we can already offer a provisional interpretation of the passage. 
As Taylor notes, the two functions that the planets are said to carry out – guarding and 
delimiting – should not be taken as two separate activities. They most likely are two aspects of the 
single activity the planets are involved in, which we previously identified in their distinctive 
 
245 “Les corps célestes ne servent qu’à être vus, leurs corps ne servent qu’à les rendre visibles. Le demiurge les place 
ensuite ‘sur les trajets circulaires que décrivait (ᾔειν) la révolution de l’Autre’. Le cercle se meut déjà quand, recevant 
les astres, il devient le ciel. Et dans la mesure où ces astres rendent visible le mouvement, et, de ce fait, le rendent 
dénombrable, le ciel est image mobile de l’aïôn. Ce n’est donc pas tant le mouvement qui joue ici le rôle essentiel, ni 
même les astres en leur visibilité, mais bien ce au service de quoi ils sont tous deux, et qui est la mise en œuvre et en 
évidence du nombre” (Brague 1982, p. 60). 
246 One could object to my reconstruction that the Demiurge must have been able to measure the motion of the various 
circles of the cosmic soul in some way, in order to set them up as proportionate in velocity (see 36d6-7). The objection 
would aim at challenging my claim that there is no distinctively enumerable structure (κατ’ ἀριθμὸν) of cosmic motion 
before the creation of the planets. However, the measurement of the velocity of the periods of the cosmic soul does not 
require that the circles themselves are structured in an enumerable way. It is sufficient that they are measured by means 
of an external term of comparison. In this case, the term of comparison could be the infallible intellect of the Demiurge, 
as it is presumably capable of calibrating proportional velocities by reference to intervals marked out in his own mind. 
247 Both Cornford and Taylor read the passage as mainly highlighting the function of planets as instruments for the 
measurement of time (Cornford 1937, p. 105). Taylor remarks that planets “‘divide’ or ‘determine’ the numbers, 
because we use their revolutions as units for measuring time; they ‘guard’ the numbers, keep them safe, in fact provide 
a standard measure, in virtue of the equability of the revolutions” (Taylor 1928, p. 192). I agree on the interpretation 
proposed by Taylor, except for the claim that we are using the planets to divide and determine. As argued above, the 
planets are instruments for the creation of time, not for its measurement. 
248 Vlastos, in agreement with Cherniss, notes that this passage shows that for Plato there is no identity between the 
planetary revolutions and time (Vlastos 1965, pp. 409-410). However, it seems to me that he conflates the planets 
themselves and their revolutions. Time is identical with the latter, not the former. 
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‘wandering’ revolutions. The hypothesis that I find most persuasive, in light of my conclusions 
about the planets as instruments of time, is that the two components match with the planets’ double 
role as agents and instruments.  
The planets are guardians (φυλακὴν) of the numbers of time, as it has been argued earlier, 
because they are divine agents, directing their own revolution along with the circle of the 
Different.249 I also argued that they succeed in the creation of time if and only if each conform to 
the period of the circle of the Different with which it is associated. Their function as guardians, 
then, seems to capture exactly the need for an intelligent preservation of their motion, so that it is as 
regular and circular as the cosmic soul’s. Moreover, to move as the cosmic soul does is a 
precondition for the creation of numbers of time, as it will become clear in sub-section 6.2.2. If the 
planets were not guardians, that is agents in control of the regularity and path of their motion, time 
(and its numbers) would not have been preserved. 
It also follows from my analysis that the other component defining the planets’ activity, 
namely the planets delimiting (διορισμὸν) the numbers of time, must concern them qua visible 
bodies, and it qualifies the way planets are instruments, rather than agents. It is in fact the visibility 
of the fiery bodies displayed in planetary revolutions that makes them creators of the κατ’ ἀριθμὸν 
structure of time. However, without a better understanding of the enumerability of time, and of how 
it relates to the planets’ visibility, the passage remains somewhat obscure. The conclusion of the 
analysis of this passage, then, will be postponed to sub-section 6.2.2, once we have familiarised 
ourselves with the relation between visibility and enumerability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
249 The action of guarding (φυλάττειν) is importantly determined by what is guarded, and of course allows for a variety 
of meanings, from ‘watching attentively’ (Lg. 632b, 758a) to the more action-related meaning of ‘safeguarding’ and 
‘protecting’ (R. 333e-334a, Lg. 625e-626a, Cf. LSJ s.v. φῠλάττω). Certain instances in the Republic and the Symposium 
specifically portray the soul as the guardian of the bodily instincts or of the safety of the body (442b5-7, 606a8) or 
restraining from misbehaviour (188c2). The two most significant instances for the purposes of the passage under 
scrutiny appear in the Laws and the Timaeus: at 741b2 the guarding concerns the number of 5040 households 
established as the precise amount that must not be exceeded or fallen short of. Finally, in the Timaeus, we have a 
naturalistic use of ‘guarding’, where the blood’s fibers are said to preserve the blood’ natural condition, that is a balance 
of thinness and thickness (85d2). 
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Ch. 6: The enumerable structure of time 
 
In Chapter 2 and 4 I argued that time is structured so as to resemble the undivided unity of αἰών 
(μένοντος ἐν ἑνὶ). However, time is a cosmic phenomenon, grounded in the physical constitution of 
the cosmic living being, and falls short of αἰών as it is complex and kinetic. This means that (a) time 
is structured as a plurality of parts and (b) those parts come to be in a sequence, as a processual 
completion of a totality. However, the temporal structure, despite the physical limitations, is defined 
as κατ’ ἀριθμὸν (37d6-7, 38a7-8) which, according to the Demiurge’s judgement, is the closest 
possible structure to αἰών’s absolute unity. In this chapter, I will generally refer to the κατ’ ἀριθμὸν 
structure as ‘enumerable’. Although the reason for this rendering will emerge more clearly once we 
are familiar with Plato’s conception of ἀριθμός, the qualification should already convey the idea 
that time, as a compound of structure and content, is not an abstract number, but rather content 
structured κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, i.e.  in an enumerable way, so that it can be counted, as we do with days, 
nights, months, years etc.250  
In this chapter my aim is to enquire into the temporal structure, by answering the ‘what’ and 
‘how’ questions: what an enumerable structure consists in and how that structure is brought about. 
Important groundwork towards answering the two questions has been laid out in Chapter 5, so I will 
briefly summarise the main conclusions reached there. The seven planets are introduced as 
instruments of time, as, in Plato’s view, their revolutions are collectively identified with time 
(39d1).251 In my reading, based on the structure-content dichotomy, that claim is interpreted as the 
planetary revolutions being identified with the structured content of time, and hence partially 
identified with both the content of time – i.e. the periods of the cosmic soul – and the temporal 
structure.  
In the previous chapter I showed in what sense the planetary revolutions are identified with 
the content of time, i.e. the cosmic periods. Most importantly, however, planets are instruments of 
time by being structure-creators, and, as I suggested in sub-section 5.3.2, they are so in virtue of the 
inherently visible nature of their fiery bodies. In other words, the planetary revolutions display, 
through their visibility, the enumerable structure of time. What remains to be accounted for, 
however, is the crucial relation between visibility and the enumerability that, in my reading, 
characterises the temporal structure. For this purpose, I will introduce the notion of visible pattern 
 
250 Paraphrasing κατ’ ἀριθμὸν as ‘enumerable’ does not intend to assign a mind-dependent status to what is so 
described. The predicate ‘enumerable’ is meant to single out the objective structural features that are distinctive of 
being a concrete number (Cf. Arist. Ph. IV 12, 220b8-9) as opposed to other kinds of structures that may not 
enumerable, e.g. geometrical or functional ones, as will be clarified in Section 6.3. 
251 See p. 94 for specific terminological remarks on my use of ‘planets’. 
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and argue that the visible patterns displayed by the planetary revolutions consist in the enumerable 
structure of time. 
To articulate the above reading, however, it is first necessary to take a detour to discuss 
Plato’s conception of number. The detour will enable us to interpret the use of ἀριθμός throughout 
the account of time, and, in particular, to understand what an enumerable, or κατ’ ἀριθμὸν, structure 
is. 
 
6.1. Concerning ἀριθμός in Plato 
 
The term ἀριθμός is usually translated as ‘number’. Our intuitive grasp of the semantics of the term, 
however, does not adequately capture the semantics of ἀριθμός. A comprehensive discussion of 
Plato’s notion of ἀριθμός would require a major detour from my present enquiry. What I offer, 
instead, is a brief outline of some relevant distinctions and conclusions proposed in the literature on 
Plato’s philosophy of arithmetic that will be important for my enquiry on time.252  
The first relevant distinction in Plato’s ontology of ἀριθμός is partially captured by the 
contemporary dichotomy between abstract and concrete objects. In Plato too there are 
fundamentally two sorts of numbers, abstract and concrete. Concrete numbers, as summarised in 
Paul Pritchard’s interpretation, are conceived by Plato as enumerable sets of concrete objects, that is 
in Plato’s terminology, a plurality of sensible things, where each of them is a unit. 253 
The ‘of’ in question, argues Pritchard, translates in each case as a material genitive, such that 
concrete numbers are sets constituted by the things specified by the genitive. That view is opposed 
to the modern conception, that takes numbers to be abstract quantities (usually represented by the 
series of numerals) predicated of a set or, in a Fregean conception, as properties assigned to the 
extension of a concept.254 In the Republic, fingers, for instance, are considered to be among the “the 
visible or tangible bodies that have numbers” (ὁρατὰ ἢ ἁπτὰ σώματα ἔχοντας ἀριθμοὺς, 525d7-8), 
and concrete numbers are also what a general must be familiar with in arraying orderly ranks of an 
 
252 For the purpose of this outline, I mainly rely on the important contributions in the work of Henry Mendell, Richard 
Mohr, Paul Pritchard and, in sub-section 6.3.2, Barbara Sattler (Mendell 2008, Mohr 1981, Pritchard 1995, Sattler 
2017). Since the main contemporary debates concerning Plato’s understanding of ἀριθμός do not directly affect how we 
should read the account of time, my interpretation is compatible with most current views on how to understand ἀριθμός 
in Plato. 
253 ‘Set’ here should be read as synonym of ‘group’, ‘aggregate’, ‘collection’, and not as the technical notion 
corresponding to ‘class’ in set theory. Pritchard argues that Aristotle, Plato, and Euclid worked with a shared 
understanding of the use of the term ἀριθμός that was also familiar in non-theoretical contexts (Pritchard 1995, pp. 9-
23). 
254 The modern conception would describe counting as ascribing the property of being e.g. four, to e.g. a given 
collection of pebbles, where the property ‘four’ is just the relation between the set and ‘four’ in the abstract series of 
natural numbers (Pritchard 1995, pp. 33-55, 84-86). 
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army and ships (522b5-e4, 525b1-4).255 Beyond the Republic, clear statements in this sense can be 
found in the Theaetetus, where Socrates enquires into the nature of acres and furlongs, arguing that 
they just are the same as numbers, evidently intending the concrete kind.256 
However, in Plato’s view, concrete numbers do not exist, nor are they knowable 
independently of their relation of resemblance with abstract numbers. As it is outlined especially in 
the Republic (although arguably partially reprised in the Philebus and in the Epinomis), concrete 
numbers are presented as flawed instantiations of abstract numbers in the sensible domain, so that 
they are qualified as visible, or tangible.257 Yet, it is also maintained by Plato that despite their 
inadequacies qua numbers, experts in arithmetic still require those visible and tangible numbers as 
images (εἰκόνες) for studying the abstract ones.258 This twofold status of perceivable representatives 
and yet flawed instantiations of abstract, or true numbers, is what defines concrete numbers in the 
Republic. 
The language of instantiation used to define the relation between abstract and concrete 
numbers is similar to the terminology employed for the content-structure relation in the previous 
chapter, for a good reason. My claim will be that concrete numbers, just as any other concrete 
mathematical entity, belong to the physical world, and are thus best analysed as a special case of 
structured objects, or phenomena, in terms of the content-structure dichotomy. Time, in particular, 
is one of such mathematical compounds of content and structure. It is, in particular, an arithmetical 
one, being composed by concrete numbers of a sort, i.e. the numbers of time. More on this will be 
said at the end of this section, when I will discuss concrete numbers in the Timaeus, and in Section 
6.3. 
Apart from the relationship they bear with concrete numbers, abstract numbers are rather 
mysterious entities in Plato’s dialogues, and there is no agreement in the literature on how to best 
conceptualise them. Since in the Timaeus the focus is, not surprisingly, on physical, concrete 
 
255 An analogous expression to the one employed for the fingers is found in the section on astronomy to indicate what 
the proportions between different temporal units have as their subject matter (τὴν δὲ νυκτὸς πρὸς ἡμέραν συμμετρίαν 
[…] σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, 530b3). The same formulation occurs in the Epinomis, when the subject matter of 
arithmetic is restricted to the numbers themselves, as opposed to numbers that have bodies: ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ’ οὐ 
σώματα ἐχόντων (990c6). 
256 Theaet. 204d. It should be noted, however, that the passage might be presenting a view Plato did not himself hold, as 
pointed out in Harte’s analysis (Harte 2002, pp. 40-47). Even so, what Plato is presenting, is clearly a notion of concrete 
number that he consistently employs, even if in conjunction with abstract numbers. 
257 Epin. 990c5-6; Phlb. 56d1-57a4. 
258 510c-511b. Plato’s notion of ‘image’ is fundamental to his conception of the practise of mathematical sciences as a 
whole: “mathematical activities proceed by reasoning (διανοεῖσθαι) from hypotheses to conclusions and they involve 
diagrams, here understood in the most general and Platonic sense, namely as any perceptible that represents a number, a 
geometrical or stereometrical figure, an astronomical entity, or a harmonic entity, whether Form, intermediate or even 
perceptible” (Mendell 2008, p. 149). 
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numbers, the details of what abstract numbers are like won’t concern the results of my enquiry, so I 
will remain neutral about which option to favour in the debate.259  
 
6.1.1. The two criteria of optimality 
 
Although Plato’s conception of abstract number is disputed, it is generally accepted that in drawing 
the contrast between abstract and concrete numbers, two criteria of optimality are outlined: 
indivisibility and sameness. These criteria are mainly discussed in the Republic to foreground in 
which respects concrete numbers fall short of their abstract correspondents. However, given that 
they make an appearance even in the late Philebus, I take it that they are useful criteria to grasp 
what kind of features characterise an optimal number, in Plato’s conception, as opposed to a more 
generic sense in which any set of items is a concrete number. As we will see in Section 6.2, time, as 
it is displayed by planetary revolutions, is accounted for as something paradigmatically enumerable, 
and the source of our first acquaintance with number in general. In Section 6.3 I will explore the 
possibility that time as it is conceived by Plato fits particularly well with such criteria, and argue 
that it meets their standards of optimality, insofar as a concrete arithmetical structure can. 
The first criterion of optimality (indivisibility) is mainly exposed in the Republic, although it 
is perhaps indirectly referenced in the Philebus.260 The premise is that the one itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν, 
525d9), intended as the fundamental part composing numbers, ought to be indivisible, so the expert 
arithmeticians, when asked to divide the one, takes it to mean that we rather intend to multiply it, 
i.e. to make the one a plurality of units (525d8-e3). The notion of unit, then, is defined by 
indivisibility, i.e. as being the opposite of a plurality (μή ποτε φανῇ τὸ ἓν μὴ ἓν ἀλλὰ πολλὰ μόρια, 
525e3). A few lines later the same criterion is formulated as absence of internal parts (μόριόν τε 
ἔχον ἐν ἑαυτῷ οὐδέν, 526a4), which seems to suggest that the units, as the fundamental parts of 
number, cannot be further divided, so that optimal numbers are composed of mereological atoms.261 
 
259 The two main options are to conceive the abstract numbers of mathematics (α) as pluralities constituted by purely 
intelligible units, analogously to their concrete counterpart, or (β) as forms, hence as paradigmatic, intelligible and 
strictly individual entities standing for different amounts (twoness, threeness, oddness, evenness and so on). Some, 
however, opt for attributing to Plato a richer ontology, including among abstract numbers both (α) and (β). A 
comprehensive assessment of the two main alternative exegetical choices that we are presented with is offered in Henry 
Mendell’s article (Mendell 2008, pp. 127-128, 153-156). In Pritchard’s reading, the abstract numbers should be 
conceptualised as (α). However, Pritchard also adds that it is not problematic that the form of twoness is not constituted 
by two units, unlike its instantiation, since the object of arithmetic, as with all the mathematical sciences, is individuated 
in the concrete numbers, qua representatives of the various forms (Pritchard 1995, pp. 150-160). Although Mohr’s 
position resembles Pritchard’s with regard to the relation between concrete and abstract numbers, he maintains that 
Plato takes the concrete number (what he calls the ‘phenomenal number’) and the set of things which instantiate the 
number as separate entities (Mohr 1981, pp. 625-627). 
260 In the Philebus the issue of being one and of different sorts of units is touched upon (see sub-section 6.3.1, p. 132). 
261 Aristotle’s account of measurement offers a similar assessment of the units composing a number. He argues that “‘to 
be one’ means ‘to be indivisible’ (διὸ καὶ τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι τὸ ἀδιαιρέτῳ ἐστὶν εἶναι), being essentially one means a ‘this’ and 
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On the contrary, in concrete numbers units appear “at once one and an unlimited plurality (ὡς ἕν τε 
ὁρῶμεν καὶ ὡς ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος)” (525a5-6), and thereby fail to meet the criterion of indivisibility. 
The criterion seems especially relevant for my enquiry because the undivided unity of αἰών is 
of paramount importance in the account of time. As argued in Chapter 4, presenting αἰών as a 
mereological atom serves to both highlight its unattainability in the cosmic image and present the 
paradigmatic term of comparison of the enumerable structure of time. I will argue in Section 6.3 
that although the units of time could be divided further – hence not being indivisible in an 
unqualified sense – none of their subdivisions could function as optimal units in that same domain, 
because none would meet the criterion of sameness (see below). The units of time are then 
indivisible in a qualified sense – qua smallest units in the given domain. 
The second criterion (sameness) is also presented in the Republic and reprised in the Philebus. 
The criterion does not seem to require sameness between units in every respect. However, sameness 
is all-important in the qualitative (i.e. kind) and quantitative (i.e. magnitude) respect. Qualitative 
sameness is not stressed in Plato as much as the quantitative one, being rather uncontroversially 
presupposed by the account. However, in the example of the three fingers it is specified that they 
constitute a visible number in virtue of each appearing as fingers, despite the accidental features of 
being dark or pale, thick or thin, and disposed in a certain order (Δάκτυλος μὲν αὐτῶν φαίνεται 
ὁμοίως ἕκαστος καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει, 523c10-d1). None of those visible features affects 
their role as units, as long as they are of the kind ‘finger’.262 
Quantitative sameness, on the other hand, is explicitly discussed in the Republic as equality in 
terms of magnitude characterising the units of the optimal number (ἴσον τε ἕκαστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ 
οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρον, 526a3-4). The same criterion is reprised in the Philebus to distinguish the 
sort of units layman arithmetic is concerned with, as opposed to the philosophers’ one: “First there 
are those who compute numbers of quite unequal units (οἱ μὲν γάρ που μονάδας ἀνίσους 
καταριθμοῦνται τῶν περὶ ἀριθμόν), such as two armies or two herds of cattle, regardless whether 
they are tiny or huge. But then there are the others who would not follow their example, unless it 
were guaranteed that none of those countless units differed in the least from any of the others (εἰ μὴ 
μονάδα μονάδος ἑκάστης τῶν μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει)”.263 The 
 
capable of being isolated either in place, or in form or thought; or perhaps ‘to be whole and indivisible’” (Metaph. X, 1 
1052b15-18). In his account, units are a measure of number, just as the unit of measurement measures a continuum 
(1052b20-24). 
262 Aristotle puts forth for a similar principle, which Sattler calls ‘principle of homogeneity’, according to which the unit 
of measurement and what’s measured must be of the same kind, applied in the case of number to the unit (Metaph. X 
1053a24-30). In Aristotle, however, the principle is extended to measurement in general, as we will see in Section 6.3. 
263 59d9-e3. Similar considerations could also be connected with the ontology presented at the beginning of the 
Philebus, where equality, the double, and everything that is related to number and measure 
(πρῶτον μὲν τὸ ἴσον καὶ ἰσότητα, μετὰ 
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concern seems to be that, while concrete numbers might well entail having bigger and smaller units, 
arithmeticians would require units of the same size. 
The argument presented in the Republic to explain why quantitative sameness a criterion for 
the optimality of numbers emphasises once more the issue of divisibility. The claim is that if a unit 
appears as big or small in comparison to another unit, this causes the two to stop appearing as units 
composing a number. In fact, the comparison makes them appear as both one finger and as more 
than one at the same time, as the greater unit of the two would be like the smaller, plus an additional 
part. The conclusion is that at least certain concrete numbers fail to meet the criterion of 
quantitative sameness and thereby fail to be composed of proper units.264  
Moreover, there is an additional beneficial consequence to quantitative sameness that has to 
do with comparability between concrete numbers in terms of their aggregate magnitude. While in 
some cases the aggregate magnitude of concrete numbers is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
calculation (e.g. when we are comparing the number of different groups of people), there are cases 
in which the units composing the number need to be informative about the aggregate magnitude 
(e.g. when we compare the aggregate weight by counting different sets of apples). As long as each 
set has units of the same magnitude, hence individually meeting the criterion of quantitative 
sameness, such a comparison is possible, given that we can establish a proportion between the units. 
Let us consider, for instance, two sets of stones equal in number, whose units are one half of 
the other: a quantitative comparison would be possible, given that the criterion of quantitative 
sameness holds for each set separately. In fact, by comparing their respective amounts, we would 
say that while they are both sets of ten, since the units of one are half the size of the units of the 
other, the latter set is double the size. However, no comparison would be possible if the units of the 
two sets were mixed together, since the unit ‘stone’ would vary in size, hence not being informative 
about the set it composes. As we will see in Section 6.3, the criterion of quantitative sameness is 
also important in the case of time, as the proportionality between different numbers of time can only 
be established because their units meet the criterion. 
  
 
δὲ τὸ ἴσον τὸ διπλάσιον καὶ πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἂν πρὸς ἀριθμὸν ἀριθμὸς ἢ μέτρον ᾖ πρὸς μέτρον) is introduced as that which 
pertains to limit. Limit is in fact opposed to the more and the less characterising the unlimited. It seems that according 
to the ontology of the Philebus, it is possible to bring about equality in the mixtures of limit and unlimited, thereby 
suggesting that concrete numbers can also be optimal (25a6-b3). As we will see below, the same could be hypothesised 
for the Timaeus as well. 
264 Εἰ ἄρα ἓν ἑκάτερον, ἀμφότερα δὲ δύο, τά γε δύο κεχωρισμένα νοήσει· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀχώριστά γε δύο ἐνόει, ἀλλ’ ἕν. 
Ὀρθῶς. Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, φαμέν, ἀλλ’ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. ἦ γάρ; (b10-c4). 
The mention of cases in which the appearance is adequate (523b1-2) might suggest that whether all concrete numbers 
fail to meet the criterion of quantitative sameness is left open. 
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6.1.2. Numbers in the Timaeus 
 
To conclude the overview on Plato’s conception of ἀριθμός I return to focus on the Timaeus. Unlike 
in the Republic, no conception of the notion of ἀριθμός is put forth explicitly in the Timaeus. 
Hence, it is only possible to infer indirectly whether there is substantial continuity between the two 
dialogues with regard to their ontology of number. As far as I can see, there is no compelling reason 
to take the ontology of number from the Republic as being retained in the Timaeus. The project of a 
comprehensive cosmogony, with its focus on the physical world and the beauty and perfection of it, 
is extraneous to the Republic, where the physical world is the one we need to learn to turn away 
from in order to have access to intelligible objects. As part of this more general shift in the 
assessment of the physical world, the Timaeus has no similar commitment to conceive of concrete 
numbers as falling short of abstract ones, despite the persisting metaphysical dualism. 
In the dialogue we are offered several examples of the Demiurge putting the universe in order 
by means of geometrical shapes, proportions, and numbers, suggesting that the mathematical 
structures are (1) compounds of structure and content and (2) their structures are optimal and fully 
intelligible despite being instantiated. The emphasis on the success of the Demiurge in crafting 
mathematically structured objects appears across the board, at the level of the whole cosmos and 
down to the most minuscule parts.265 In the remainder of the section, I will focus on certain specific 
instances of concrete numbers discussed in the dialogue, so as to present in outline Plato’s view on 
numbers in the Timaeus.  
Throughout the dialogue, there is a list of occurrences of ‘number’ that naturally falls under 
the ‘concrete’ classification.266 The clearest ones appear when the micro-structure of the four 
elements is discussed. There, the Demiurge gives them a distinct configuration “by means of 
geometrical shapes and numbers” (οὕτω δὴ τότε πεφυκότα ταῦτα πρῶτον διεσχηματίσατο εἴδεσί τε 
καὶ ἀριθμοῖς, 53b4-5). The enquiry, accordingly, focuses on the concrete numbers involved in the 
creation of the four bodily elements. Firstly, the numbers of simple triangular bodies compose the 
three dimensional bodies of individual particles (οἷον δὲ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν γέγονεν εἶδος καὶ ἐξ ὅσων 
συμπεσόν των ἀριθμῶν, 54d3-4): four equilateral triangles for the tetrahedron (fire), eight for the 
 
265 The metaphysical imitation between the physical and ideal domain seems to always involve a degree of successful 
geometrical shaping and dividing according to proportions (Pritchard 1995, pp. 129-130). Remarks showing the 
complete conformity of the four elements to their mathematical models is given at 53e1 and 56c3-7 among others. On 
the contrary, the pre-cosmic state could be seen as the state where mathematical structures are lacking completely, 
except perhaps for ‘traces’ of the four elements that must bear some sort of distant resemblance to geometrical shapes 
(53a-b). Admittedly there seems to be room for the geometrical shapes of the four elements to lose their efficacy and 
perfection, associated with old age (81c-d). Still, in an optimal system as the cosmos, the structure at the macro-level 
persists unaffected by accidental modifications at the micro-level. 
266 In total, there are nineteen occurrences of ἀριθμός in the Timaeus, six of which within the account of time (see the 
Index of occurrences, s.v. ‘ἀριθμός’, p. 145). 
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octahedron (air), twenty for the icosahedron (water) and the twenty-four isosceles triangles that 
make up the cube (earth). Moreover, the numbers of triangles are also crucial to provide an account 
of the transformations between elementary bodies, at 56c8-57c6. Finally, for each geometrically 
shaped elemental body, there seem to be a limited number of sizes corresponding to the number of 
triangles composing the shape (ἀλλ’ ἐλάττω τε καὶ μείζω, τὸν ἀριθμὸν δὲ ἔχοντα τοσοῦτον ὅσαπερ 
ἂνᾖ τἀν τοῖς εἴδεσι γένη, 57d2-3).267 
Concrete numbers are moreover involved in the arrangement of the cosmic body as a whole. 
There are fixed proportions between the total amount of each kind of elemental bodies, and they are 
important to maintain the resulting body to be unified, as explained extensively at 31b4-32c4. 
Although Timaeus’ reasoning seems to refer to ‘number’ in a generic sense (ὁπόταν γὰρ ἀριθμῶν 
τριῶν…), as he outlines a general principle about proportions, it is nonetheless a principle guiding 
the instantiation of a specific proportion between bodily parts that constitutes the body of the 
cosmos (31c4-32a6, 32b3-c2). Even the cosmic soul is structured proportionally by dividing 
portions in concrete numbers. Although it seems a limiting case, as there is no body to be 
structured, the soul ‘material’ is treated as equally capable of instantiating mathematical, and in 
particular, arithmetic, structure.268 
The only significant distinction concerning the use of ἀριθμός in the Timaeus is implicit and 
lies in the contrast between concrete numbers and a generic number, which encompasses all the 
concrete ones, qua numbers. There is a small list of occurrences that suggest the employment of an 
unqualified sense of ἀριθμός. I already mentioned the use of ἀριθμός in the passage concerning 
proportions in the cosmic body. In that case, Timaeus presents considerations applicable to numbers 
in general, although they inform a specific proportion between the aggregates of the four elements. 
Other four instances of generic number appear in the account of time (37d6, 38a7, 39b6, 47a6), and, 
since they are crucial to understanding the relation between time and number, they will be discussed 
at length in the next sections.  
It remains unclear, however, if the generic number is taken to be an additional and distinct 
number existing over and above the concrete ones, in the same way geometrical shapes exist as 
models for the shapes of the four elements.269 Regardless of whether we intend to read an 
 
267 See Cornford 1937, pp. 230-239. 
268 The cosmic soul is spatially extended and divisible (ὅλον τοῦτο μοίρας ὅσας προσῆκεν διένειμεν […], ἤρχετο δὲ 
διαιρεῖν ὧδε, 35b2-4), which makes it eligible to instantiate mathematical structures. The Demiurge is described as 
operating a series of divisions of the unstructured whole with the goal of making the resulting portions commensurable 
according to certain proportions in a series. The portions are considered as numbers (at 36a5 and twice at 36b3), 
presumably because the Demiurge measures out the amount of each new portion by counting either hypothetical or 
actual units equal to the first portion. 
269 Insofar as the Timaeus is concerned, there seems to be little room for an ontology admitting ‘intermediate’ 
mathematical entities as a separate metaphysical kind, given that (1) only three fundamental kinds are explicitly 
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ontological commitment to abstract numbers in the Timaeus, the crucial difference from the 
conception of number presented in the Republic is that the generic number is always employed to 
highlight how concrete numbers successfully instantiate enumerability. So, although, criteria for 
optimality are not addressed explicitly, the fact that no mathematical structure is presented as 
flawed is telling of the outstanding craftmanship of the Demiurge. The case of time, as we will see, 
is especially significant, with respect to optimality. 
 
6.2. The visible patterns of planetary revolutions 
 
This section will account for the enumerable structure of time, on the basis of the insights from the 
previous overview on Plato’s conception of ἀριθμός. Although I will mainly focus on how the 
enumerable structure of time is brought about by means of the planets, I will first roughly outline 
what the structure consists in.270 
The κατ’ ἀριθμὸν qualification in the definition of time captures time’s conformity with 
number, in the generic sense, so that its various parts are units composing concrete numbers. The 
resulting structure is what I call an enumerable structure. Being concrete, the enumerable structure 
requires to be physically instantiated. As we have seen in Section 5.3, the temporal structure is 
instantiated in the cosmos by means of the planets so that it is identified with their visible 
revolutions. The best way to answer the ‘what’ question about the temporal structure is then to 
describe it as the visible patterns of planetary revolutions. The temporal structure then differs from 
simple concrete numbers both because it has multiple units of different length displayed by different 
planets and because the units, unlike with normal sets of objects, are displayed in a sequence. 
Before setting out with the analysis of the conditions that make the planets display 
enumerability, I will provide an illustrative example of what I mean by ‘visible pattern’. As I 
pointed out already at the beginning of Chapter 5, Plato identifies parts of time such as the night-
and-day, month and year with a full revolution (κύκλος, περίοδος), along the path of their assigned 
cosmic circle, i.e. from a certain original position and back to it again along the circular path 
(πάντας τοὺς κύκλους, 39a5-6; ἡ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος, 39c2; τὸν ἑαυτῆς 
 
introduced (see my discussion of the Timaeus’ ontology in Section 2.1) and that (2) the geometrical shapes of the four 
elements are derived directly from the abstract shapes incorporated in their forms. Although this remains open to a 
variety of interpretations, it could be held, given (2), that abstract mathematical forms belong to the intelligible kind, 
and the same should be hypothesised for the generic ἀριθμός, as the Demiurge must need a non-concrete version to 
create optimal numbers in the cosmos. However, at least in the case of time, the structural component presented by αἰών 
is not itself a number, but rather undivided unity. To assume that Plato postulates an abstract number in addition to αἰών 
as a model for the creation of time leads to an unwanted proliferation of abstract models. 
270 I will return to the ‘what’ question in Section 6.3, where I provide an in-depth analysis of the features characterising 
the enumerable structure of time. 
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κύκλον, 39c3; ἥλιος τὸν ἑαυτοῦ περιέλθῃ κύκλον, 39c4-5). Together with κύκλος and περίοδος, the 
verb περιέρχομαι emphasises the return of the planets to an original position on the circular path 
they traverse.271 I will refer to a planet’s return to the original point as a cycle. In the iteration of the 
same circular path with the same overall velocity, a planet is displaying a visible pattern of cycles. 
A visible pattern, then, is defined by how the visible configurations of the planet change in its 
motion. The focus, however, is not on the motion of planets per se, but on the structural aspect 
displayed by the planets in their motion, i.e. on the sequence of units. 
 
6.2.1. Visible patterns and configurations 
 
To vindicate the notion of visible pattern as one that adequately captures Plato’s conception of time, 
I will propose a close textual examination of passages from the Timaeus and the Epinomis.272 The 
first piece of evidence is provided in the astronomical section of Plato’s account of time. Plato is 
discussing the teleological function that he ascribes to night and day. Night and day are discussed at 
39b2-c2, as having two distinct, albeit connected, functions: (a) they display a visible pattern that 
stirs the first understanding of number in mankind, and (b) in doing so they constitute, in their 
alternation, a temporal unit of measurement. In this section I will consider night and day with regard 
to (a).273 Their function as a unit of measurement will be discussed in sub-section 6.3.2. 
Function (a) is described as bestowing a share in number (μετάσχοι ἀριθμοῦ ἦν προσῆκον, 
39b6), “upon all those living beings appropriately endowed”, who seem to be exclusively humans, 
 
271 Aristotle also widely employs κύκλος to highlight the return to an initial point in the astronomical context (“circular 
motion is motion of a thing from its place to the same place, whereas rectilinear motion is motion from its place to 
different place”, ἡ μὲν γὰρ κύκλῳ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἀφ’ αὑτοῦ εἰς αὑτό, Ph. VIII 8 264b18-19, again at b27-28; “this at 
once makes it reasonable that the body which is nearest to that first simple circular motion should take the longest time 
to traverse its circle”, πρώτης περιφορᾶς ἐν πλείστῳ χρόνῳ διιέναι τὸν αὑτοῦ κύκλον, De Cael. II, 10 291b3-4) and 
beyond, when comparing the cycles of the seasons with the generation and destruction taking place on Earth. The cycle 
is there described explicitly as a returning back, so much that the Sun’s circular motion is explicitly connected with the 
continuous alternation of different phases, i.e. seasons (De Gen. et Cor. II, 11 338a4-5, 338b3-5). The conclusion of the 
cycle can entail either that what accomplishes the cycle persists to the next cycle as numerically the same or only in 
species. The imperishable substances, like the heavenly bodies, are accomplishing cycles while remaining numerically 
the same, whereas the elements and the perishable compound bodies are not (338b12-13). 
272 My focus will be on four passages in the astronomical section of Plato’s account of time where numbers and 
measures are mentioned in connection with the planetary revolutions (38c6, 39b2-c5, 39c5-7, 39d2-7) plus the 
eulogistic section on astronomy in the spurious Epinomis (in particular 976d5-979b3, 989e1-990c8 and 991b5-992a3). 
Appealing to the Epinomis might be seen as weak support for an interpretation of the Timaeus, since we know it is 
likely a spurious work, generally attributed to Phillip of Opus. In this enquiry, however, the reason to refer to the 
Epinomis lies in the evident affinity between the astronomical sections of the two dialogues, insofar as the relation 
between number, visibility and planets is concerned. The Epinomis can be plausibly read as a more extensive and 
insightful commentary on an otherwise short discussion. So, even if it is the case that we are not reading Plato’s own 
elaboration, it is nonetheless as close as we can get to a direct testimony about certain details of Plato’s conception, that 
are only hinted at in the Timaeus. 
273 Both functions are introduced by ἵνα (39b2, b5) and are later taken to be distinct, although a consequence of the 
same phenomenon (διὰ ταῦτα, 39c1-2). 
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due to their capacity to develop a basic astronomical understanding. Timaeus claims that the 
rotation of the Same, by dragging the Sun along, casts light (φαίνοι, 39b6) across the entirety of the 
cosmos and together with the partial obstruction provided by the Earth, it creates day and night. The 
visible phenomenon of the alternation of daylight and darkness produced in this way teaches us 
(μαθόντα, 39b7) about number, and here ‘number’ intended in the generic sense clarified in Section 
6.1.274  
The same conclusion is restated and expanded upon at 47a4-7, when Timaeus discusses the 
benefits of observing the revolutions of the heavenly bodies in the sky, and thus day and night, the 
months and the periods of the years, and also the equinoxes and solstices (δ’ ἡμέρα τε καὶ νὺξ 
ὀφθεῖσαι μῆνές τε καὶ ἐνιαυτῶν περίοδοι καὶ ἰσημερίαι καὶ τροπαὶ). In the above passage the 
acquisition of familiarity with number is presented as an artifice or contrivance (μεμηχάνηνται μὲν 
ἀριθμόν), and it is coupled with the acquisition of the notion of time (χρόνου δὲ ἔννοιαν). 
Moreover, it is not only the alternation of day and night that matters for learning about number and 
time, but seemingly all the most familiar parts of time contribute to it. Both passages attribute a 
crucial role to the visible patterns of the planets in the apprehension of both time and number. In 
fact, they are the visible stimuli for the apprehension of number and, moreover, by looking at them 
mankind first becomes familiar with the cosmological conception of time Plato is working with. 
Although number and time are indeed treated as separate objects of cognition, the joint 
apprehension of the two is explained by the visible patterns displayed by the planets. On the one 
hand, if time is indeed identified with the planetary revolutions and those revolutions are visible – 
thanks to the planets’ bodies – it is only natural to claim that we first learn about time by observing 
those revolutions. On the other hand, if the enumerable structure of time, as anticipated above, 
consists in the display of visible patterns, it is also the most adequate physical phenomenon to 
familiarise with number in general. In fact, it is plausible that knowledge about number must be first 
stirred by something which is particularly suitable to be counted while being outstandingly visible 
from anywhere.275 
 
274 The alternation of night and day, in the Timaeus just as in the Epinomis, is the alternation of two phases across the 
heaven, daylight and darkness. They are mainly brought about by a heavenly beacon, i.e. the Sun, but the Earth seems 
also involved in defining those two phases. In the Timaeus there is an answer for the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of that 
alternation. The ‘how’ simply consists in the kindling of the Sun’s body. Although all the heavenly bodies have fiery 
bodies (40a2-4), it is clear that the Sun’s light is by far the most intense in terms of the light it casts across the heaven 
(see Chapter 5, fn. 218). The second component needed to produce the alternation, i.e. the Earth, is mentioned only 
later, as “the guardian and maker of day and night (φύλακα καὶ δημιουργὸν νυκτός τε καὶ ἡμέρας, 40c1-2)”. 
Presumably the Earth is guarding and making nights and days by obstructing sunlight from shining throughout the 
cosmos. Both Proclus and Plutarch argue in favour of this reading concerning the Earth’s involvement in the creation of 
the day and night (in Ti. IV, 139-141; Plut. 1006E). 
275 Thomas Johansen highlights that there are two necessary components behind the teleological account, the first of 
them being the intellectual faculty for counting, and the second being an appropriate visible stimulus that first activate 
that capacity. The account in the Timaeus, after all, describes the process of making calculations about planetary 
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To substantiate the reading of the two passages in the Timaeus I will now turn to the 
Epinomis, where the connection between time and number is thematised in a more explicit way. 
There a more detailed account of the apprehension of number is provided, as the baby steps in 
learning to count are described in terms of increasing complexity. The Athenian makes clear that 
the visible stimulus from planetary revolutions stirs only a basic understanding of numbers, 
quantitative relations and properties (for instance, knowledge of two or three, or even and odd, as 
mentioned at 977c4-6), thus probably being directed towards children or humans living in a 
thoroughly uncivilised condition.276 
The description of the steps in the learning process offers a precious commentary on the 
connected visibility and enumerability of the planetary revolutions that I refer to as ‘visible pattern’. 
The appropriate stimulus to learn to count has its origin in the Sun and the Moon, as we see them 
most clearly moving across the sky in various configurations. The starting point is once more the 
daily revolution of the Sun, manifested as the alternation of night and day. The Athenian guest 
remarks that “of the things he [i.e. the heaven] shows us, taken one by one, what can we behold 
more beautiful than the kind of the day (τὸ τῆς ἡμέρας γένος)? Later, when we come to see the part 
of the night, everything appears different to our vision (εἶτα εἰς τὸ τῆς νυκτὸς ἔλθοι μέρος ἔχων 
ὄψιν, ὅθεν ἕτερον πᾶν αὐτῷ φαίνοιτ’ ἄν). Since the heaven never stops making these heavenly 
bodies revolve for many nights and many days, he never stops teaching humans one and two. For 
each of us who sees them will also grasp the three, four, and many” (978c6-d5).277  
The sight of the alternation of day and night is connected with learning to distinguish one and 
two at first, and then larger amounts. In particular, learning to tell apart one and two comes from the 
contrasting visible appearance of the illuminated and then darkened heaven (ἕτερον πᾶν αὐτῷ 
φαίνοιτ’ ἄν) caused by the relative positions of the Sun and the Earth. It is, however, also possible 
 
revolutions as an assimilation of the rotations of the intelligent part of the human soul to the ones visibly displayed by 
the cosmic god. In this picture, the kind of stimulus received through sight is just as necessary as the intellectual faculty, 
as Johansen recognises taking the standpoint of the ‘empiricist’ reading of the account: “If perception is not important 
to astronomy because of the information it gives us why does it matter whether we look at the sun rather than at a 
falling stone or the dance of the bumble-bee?” (Johansen 2004, pp. 174-75). I will argue that the planetary revolutions, 
identified with time, are the most suitable natural phenomenon for the goal of learning to count, as their visible patterns 
have features that make it optimally enumerable. Given that counting involves considering one unit after the other, the 
exposition to a visible stimulus in motion is what demands the least intellectual effort in learning to count. The 
difference between time and other candidates seems to the be (1) the outstanding visibility from anywhere, (2) the 
kinetic nature of the phenomenon that provides a natural sequence to the units counted; (3) the optimal enumerability, 
for which see Section 6.3. Each of those features are missing with fingers, stones and other perceivable sets of objects in 
our everyday life. 
276 At a later stage of development, arithmetic becomes the precondition for the development of every other art, 
including, it can be inferred, astronomy itself (977d8-e2). However, the subject matter of that science is number itself, 
the even and odd and the other properties of numbers (990c5-8) so it is not clear how advanced the science is taken to 
be, beyond the ability to count.  
277 While the ‘teacher’ is identified with the cosmos itself, just as in the Timaeus, in the Epinomis the cosmos is also the 
provider of the intellectual faculty required to count (978d2-4). 
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that what is recognised as ‘one’ is not only night or day separately, but the combination of the two, 
as that compound is always of the same length in its iteration. In this way, night and day are 
understood as two phases composing one cycle, the night-and-day.278   
Both visible patterns – phases and cycles – are enumerable in their display, according to the 
description. The Athenian guest focuses on the fortnight as an example of a (supposed) period, or 
cycle, counted as one (αὕτη δ’ ἔστιν περίοδος, εἰ βούλεταί τις τὸν κύκλον ἕνα ὅλον εἰς ἓν τιθέναι, 
978e2-3) and argues that the fifteen enumerable phases of the fortnight are marked out by the 
changing configuration of the Moon, standing against the alternation of day and night, i.e. all the 
phases of the waxing or waning Moon, from a new moon to the full moon or vice versa.  
The fifteen phases of days and nights composing the fortnight are then involving the Moon as 
much as the Sun and the Earth, as all three contribute to the distinctness of each phase in the pattern 
they compose. In fact, days and nights are phases composing the fortnight in virtue of the difference 
in appearance displayed by the Moon (ἄλλην ἀεὶ φαίνουσα ἡμέραν). Once all the distinct visible 
phases, from new to full Moon, have been displayed, and the fortnight is complete, the opposite 
sequence is displayed by the planets involved (i.e. waxing to waning) and a unit is recognised in the 
overarching cycle, i.e. the month.279  
Finally, the Athenian focuses on the month and year in the account as those inducing us to 
engage in more complex calculations to find a fixed proportion between them, hence learning more 
generally to compare concrete numbers with units of different magnitude. The pursuit of 
discovering the exact proportion between cycles is also touched upon in the astronomical section in 
the Timaeus and has been the main pursuit of Greek astronomers until the late V century, as we will 
see in Section 6.3. 
There is an important lesson to be learned from the Epinomis’ extended description of 
astronomical observation. The description provides clear indications about which conditions should 
hold for the instantiation of the enumerable structure of time in planetary revolutions. As 
anticipated at the beginning of this section, the main condition is to have the planets display visible 
patterns in their revolutions. However, we can now introduce a further level of analysis with regards 
 
278 The whole, however, is never repeated in the exact same way, except for the two equinoxes, as there is a great 
variety of ratios between night and day throughout the course of the year. Nonetheless, it is true that the two phases, 
night and day, always alternate, although they last for varying fractions of the whole cycle, and the overall cycle is 
always of the same length. As for the discussion of Plato’s conception of the night-and-day as a temporal measure, see 
sub-section 6.3.1. 
279 “God made a unit by constructing a moon which goes through its course sometimes appearing larger and sometimes 
smaller, thus always revealing each day as different (διεξῆλθεν ἄλλην ἀεὶ φαίνουσα ἡμέραν) until fifteen days and 
nights have passed” (978d6-e2). However, it should be noted that if Plato is indeed drawing a substantial distinction 
between phases and cycles, it is not clear whether the fortnight falls under the latter rather than the former, since, unlike 
the month, it does not include all the phases, but only half of them. Even if the two fortnights mirror each other in a 
way, the order between phases in each is the opposite (the waning fortnight does not appear the same as the waxing 
one). The fortnight is in fact not taken for granted as a cycle in the rather uncommitted evaluation from the Athenian. 
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to how visibility interacts with enumerability by focusing on the variety of visible patterns the 
planetary revolutions display. In fact, that variety of patterns can be classified in terms of the 
planets’ changing configurations of visible sameness and difference. 
Let us start our analysis with phases. Phases generate enumerable patterns in virtue of (1) 
being each visibly different from the others and (2) being always displayed in a fixed sequence. 
First consider the phases of night and day, in their alternation. As seen above, they are explicitly 
defined in terms of the visible difference between them, day as the light cast by the Sun and night as 
the darkness following from the absence of sunlight. In a similar fashion, the phases marked out by 
the Moon are enumerable because they always appear different from one another and disposed in a 
fixed order of succession, up until the fifteenth – a fortnight – or the twenty-ninth/thirtieth – a 
month. 
It should be noted, however, that the day-night cycle is also part of the overall visible 
configuration of more complex phases involving the motion of other planets beside the Sun. As 
seen above, the day-night alternation is the backdrop against which we see the Moon changing 
position and appearance, so that each new phase is marked out as a distinct unit also because a new 
night-day cycle has been displayed. Hence, phases are defined by the joint display of the night-day 
cycle and the changing configurations due to the partial progression of the cycle of the other planet 
involved – in the case above, the Moon. In Section 6.3, I will argue that this aspect of phases is 
what makes the night-day cycle a μέτρον for all the other cycles and for time as a whole. 
With cycles, the configuration that marks them as units in a pattern is visible sameness. In 
fact, the planet returning to the same visible configuration as when it started marks out a cycle. The 
crucial difference, then, between the enumerability of phases and that of cycles is that, while in the 
former the units are distinct from one another because of visible difference, in the latter they are 
distinct in virtue of the return to visible sameness. The two different ways in which phases and 
cycles are enumerable also entails that, unlike with phases, the visible configuration of a cycle does 
not tell which cycle in the sequence we are looking at, as they are all visibly identical. This feature 
will be important for cycles to stand out as units of time among the visible patterns, as we will see 
in sub-section 6.3.1. However, it is also evident that the visible pattern of phases is intertwined with 
the display of a cycle, and that their visible sameness is only recognisable because of the sequence 
of different phases displayed in between. That is why cycles tend to be divided in relation to 
prominent phases in the sequence, as for instance the equinoxes and solstices that divide the yearly 
cycle into four parts.280  
 
280 The seasons and the fortnights are measured by certain outstanding phases in the progression of the year and the 
month respectively, just as they are marked out by the night-day cycle (Cf. Arist. GC 336a31-b9). 
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Finally, when we consider the visible patterns exhibited by more than one planet, there is a 
third level of complexity beyond cycles, which I will refer to as ‘complex cycles’. Complex cycles 
are marked out similarly to individual cycles, by their return to the same original visible 
configuration. Unlike individual cycles, however, they are marked out by the visible configurations 
of two or more planets. The metonic cycle, measured by Meton and Euktemon in 19 years, serves as 
a standard example of the complex cycles Plato wishes to be investigated further in the Timaeus, as 
we will see in Section 6.3. The visible sameness for the Metonic cycle is the following: at the 
beginning of the first year and at the end of the nineteenth the Sun and the Moon appear in the same 
position relative to one another. 
The juxtaposed individual cycles are also marking out different complex phases in a fixed 
sequence. In fact, with each new year completed, the metonic cycle is closer to completion, and that 
is visibly displayed in the different position the Moon and the Sun have at the end of each year, so 
that at any point in the Metonic cycle it is possible to infer its stage of completion, just as with 
phases in individual cycles.281 The greatest of the complex cycles is the complete number of time, 
i.e. the complete year, as its completion is defined by the display of all possible configurations of 
all the planets, as argued already in Chapter 4. 
To sum up, the descriptions in the Epinomis and the Timaeus present a consistent picture of 
the enumerability of the planetary revolutions, making apparent how enumerability is built into their 
visible patterns. The visible patterns created by planetary revolutions are thus correctly identified 
with the enumerable structure of time and they provide a first stimulus for human beings to acquire 
a basic familiarity with number in general. 
I conclude this analysis with one more remark on the notion of ‘visible pattern’. To 
understand the temporal structure in terms of visible patterns is not to claim that Plato has an 
anthropocentric understanding of time, according to which ‘visible’ means that it is visible for us. 
Plato does not describe time as depending on human observers, any more than he does for the 
visible and tangible body of the cosmos (ὁρατὸν ἁπτόν, 31b4).282 In fact, the only ‘gaze’ that 
assesses the success in creating the cosmos and time is the Demiurge’s, i.e. one that is external to 
the physical world. So, I would argue, visibility here primarily concerns the domain, or medium, in 
which the structure is displayed. 
 
281 Eclipses and analogous unusual configurations should then be thought of as outstanding complex phases, so that 
their variety is what justifies the foregrounding of the astonishing plurality of astronomical phenomena at 39d1-2 and 
more extensively at 40c3-d2. 
282 Plato never raise the issue of the observer-dependence of time, whereas Aristotle seems to have at least entertained a 
similar worry concerning the enumerability of time in absence of minds capable of counting (Ph. IV 14, 223a22-28). 
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At the same time, it should be noted that building the enumerability of time on top of 
visibility is itself a choice made by the Demiurge. The patterns built on the cosmic circles could 
have been audible or tangible ones, or perhaps the sky might have been entirely obscured by clouds 
(as it often is in Scotland), hence making the visible patterns inaccessible from Earth. All such 
options would in a way still result in the creation of time, insofar as they imitate the intelligible 
unity of αἰών with patterns of cosmic motion ‘according to number’.  
Hence, the choice to use a visible medium for the creation of time must be justified on a 
teleological ground. Although Plato never makes explicit why visibility is superior to other media, 
we have seen that the best living beings in the cosmos, i.e. the heavenly gods, are defined primarily 
by their fiery nature, and fire is the source of their outstanding visibility. Moreover, as we will see 
in sub-section 6.3.2, the Demiurge chooses to make the visible patterns especially accessible to 
living beings on Earth and, in particular, human beings. To make time visible for us, then, is 
recognised as one of the goals in the making of time just as in the making of sight.283 So, although 
in a less than optimal cosmos the time could have been created differently, such that it would be 
accessible to us, the accessibility of the structure from everywhere in the cosmos given by visibility 
is taken as an important marker of the excellent work of the Demiurge.284 
 
6.2.2. The planets in their function as structure-creators 
 
The account of the enumerable structure of time in terms of visible patterns also helps to complete 
the enquiry into the function of the planets as structure-creators which I started in sub-section 5.3.2. 
According to the passage at 38c6, the function of the planets is to delimit and guard the numbers of 
time (εἰς διορισμὸν καὶ φυλακὴν ἀριθμῶν χρόνου γέγονεν). I argued in the previous chapter that 
both aspects of their function are accomplished by a single activity, i.e. the planets’ twofold 
revolution: whereas διορισμὸν highlights what their visible body is responsible for (as the 
 
283 The description of the visible patterns from the Earth in the Timaeus and the Epinomis does not imply that that 
perspective is necessary to have access to those patterns. While the beginning and end of phases and cycles is more 
evidently marked out from the perspective from Earth than from, say, the extremity of the universe, the  structure of 
visible patterns does not hinge on that. All that matters, in fact, are the changing configurations of the planets in relation 
to their twofold revolution. A more significant issue for Plato’s account is whether the planets have, as it is suggested, 
an original position where individual and complex cycles are marked out (see sub-section 4.2.2). This, in fact, would 
pose problems: if we imagined an observer located in the southern hemisphere who could never see planets in their 
original position, that person would inevitably fail to reckon time correctly. It is not clear whether Plato admitted the 
possibility of life anywhere else other than in Europe, Africa or Asia. If he did consider the possibility, then he would 
have to claim that access to the visible patterns is not everywhere adequate, as there are clear hints in his description of 
the monthly and yearly cycle that he considers those patterns to end and begin within sight in the Northern hemisphere. 
Our felicitous perspective on the planets, then, could only have a teleological explanation, as we would have been 
placed in the hemisphere that allows for a correct grasp of the Demiurge’s work. 
284 Gábor Betegh’s observations led me to distinguish the two points and to acknowledge the importance of the criterion 
of accessibility in the decision of making time visible. 
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instrument), φυλακὴν focuses on their intelligent and divine soul, guiding their revolution to 
persistently conform to the cosmic circles (as the agent). Finally, both aspects are aimed towards the 
numbers of time. Now that the visible patterns of the planets have been independently discussed in 
the previous subsection, we can see how the passage ties together with my overall reading. 
My first claim is that the numbers of time delimited and preserved by the planets are 
identifiable with the visible patterns of cycles, phases and so forth. Given Plato’s conception of 
concrete numbers (see Section 6.1), the visible patterns can be treated as a kinetic case of concrete 
numbers, where instead of a set, we have a sequence of days-and-nights, months, years. It is fitting, 
then, that those sequences are referred to as ‘numbers of time’.285 
My second claim is that the changing visible configurations of the planets, analysed in the 
previous sub-section, fit the description of the διορισμὸν function. In fact, while the use of διορίζω 
and διορισμός in Plato’s work is mostly connected with abstract distinctions between kinds, they 
are occasionally employed to describe delimitation with regard to phenomena and objects of the 
physical world. In the Timaeus, such terminology denotes either the structural and qualitative 
distinction of the front and the back in the human body, or the material separation between the seat 
of the spirited part of the soul and that of the appetitive part (διωρισμένον ἔχειν καὶ ἀνόμοιον, 45a5; 
διορίζοντες οἷον γυναικῶν, τὴν δὲ ἀνδρῶν χωρὶς οἴκησιν, 69e6). 
A passage from Aristotle on the alleged function of the void illustrates the function of διορίζω 
to delimit (concrete) number in much the same way as I am suggesting for the planets in the 
Timaeus. He reports in the Physics that Pythagoreans admitted the existence of void since they 
attributed to it the function of separating out natures, and in particular the nature of number.286 The 
void delimits the distinct units composing a concrete number, by introducing a chasm between 
them. In my reading, the function of the planets is similar, insofar as their visible bodies delimit 
units in a sequence by displaying changing configurations in their motion. As Richard Mohr notes, 
“a perfectly homogeneous revolving disk, by contrast, could not serve as a clock, since even if its 
motion was completely regular, we would have no way of determining this, or of counting its 
 
285 Moreover, evidence that Plato is using ‘numbers of time’ as the concrete numbers of temporal units can be found in 
plainly non-theoretical contexts, e.g. in one of Aeschines’ speeches, showing that the expression ‘number of time’ was 
not astronomical or philosophical jargon. In his speech Against Timarchus he uses πολὺν ἀριθμὸν χρόνου to refer to the 
years of a man’s life (In Timarchum 1, 49.5; 49.8). 
286 Ὃ διορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ὄντος τοῦ κενοῦ χωρισμοῦ τινὸς τῶν ἐφεξῆς καὶ [τῆς] διορίσεως· καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι πρῶτον 
ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν διορίζειν τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν (Ph. IV 6, 213b25-28). The terminology employed in the 
passage can be compared with similar instances in Metaphysics I 8, 990a22-27 and, most importantly, De Caelo I 
275b29-32. While Aristotle would of course distinguish between concrete and continuous quantities for the two case, in 
Plato there is no similar account, so all cases of physical ‘delimiting’ equally yield distinctness. 
 
 
129 
 
repetitions. We would in fact not even know (by sight at least) that it is moving”.287 The contrast 
highlights how the visibility of the planets’ body is essential to the project of making the cosmic 
motion enumerable, while a homogeneous disk, and a fortiori, the invisible circles of the cosmic 
soul, would never yield the same result. 
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the function of the planets as ensouled, intelligent 
beings, i.e. as guardians (φυλακὴν), is no less essential to displaying numbers of time than the 
‘delimiting’ function. I argued in Section 5.3 that the regularity with which planets carry out their 
revolution along the circle of the Different is in fact determined by their intelligence. Regularity, as 
we will see extensively in Section 6.3, is a crucial precondition to for the optimality of the 
enumerable structure of time. For instance, a planet failing to be a proper guardian of those numbers 
would display changing configurations of sameness and difference but not always at the same pace. 
We would still be able to count each reappearance as a visibly distinct cycle, but we would not 
consider them as units composing a number of time, in that they would not have the same length. In 
order to be defined by enumerability the visible patterns need the work of intelligence, as nothing 
else guarantees unerringly regular motion in Plato’s account. 
 
6.3. The optimal enumerability of the temporal structure 
 
On the basis of the analysis proposed in Section 6.1 and 6.2, the claim that time moves ‘according 
to number’ is finally intelligible. Time consists in the visible patterns displayed by planetary 
revolutions which Plato also refers to as ‘numbers of time’. Hence, κατ’ ἀριθμὸν specifies the way 
in which time is structured i.e. ‘in conformity with number’, where ‘ἀριθμὸν’ should be read in the 
generic sense singled out in sub-section 6.1.2. That specification I rendered in English as 
‘enumerable’.288 
‘Enumerable’, in my reading, captures a specific kind of mereological structure, in which the 
parts constituting the whole have special features that make them units. Time is not, in fact, 
enumerable in the loose sense in which any whole made of parts is a concrete number, as a set of 
items. As we have seen in sub-section 6.2.1, Plato takes time to have the outstanding enumerable 
structure in the physical world, so much so that, by seeing the visible patterns of the planetary 
revolutions, we first acquire a basic familiarity with number in general. In the remainder of the 
 
287 Mohr 1985, p. 58. However, I maintain that Mohr’s definition of time as a cosmic clock misses the mark (see sub-
section 1.2.2 for an overview of his account). I will return to Mohr’s understanding of Plato’s conception of time in my 
Conclusion. 
288 I read κατά as expressing conformity, LSJ s.v. κατά (entry B, IV). Moreover, compare the κατ’ ἀριθμὸν qualification 
with the verb καταριθμέω, ‘to count’ or ‘to enumerate’, which Plato uses, for instance, at Sph. 266e3. See fn. 251 on my 
paraphrasis of κατ’ ἀριθμὸν as ‘enumerable’. 
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chapter I will argue for the hypothesis that time is optimally enumerable, and employ the two 
criteria of indivisibility and sameness (see sub-section 6.1.1) to analyse the outstanding 
enumerability of the numbers of time. In particular, I will discuss the units of time (6.3.1) and the 
proportionality between those units, linked with the special function as a measure played by the 
night-and-day cycle (6.3.2).  
 
6.3.1. The eight temporal units 
 
In Chapter 4 I argued that Plato’s account seems to take only certain subdivisions of cosmic motion 
as parts of time. In particular, I pointed out that the eight cycles (the nights-and-days, months, years 
and the nameless ones displayed by the five remaining planets), corresponding one-to-one with the 
eight periods of the cosmic soul, are given an implicit primacy among the parts in which time is 
divided.289 My proposal is that their primacy is warranted because they are optimal units of time 
composing the numbers of time, thus playing a fundamental role for the enumerability of time as a 
whole. 
In the account of time there is only one reference to a specific number of time, i.e. the 
complete number of time (ὅ γε τέλεος ἀριθμὸς χρόνου, 39d3-4), which consists of the maximal 
number of temporal units (see sub-section 4.2.2). The unit of that number is not specified. However, 
I’d argue that there is a structural reason to take the eight cycles as the units of the numbers of time 
over the other subdivisions of planetary revolutions we have seen in Section 6.2. Let us first 
compare cycles and phases. Referring to a specific phase, say the one marked out by the full Moon, 
is possible only if we specify to which month it belongs to. On the contrary, we do not need any 
further specification to refer to any night-and-day, month, year, once we clarified how many cycles 
away from the present cycle in the future or the past.  
In the above discrepancy lies the structural difference between cycles and phases, showing 
why cycles play the part of units in the optimally enumerable structure of time, whereas phases do 
not. Counting phases is intelligible only within the progression of a given cycle, since their 
sequence is defined by visible difference (e.g. the different appearance of the Moon) and it ends 
 
289 Apart from the almost exclusive focus on the eight cycles in the astronomical section (37e1, 39b2-d1), the Timaeus 
at large offers several examples of the familiar practice of measuring human lifespans and past events with reference to 
the corresponding numbers of years: τῆς δὲ ἐνθάδε διακοσμήσεως παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν ὀκτακισχιλίων 
ἐτῶν ἀριθμὸς γέγραπται (23e2-4). Cornford translates ‘ἀριθμὸς’ as ‘age’ (Cornford 1937, p. 16). ‘Χρόνος’, is used a 
particular interval of time twice in the introductory part where Critias narrates in outline the myth of Atlantis: once 
when Critias refers to the time, i.e. the year when the older Critias was 90 years old (21b6), and the other describes what 
happened after some time (ὑστέρῳ δὲ χρόνῳ) from the victory of the ancient Athens when in one day and night (μιᾶς 
ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς) a cataclysmic event submerged the Athenian force and the isle of Atlantis (25c7-d1). See Index of 
occurrences, s.v. χρόνος, p. 145. 
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with the completion of the cycle, that is when there is a return to visible sameness. Moreover, every 
kind of phase, with the exception of the ‘day’ and ‘night’ phases, is enumerable only in virtue of the 
juxtaposition of visible difference with the daily cycle.  
Cycles, however, are defined by a return to sameness, so that the pattern they compose 
consists in a sequence that extends for the totality of time, where any given year is visibly identical 
to any other. The only upper limit for the number of cycles seems to be the complete number of 
time, after which the same enumerable structure is repeated, over and over. However, even in that 
case, there is no visible difference between the last year in one complete year and the first one in the 
next, and their difference comes to the fore only when we consider that year as part of a complex 
cycle. 
Complex phases are not optimal units either, as they suffer from the same issue raised for the 
phases of individual planets, with the only exception of the complex phases relative to the complete 
year. The entire sequence of those phases, in fact, corresponds to the whole of the temporal 
structure, hence not needing any further specification, as is the case for individual cycles. However, 
just like all the other phases, the complex phases of the complete year still need to be marked out by 
individual cycles in order to be enumerable. Finally, complex cycles are not eligible as optimal 
units. They inherit the features outlined for individual cycles, so they are not deficient units in the 
way phases are. However, the complex cycles cannot be optimal units, insofar as the individual 
cycles are the basic components that compose and measure them, as smaller units. For instance, the 
Metonic cycle is divided in years and months. 
To sum up, cycles are structurally outstanding as temporal units for two connected reasons: 
(1) they constitute a sequence of identical units for the totality of time (2) while also not being 
further divided in smaller units for which (1) holds true. Significantly, these two aspects 
characterising cycles resemble the two criteria of sameness and indivisibility defining the units of 
optimal numbers (see sub-section 6.1.1): (1) the cycles in the sequence meet the criterion of 
sameness (qualitative and quantitative). Cycles are in fact all of the same kind and length. In fact, 
cycles are defined by the visible configurations of the planets, and in particular, by the return to an 
original visible configuration caused by a full planetary revolution. This makes all cycles 
qualitatively identical, unlike phases. Moreover, because the planetary revolution that defines the 
cycle is regular, i.e. carried out at the same velocity in each iteration, cycles are quantitatively 
identical to one another, or of the same length. 
Moreover, (2) cycles are indivisible, insofar as they are the smallest temporal units that meet 
the criterion of sameness, so they meet the indivisibility criterion, albeit in a qualified sense. While 
complex cycles and phases can be broken down into individual ones, there are no smaller optimal 
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units, if we divide the eight cycles further. Since phases, despite being smaller than their respective 
cycle, are not viable candidates as temporal units for the reasons presented above, cycles 
structurally stand out as the optimal units of the temporal structure. Barbara Sattler aptly refers to 
this kind of qualified indivisibility as qualitative indivisibility, arguing that there are units that, if 
further divided, would no longer be units of that domain. In the case of time, the domain is 
delimited by the visible patterns displayed the planets, so, among them, cycles are the smallest units 
that are also identical in the sequence. If we were to consider further divisions of cycles (e.g. 
phases), we would not have optimal units of time anymore.290 
Admittedly, my remarks do not conclude that cycles are indivisible in the absolute sense 
presented by Plato in the Republic. Their relation to the absolute unity of αἰών is more like the one 
presented in the Philebus, where ‘true’ unity is compared and related to the sort of unity attainable 
for physical objects that have generation and destruction and are also further divisible.291 Optimal 
visible units resemble as closely as possible the absolute intelligible unity, given the ontological 
constraints of the physical world. 
Finally, as suggested in sub-section 4.2.1, in Plato’s conception it is not possible to further 
reduce the complexity of the temporal structure by identifying only the smallest of the eight cycles, 
i.e. the daily one, as a unit of time, even though it measures out every other cycle.292 In fact, all 
planetary revolutions are identified with time, and this means that each is individually enumerable, 
and hence constituted by numbers and units of time. If any of the planets were to be removed, time 
would not be complete. As shown in Section 5.3, the planets are instruments of time only insofar as 
they make visible the motions of the circles of the cosmic soul, i.e. the content of time. If any of 
those circles hadn’t corresponding visible patterns, the result would not be an appropriate image of 
αἰών. 
  
 
290 “Attempting to divide such a unit indivisible in quality would lead to something that is no longer part of the 
respective field (of our musical scale, of scanning, or of speech). By contrast, units indivisible in quantity could in 
principle be divided and still be used as a unit for measuring the same magnitude: for example, in principle we could 
use a half foot (understood as a unit for length) as our basic unit to measure the length of our table” (Sattler 2017, pp. 
279-280). The claim that the circular motion of the heaven is a primary part of time is challenged by Aristotle, as 
pointed out in sub-section 4.2.1. 
291 The true unit that is always the same (μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν) is presented as that which ‘lends’ unity to 
physical units, as “it is afterwards found again among the things that come to be and are unlimited” (Phlb. 15a1-c3). 
Note that in the Timaeus unity is predicated of the cosmic body, in virtue of the harmony between the four elemental 
components (31c3), which shows a somewhat similar conception. 
292 It might, however, have been the reasoning behind the definition of time of the Platonic Definitions (see Section 1.1). 
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6.3.2. Proportionality between numbers of time 
 
The enumerable structure of time is complex, as it is composed by eight concomitant sequences of 
numbers of time – one for each unit of time. To have fixed proportions between the different units, 
then, seems all-important, as otherwise the complexity of the structure would hinder the 
enumerability of time as a whole.293 Moreover, I will argue, the proportionality between the units of 
time is a precondition for having a measure of time, i.e. the night-day cycle, on the one hand, and 
the maximal number of time, i.e. the complete year cycle, on the other.  
In order to discuss proportionality, however, Plato’s astronomical account in the Republic 
should be briefly discussed. There Plato holds that there is no proportion between temporal units, as 
part of a radical criticism of the empirical approach of astronomical studies.294 At first, Glaucon 
holds that atronomy consists in a basic understanding of time (“a better acquaintance with the 
seasons, months, and years”), taken to be primarily useful for all sort of practical uses, i.e. for a 
general as well as for the farmer and navigator (527d2-4).295 However, Socrates is critical of the 
view of astronomy presented by Glaucon, as it focuses on the visible revolutions of the heaven per 
se, and does not take them for what they are, i.e. a flawed representation of something else (τῇ περὶ 
τὸν οὐρανὸν ποικιλίᾳ παραδείγμασι χρηστέον τῆς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα μαθήσεως ἕνεκα, 529d7-8), 
following the analogous criticism offered about the other mathematical forms of enquiry (see 
Section 6.1 for the ‘arithmetical’ cases). 
In fact, Socrates’ claim is that, because days, nights, months and years are nothing else than 
motions of visible bodies, astronomers are bound to fail to establish a proportion (συμμετρίαν) 
between them (in particular: “day to night, day to month, month to year”) that is not subject to 
variation (ταῦτα ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως καὶ οὐδαμῇ οὐδὲν παραλλάττειν).296 The heavenly motions should 
 
293 Although Plato does not state it openly, proportionality makes the structure more unified. Consider for instance the 
importance of proportions in the arrangement of the cosmic body and soul (31c-32c; 35b-36b). 
294 Astronomy is classified as fourth, together with harmony, among mathematical sciences, following in terms of 
increasing complexity arithmetic, geometry and stereometry. In particular, it is categorised as the mathematical science 
concerning number and proportion in the movements of the heavenly bodies. It however relies on geometry and 
stereometry as much as on arithmetic, insofar as the bodies that are in motion have depth and a geometrical shape 
(ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους, 528d10). It should be noted that the extent to which the Timaeus’ account 
is a rejection of the Republic’s one is itself the focus of a longstanding discussion in the literature. See for instance the 
interpretations of Alexander Mourelatos (Mourelatos 1981) and Ivor Bulmer-Thomas (Bulmer-Thomas 1984). 
295 The identification between the months, seasons, years and the respective planetary revolutions is in the background 
of the Republic account as much as it is made explicit in the Timaeus. The proportions between the parts of time are 
said to concern what belongs to the visible and the bodily (σῶμά τε ἔχοντα καὶ ὁρώμενα, 530b3) namely the movements 
of the heavenly bodies (τῶν ἄστρων φορὰς, 530a5). Earlier in Book VII, the Sun is explicitly presented as responsible 
for the seasons and the year:  ὁ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς (516b8-9). 
296 530a8-b3. 
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instead be used as representations to focus on the measurement of an abstract and true swiftness and 
slowness.297 
Socrates does not clarify in what respects the proportion between numbers of time with 
different units deviates (παραλλάττειν). However, it is at least clear that the deviations do not occur 
only under exceptional circumstances, as in the Timaeus and the Statesman (see sub-section 4.2.2), 
and are rather pervasive throughout the sequence of temporal units. However, there are at least two 
ways to conceive of the deviation: (1) the planetary revolutions are not carried out always with the 
same velocity or on the same path, and as a result the temporal units in the sequence are not always 
of the same length nor are they marked out by the same visible configurations. If so, the visible 
patterns aren’t optimally enumerable at all, infringing on the sameness criterion, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Consequently, there cannot be fixed proportions. (2) The planetary revolutions 
are regular, so the visible patterns do meet the criterion of sameness, and yet the planets move at 
incommensurable velocities, thus making it impossible to have proportions between the units of 
time. Assuming that the astronomical account introduced in Republic Book X expands on the 
astronomical claims from Book VII, it seems that option (1) is more likely. In fact, Lachesis, Clotho 
and Atropos are described as producing alterations in the course of the eight circles at certain times 
(διαλείπουσαν χρόνον, 617c5-d1) so that there would be a pervasive deviation for the reasons 
outlined in (1). 
It is all the more significant, given the above account, that in the Timaeus the opposite claim 
is upheld, namely that fixed proportions stand between the visible patterns of the planetary 
revolutions. Plato clearly excludes option (1), as we have seen already in the previous sub-section, 
since all cycles in the sequence are normally identical, both qualitatively and quantitatively, hence 
meeting the sameness criterion. However, he also rejects option (2) in the description of the eight 
periods of the cosmic soul: at 36c4-d7 they are described as seven unequal cycles (ἑπτὰ κύκλους 
ἀνίσους) – their velocities being homogeneous in three cases (τάχει δὲ τρεῖς μὲν ὁμοίως; the second, 
the third and the fourth), and non-homogeneous in the remaining four (τοὺς δὲ τέτταρας ἀλλήλοις 
καὶ τοῖς τρισὶν ἀνομοίως; the first, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh), and nonetheless 
proportionate (ἐν λόγῳ δὲ φερομένους, d6-7). 
 
297 “But we should consider their motions to fall far short of the true ones—motions that are really fast or slow as 
measured by true numbers, that trace out true geometrical figures, all in relation to one another, and that are the true 
motions of the things carried along in them (τῶν δὲ ἀληθινῶν πολὺ ἐνδεῖν, ἃς τὸ ὂν τάχος καὶ ἡ οὖσα 
βραδυτὴς ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀληθέσι σχήμασι φοράς τε πρὸς ἄλληλα φέρεται καὶ τὰ ἐνόντα φέρει). 
And this, of course, must be grasped by intelligence and thought, not by sight” (529d1-5). While there is no need to 
draw a substantial comparison between the two dialogues in this respect, the abstract model deficiently displayed by the 
planets in the Republic does in some respects correspond to the invisible rotations of the circles of the cosmic soul in the 
Timaeus: they both are invisible, in motion and perfectly regular. As argued in Chapter 5, however, the planetary 
revolutions in the Timaeus do display accurately the invisible motion of the cosmic soul in the visible domain. 
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Further evidence that this view is endorsed in the Timaeus comes from the description of the 
task of astronomers in studying and measuring the planetary revolutions, at 39c5-7. The passage 
states that the expert astronomers’ give names to their revolutions and measure them against each 
other, examining them by means of numbers (πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετροῦνται σκοποῦντες ἀριθμοῖς). 
The verb συμμετροῦνται seemingly describes a comparative measurement looking for a fixed 
proportion, which would be impossible, according to the Republic’s account. Moreover, the passage 
clarifies that it is by means of numbers, i.e. the numbers of time displayed by the planets, that the 
measurement takes place.298 In Plato’s view, then, the pursuit of the astronomers is mainly a study 
of the numbers of time identified with the visible patterns displayed by planetary revolutions. 
The night-and-day cycle is the only unit that, in Plato’s account, stands in a simple proportion 
(one to a number) to the other temporal units, as we will see below. In all the other cases the fixed 
proportion is expressed between two numbers of time. Importantly, the approach of the expert 
astronomers outlined by Timaeus matches with the historical development of Greek astronomy 
prior to or coeval with Plato. Astronomers played a crucial role in devising more and more precise 
calendars to better match the patterns displayed by the planets and add a minimal number of 
intercalary months.299 The most precise proportion between months and years in Plato’s times is 
presumably the metonic cycle, discovered in the late V century. The cycle lasts 19 years, 
corresponding to 6,940 nights-and-days and 235 months.300  
Plato’s description of the pursuit of the astronomer suggests that he either intends to 
encourage or just reports a systematisation of the study of complex cycles beyond the one involving 
the Sun and Moon. The emphasis on the discovery of the complete year, as the maximal number of 
time that astronomers would eventually be able to calculate by following up on the practise he 
describes, further supports this reading. The complete year would be measured by a simple 
 
298 I read σκοποῦντες ἀριθμοῖς as an instrumental dative. The standard translation of ἀριθμοῖς is ‘numerical reckonings’ 
or ‘numerical measurements’, in Cornford 1937, p. 116 and Zeyl 2000, p. 26. However, if the ἀριθμοῖ employed by 
astronomers were simply the computations in our minds, it would not add much as a qualification, given that the verb 
συμμετροῦνται already describes a comparative measurement. My reading is instead that ‘numbers’ refers to the 
numbers of time as the precondition for measuring the velocity of the planetary revolutions. 
299 It is possible that intercalation of days-and-nights and months in lunisolar calendars had been carried out since at 
least Hesiod, given that the month of Lenaion was associated in a fixed way with the winter season (Hannah 2005, p. 
30). Early solutions at intercalating were simply to add an additional month (that is 30 nights-and-days) every two 
years, so that there would be an alternation of a year of 360 nights-and-days and one of 390, and similarly, for the 
month, between the length of 29 and 30 nights-and-days. The measurements became more precise when the dates of 
festivals started to require calendars that matched closely with the planetary revolutions, leading to the discovery of a 
longer cycle called ‘octaeteris’, corresponding to eight years and ninety-nine months. With the discovery of this new 
complex cycle, the calendars added only three 30 nights-and-days long months (instead of four) over the course of the 
eight years cycle (Hannah 2005, p. 31-40). 
300 Only 7 intercalary months were added, so that, of the total number of months in the metonic cycle 110 were ‘hollow’ 
(29 nights-and-days long) and the remaining 125 were ‘full’ (30 nights-and-days long). Scholars, however, do not agree 
on how accurate and trustworthy Geminos’ testimony on those numbers really is (Hannah 2005, p. 56-57). 
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proportion of one (complete year) to a whole number of time – where the unit could be any one of 
the eight cycles.  
Before wrapping up the enquiry into the enumerability of the temporal structure, the special 
function of the night-and-day cycle, as a μέτρον ἐναργές (39b2), needs to be briefly discussed. Plato 
recognises that, among the eight revolutions (περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς, 39b3-4) the one along the circle 
of the Same stands out and it is consequently devised by the Demiurge to have a special function as 
a temporal μέτρον.301 
As Barbara Sattler pointed out, there is no substantial account of μέτρον in Plato’s dialogues, 
although the term is central to his theorising, especially in late works like the Philebus and the 
Statesman.302 For this reason, I will refer to Aristotle’s more developed account of measurement as 
a term of comparison for Plato’s treatment of the night-and-day cycle. Aristotle famously defines 
the notion of measure, in general terms, as “that by which ‘how much’ is known (μέτρον γάρ ἐστιν 
ᾧ τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται)” (Metaph. X, 1052b20). The definition is compounded with a guiding 
principle, named the ‘homogeneity principle’ by Barbara Sattler. The principle states that both the 
measure and what is measured must share the respect under which the measurement is taking place: 
hence, a length is the measure of a greater length and so on.303  
Aristotle applies the principle in the case of astronomy by identifying the motion of the 
heaven (corresponding in Plato’s terminology to the motion of the circle of the Same) as the unit of 
measurement employed to measure all other astronomical motions. He argues in the Metaphysics 
that we know ‘how much’ about motion “by the simple motion and the swiftest, for this takes the 
 
301 The clause introducing the temporal measure at 39b2-3 (ἵνα δ’ εἴη μέτρον ἐναργές τι πρὸς ἄλληλα βραδυτῆτι καὶ 
τάχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀκτὼ φορὰς πορεύοιτο) has raised a discussion about the best syntactical reading. The crux of the 
discussion lies in the καὶ τὰ, which Fraccaroli proposes to emend as καθ’ ἃ, followed by Zeyl (Zeyl 2000, p. 25). In 
Cornford’s conjecture, the καὶ in question should not be read, moreover reading τι as τίνι, with the resulting translation: 
‘with what relative slowness and swiftness the bodies involved in the eight revolutions travel’ (Cornford 1937, p. 115 
fn. 1, 4). Mohr proposes a different reading, retaining καὶ τὰ and translating ‘in order that [the planets mentioned earlier] 
in their swiftness and slowness relative to each other should be a sort of conspicuous measure and [in order that] the 
things regarding the eight revolutions should be conveyed’. In his reading, the sunlight makes every planet stand out as 
a measure (Mohr 1985, p. 59 fn. 11). Although I am sympathetic to the idea that the measure does not only concern the 
Sun, since they all share in that revolution, I do think that the Sun’s outstanding visibility in its revolution along the 
circle of the Same is what ultimately provides the visible pattern. 
302 Sattler 2017 p. 257-258 fn. 1. There is a brief mention in the Statesman of an art of measurement (τὴν μετρητικήν) 
which is distinguished from the more ethically oriented or qualitative kind. The former kind clearly focuses on the 
purely quantitative nature of what is measured: it comprises “all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, 
and speeds in relation to their opposites”. Plato is referring, among others to ἀριθμοῖ, in the generic sense of the 
arithmetician, and, following Rowe’s conjecture, astronomical speeds (284b6-285c2, Rowe 1995, pp. 209). 
Unfortunately, the discussion focuses on the other kind of art of measurement, the one regarding the ethical side, so it is 
not clear how measuring works in the case of quantity. In the Philebus μέτρον is mentioned in particular with regard to 
one of the four ontological kinds that are distinguished by Socrates. The kind named ‘limit’ in particular, counts within 
its scope, the proportioned, τὸ μέτριον together with quantity, τὸ ποσόν and with ἀριθμός. Later on, the third kind is 
introduced again with a reference to measure: “I treat all the joint offspring of the other two kinds as a unity, a coming-
into-being made through the measures imposed by the limit (γένεσιν εἰς οὐσίαν ἐκ τῶν μετὰ τοῦ πέρατος 
ἀπειργασμένων μέτρων)” (Phlb. 24c6-7; 26d7-9). 
303 Sattler 2017, p. 267. 
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least time. Hence in astronomy a unit of this kind is the starting point and measure (διὸ ἐν τῇ 
ἀστρολογίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἓν ἀρχὴ καὶ μέτρον); for they assume that the motion of the heaven is 
uniform and the swiftest (τῇ ἁπλῇ κινήσει καὶ τῇ ταχίστῃ), and by it they judge the others” (Metaph. 
X, 1053a8-12). Moreover, in the Physics it is added that the number of the heavenly motion is the 
most knowable (ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὁ ταύτης γνωριμώτατος), which I take to mean that the heavenly motion 
is ‘the most clearly enumerable’. The passage seems to be a clear parallel to Plato’s account of the 
alternation of night and day as that which taught humans how to count (see Section 6.2). That same 
accessibility, together with its speed and simplicity, makes that motion an astronomical and 
temporal measure for Aristotle.304  
Plato’s account of the temporal measure shares most of Aristotle’s analysis. In fact, the period 
of the circle of the Same that drags around the Sun is presented as the swiftest and uniform one (τῇ 
ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίου περιφορᾷ, 36c7-d1; also repeated at 39b7 and d6; τὰ τάχιστα περιιόντα, 39a4), 
clearly standing out in comparison with the circle of the Different and its subdivisions, which are 
slower and not uniform as a whole. As a result, the unit of time that corresponds to that period is the 
smallest temporal unit and the most precise to answer ‘how much’ questions concerning time.305 
However, not surprisingly in light of my reading, Plato’s account, unlike Aristotle’s, takes 
outstanding visibility (i.e. ἐναργές) as an essential essential condition to create a temporal measure: 
the creation of the night-and-day cycle consists in the kindling of the Sun, such that it greatly 
outshines every other heavenly body. As we have seen in Section 6.2, in Plato’s account, visibility 
grounds the instantiation of enumerability in the cosmos. The other side of the coin, then, is that 
there is no temporal measure without it being a visible pattern.306 
However, we might legitimately wonder why Plato thinks it necessary, in order to have a 
visible measure, that the Sun outshines the other planets. After all, the revolution along the circle of 
the Same is shared by the each of the seven planets, so that they all already display a visible pattern 
along the same circle. I would argue that, in Plato’s account, having a single planet bringing that 
 
304 “Time is measured by motion as well as motion by time (this being so because by a motion definite in time the ‘how 
much’ both of the motion and of the time is measured): if, then, what is first is the measure of everything homogeneous 
with it, regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is the best known”, (223b13-
223b24). Since time is the number of motion in Aristotle’s account, the heavenly motion is not only an astronomical 
measure, but also a measure of time. 
305 As for why the fixed stars are not considered as a candidate, see sub-section 5.3.1. 
306 “In this way and for these reasons night-and-day, the revolution of the single circling, the wisest one, came to be (νὺξ 
μὲν οὖν ἡμέρα τε γέγονεν οὕτως καὶ διὰ ταῦτα, ἡ τῆς μιᾶς καὶ φρονιμωτάτης κυκλήσεως περίοδος)”. In my reading 
περίοδος refers to the revolution of the Sun along that circle of the Same, not to the motion of the circle in itself (see 
sub-section 5.3.1 for a discussion of Plato’s terminological ambiguity). The reference to night-and-day as a περίοδος, 
moreover, highlights the unity of night and day as a cycle. Taylor remarks that “the period is therefore taken to be 24 
hours, a νυχθήμερον. Νύξ is mentioned before ἡμέρα in accordance with the practice of reckoning the day from sunset 
to sunset” (Taylor 1928, pp. 214-15). Whereas the term νυχθήμερον only appears in the following century, Plato 
already shows awareness that the true unit lies in the cycle, not in the two phases of the revolution separately 
considered. 
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pattern to the fore is interpreted as an improvement operated for our sake. Having a single, 
outstandingly visible measure instead of seven is in fact a solution to the problem of misleading 
appearances of the planetary revolutions (ἀπέφαινεν, 39a5-b2), illustrated in the lines of dialogue 
immediately preceding the creation of the temporal measure. To us, it might look as if the swifter 
planets are slower and vice versa, and that is because it is difficult to visualise the two contrary 
revolutions as distinct trajectories, since the circle of the Same equally affects all the planets. With 
the outstandingly visible pattern of nights-and-days, however, the configurations of visible 
sameness and difference of all the other planets become more distinct, and, as a consequence, the 
velocity of their revolutions is more easily measurable. 
Yet, the teleology-driven choice makes for an objective difference in the visible patterns 
constituting time. Because of its outstanding visibility, the alternation of night and day displays 
most clearly the rotation of the Same in the visible domain. In this way, temporal structure as a 
whole is also improved, as the phases of the other seven cycles become enumerable in their 
juxtaposition with the night-and-day cycle: as noted in sub-section 6.2.1, we count the phases 
constituting a fortnight as fifteen nights and fifteen days, by seeing the visible difference in the 
progression of the Moon juxtaposed to the sameness in the repetition of the night-and-day cycle. 
And the same considerations apply to the phases of the other cycles. 
Moreover, phases clearly illustrate the function assigned to the night-and-day as a visible 
measure of time, that is, in Aristotle’s wording, as that by which the ‘how much’ is known. The 
repetition of the night-and-day cycle marks out the complete sequence of phases dividing the other 
seven cycles. In this way, the number of phases marked out corresponds to an (approximately) 
simple proportion, i.e. one to a whole number, between the other cycles (measured) and the night-
and-day cycle (measure).307 This simple proportion, in turn, is employed by astronomers as an 
intermediate term for discovering the fixed proportions between the other seven cycles, and, with 
the systematisation of measurements described by Timaeus, more and more complex cycles become 
precisely measurable. Finally, Timaeus specifies that the fulfilment of the complete number of time 
– the maximal cycle – is also measured with reference to the circular motion that corresponds to the 
night-and-day cycle (τῷ τοῦ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ὁμοίως ἰόντος ἀναμετρηθέντα κύκλῳ, 39d6). 
 
 
307 There is overwhelming evidence that the Greeks consistently used nights-and-days to measure the normal course of 
months and years (30 and 360 nights-and-days respectively), and especially abnormal length, like in the early 
intercalary system, when nights-and-days were added to months or years to comply with the actual course of the 
heavenly revolutions (Hannah 2005, pp. 29-41). Plato was probably aware that the proportion between the night-and-
day and the month is not exactly a simple one, since nights-and-days were commonly added to calendars to compensate 
for the misalignment with the year. Nonetheless, the night-and-day cycle, in virtue of being the smallest one, is also the 
cycle that is closest to having a simple proportion with the other cycles, hence allowing for the most precise 
measurements. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Plato’s conception of time has been analysed in three steps.308 In Part I, I argued that Plato 
conceives of time as a cosmic phenomenon, that is as an essential feature of the cosmic living being. 
In Part II, I focused on why time, as a cosmic phenomenon, resembles αἰών, arguing that both are 
totalities of life, defined as a compound of structure and content. Finally, in Part III I focused on 
how time is a totality of life which is characterised by enumerability and identified with the visible 
patterns of the planetary revolutions. Now the complete picture of Plato’s conception of time can be 
summarised as follows: time is an enumerable cosmic phenomenon resembling αἰών. Each of these 
bits are necessary, in my reading of Plato, to qualify time: 
(1) cosmic: Plato’s conception of time is cosmological in a strong sense, as it takes time to be 
constitutive of the cosmos, and, in particular, of its completeness as a living being.  
(2) phenomenon: I refer to time as a phenomenon, rather than as ‘feature’ or ‘object’, because 
Plato defines time as ‘moving image’, hence singling out the kinetic and visible component 
as essential to time: the kinetic component refers to the eight periods of the cosmic soul that 
constitute the content of time. The visible component refers to the planets that, by 
collectively revolving along the cosmic periods, make the cosmic living motion visible. 
(3) resembling αἰών: αἰών, as the paradigmatic and everlasting totality of the CILB’s life, sets 
the standard for the creation of time. Time, then, by imitating αἰών, is the corresponding 
totality of cosmic life. This explains why time is structured on the basis of the cosmic 
periods, in its parts and as a totality. 
(4) enumerable: finally, the visibility of the planets in motion mentioned above displays the  
enumerable structure of time (‘according to number’), that resembles the undivided unity 
characteristic of αἰών: in their revolutions, planets display visible patterns that consist in 
sequences of optimal units and numbers (nights-and-days, months, years and so on). 
 
308 There are many more aspects of Plato’s conception that I haven’t had space to address properly. I only touched upon 
the relation between time and the intra-cosmic living beings, most importantly humans, in the Introduction and in 
Section 6.2 and 6.3 with the observation of the planetary revolutions. Plato does however consider it further, by 
referring to mortal lifetimes (τὸν προσήκοντα χρόνον βιούς, 42b3) and by thematising, both in the Timaeus and other 
late dialogues, the relation between human history and time (see Sattler 2010). A further aspect I barely touched upon is 
tense. As explained in the Introduction, tense is not, in my reading, part of the creation of time. However, its relevance 
for time cannot be overstated, so a more developed assessment of how the two are connected would be of paramount 
importance. Moreover, given my reading of time, a more systematic comparison could be drawn with the mixtures from 
the Philebus, as they are a clear analogue in accounting for physical objects and phenomena as structure-content 
compounds (see Harte 2002 or Sayre 1998 for attempts at cross-dialogical comparisons of this sort). 
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In my reading, Plato’s cosmological conception yields a reductionist account of time.309 It is 
reductionist in the peculiar sense in which the familiar notion of clock, while a natural counterpart 
to a non-cosmological conception of time, becomes unintelligible in Plato’s conception. I already 
pointed out in my criticism of Mohr’s reading, in sub-section 1.2.2, that the notion of clock we are 
familiar with (from OED: “an instrument for the measurement of time”) assumes that any object in 
regular motion equally measures time, where ‘time’ is something distinct or even entirely separate 
from that motion. This conception of time is, for instance, the one we find in Aristotle (see Section 
1.1). 
Let us consider one example offered in Plato’s Timaeus to articulate the difference I am 
gesturing at. Critias is ninety years old when he tells about old Athens to the younger Critias, who is 
ten years old then (21a7-b2). We, with Aristotle, would present the measurement of their age as 
follows: we (1) employ the planetary revolutions as an instrument to measure (2) time, and in 
particular, years. Finally, (3) we count how many years measure the life of Critias and younger 
Critias. In Plato, however, the distinction between (1) and (2) expressed by the notion of clock is 
rejected, as time is identified with the planetary revolutions. In identifying time with the planetary 
revolutions, the relation of time-measurement is not any more a three-places relation, but a two-
places one. In this relation, planets are not simply instruments to measure time, i.e. clocks. They are 
instruments to create time, with their revolutions. 
Given that our notion of clock is unintelligible, in Plato’s conception, we might wonder how 
Plato conceives of the objects we refer to as ‘clocks’, and in what way they relate to time, if not as 
instruments for measurement.310 I would argue that time, in Plato’s conception, is ontologically not 
different from a clock in motion, and Mohr is right in this regard: both should be classified as 
physical phenomena, because of their created, perceivable and kinetic nature. Plato never discusses 
clocks directly, but we can imagine that their motion would receive a similar treatment to other 
well-organised phenomena, such as bodies moving to a certain rhythm in music. For instance, in the 
Philebus, at 17d4-5, a dancing body is said to be rhythmical if its movements are of the sort that 
display enumerable characteristics (ἔν τε ταῖς κινήσεσιν αὖτοῦ σώματος ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἐνόντα πάθη 
γιγνόμενα, ἃ δὴ δι’ ἀριθμῶν μετρηθέντα). Moving clocks and dancing bodies could be, in principle, 
analysable in terms of content and structure just as I did in Part III for the planetary revolutions 
identified with time. 
 
309 Plato’s account is not reductionist in the sense that, for example, Leibniz’s was, as for Plato time is not simply 
defined as a relative order between phenomena, but rather as itself a physical phenomenon, i.e. the planetary 
revolutions. However, Plato would be a reductionist against the ‘absolute time’ view, in the Newtonian sense, as it 
would classify time as a separate dimension of the physical world and unaffected by changes within it (Futch 2008, pp. 
29-32). 
310 For references to Plato’s familiarity with man-made clocks, see fn. 57. 
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What differs between time and a clock in motion, then, is not their ontology, but rather the 
scope that time has, compared to clocks: time is a cosmic phenomenon, hence concerning the whole 
of the physical world and all the living beings within it, whereas clocks are, at best, objects 
displaying a miniature version of that phenomenon, with a limited, or contextual scope. In fact, in 
my reading, time is constituted by the eight periods of the cosmic soul, as the structured totality of 
cosmic life. Hence, time is grounded in the uniqueness and all-comprehensiveness of the cosmos, so 
that time, in turn, provides a single framework for measuring everything that happens within the 
cosmos, as exemplified above.311 
Clocks, on the other hand, are a part of the cosmos, and while they might be used for a 
function analogous to the planets, they cannot substitute the cosmic role played by time, because of 
the inherent locality and circumstantiality of the measurements they allow. To use Mohr’s 
terminology, then, time really is an immanent standard for clocks in Plato’s account. Unlike in 
Mohr’s reading, however, the reason to attribute a special status to time is its essentially cosmic 
dimension.312 
 
An upshot for philosophers of time 
 
There is a further significant upshot to the endeavour of reconstructing Plato’s conception of time, 
and it is, once more, a conceptual one. Understanding Plato’s conception of time shows how distant 
a notion it is from the one we are acquainted with. At the same time, however, there are aspects of 
this account that are philosophically significant, especially in light of what up to date physical 
theories tell us about the universe. Physicists generally conceive of time as a dimension tied 
together with the spatial ones, in a space-time manifold. The measurement of a time-interval in the 
manifold depends on the position in which the measurement is taken and its relation to (significant) 
masses of other objects.313 Nonetheless, we can narrow down sections of the universe whose 
 
311 Time, as a cosmic phenomenon, measures everything in the cosmos (τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν ἰοῦσαν, 38a1-2) and its 
application is by definition global (ἡμέρα [εἴη] μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ, Prm. 131b3-5). 
312 In this picture, it seems that the most successful clocks are those closely coordinated with the planetary revolutions. 
Examples of these well-attuned clocks are sundials or even human beings in their sleep-wakefulness alternation, based 
on the alternation of light and dark originated in the daily revolution of the Sun (Ti. 45b-d, Tht. 158d). Biological 
clocks, as human beings are, could be the best example of an imitation of time, although they are not very informative, 
since they simply mirror the cosmic phenomenon of time in their own internal changes. Pushing this line of thought to 
the extreme, calendars could be thought of as a blueprint, that, if followed, would make a polis functioning like a well-
attuned clock coordinating religious and political events with the visible patterns of the planetary revolutions. 
313 This rough outline of some results stemming from general relativity is not intended to delve in any of the details of 
today’s physical theories, nor to argue that a more systematic comparison with Plato’s conception of time would even 
be possible. It suffices to point out that tensed distinctions are seemingly never questioned by Plato in their 
absoluteness, independently of whether time exists (see Introduction, On tense), whereas in a relativistic framework to 
admit an universal present is problematic, because of the non-uniformity of the space-time curvature (Zimmerman 
2011). 
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approximately uniform spacetime curvature allows for an approximately shared time-frame. The 
surface of the Earth, and the macroscopic objects and phenomena surrounding us in our everyday 
lives are examples of those temporally ‘uniform’ sections of the universe. 
Plato’s account of time, despite its archaic commitments in cosmology (e.g. to a living 
cosmos and to the identification of time and the planetary revolutions), maintains that time is a 
phenomenon grounded on the cosmic arrangement and its regular motion. As such, Plato’s account 
upholds a thesis about time that only the development of the relativistic theory empirically 
confirmed: a shared temporal measurement is not a given in the physical world, and must be 
grounded in a special configuration of that world, or of portions of it. Evidently, the special 
configuration required in Plato’s account and in contemporary physical theories is of a completely 
different kind. However, Plato’s conception of time, on the basis of the thesis above, leaves open 
the possibility of a plurality of time-frames – something that is typically accounted for in 
contemporary physical theories. In fact, in Plato’s account the possibility that the cosmic 
arrangement had multiple instantiations in different portions of the universe, so that we would end 
up with many cosmoi, is not absurd. In that scenario, however, there would be just as many time-
frames. 
Although the ‘many time-frames’ scenario is certainly repugnant to Plato, and he counters the 
possibility teleologically – with the assumption of a divine maker always pursuing what is best – 
that scenario could still occur in a sub-optimal universe.314 The Aristotelian objection seen in 
Section 1.1 is after all outlining that scenario as a reductio: by accepting a cosmological definition, 
if there were multiple cosmoi there would be multiple times at once. While deemed a self-evident 
absurdity by Aristotle, from the point of view of contemporary physics we would rather take the 
‘many time-frames’ scenario as a felicitous consequence of the account, since it more adequately 
represents the physical world. 
The upshot, then, is certainly not to put forth anachronistic claims about Plato being a 
precursor of contemporary physics with regard to time. It is, perhaps more interestingly, that Plato’s 
account, which appears archaic in many respects, does not commit to certain unwarranted 
assumptions that later became widely accepted, and that modern science only relatively recently 
challenged in their alleged self-evidence. In Plato’s conception, the uniqueness of time, just as the 
very possibility of its existence, require to be grounded in the arrangement of the physical world, as 
 
314 Plato never considers the option of multiple cosmoi  as one that could be actualised, given that (1) the Demiurge does 
what is optimal; (2) to make the universe in resemblance of the CILB is the best possible course of action; (3) the CILB 
prescribes uniqueness and all-comprehensiveness (see Section 3.1). Nonetheless, Plato’s account of time would be 
consistent with a sub-optimal arrangement of many cosmoi, each with their own planetary revolutions. 
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time is non-fundamental. As such, Plato’s conception of time provides one more example of how 
misleading the narrative of a linear progress in the sciences and in philosophy is. 
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OUTLINE OF PLATO’S ACCOUNT OF TIME (37c6-39e2) 
 
I. Definitional section (37c6-e3) 
a. Intention to make the living cosmos as similar as possible to the everlasting living 
being (37c6-d2) 
b. Introduction of αἰών and comparative definition of time (37d3-e3) 
II. Digression: Tensed distinctions and tenseless present (37e3-38c3) 
a. The mistake of attributing tensed expressions to the everlasting being (37e3-38a1) 
b. Explanation of the mistake: tensed distinctions have their origin in becoming, and 
thus time has forms that have come to be (38a1-b5) 
c. Comparison between time and αἰών in their relation to the model and the cosmos 
(38b6-c3) 
III. Development of the definition: the creation of time by means of the planetary revolutions 
(38c3-39e2) 
a. Function and creation of the planets (38c3-e3) 
b. Astronomical section (38e3-39d7) 
i. The planetary revolutions along the cosmic periods (38e3-39b2) 
ii. The creation of the parts of time and the complete year (39b2-d7) 
c. Recapitulation: the planetary revolutions and the cosmic imitation of αἰών connected 
(39d7-e2) 
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INDEX OF OCCURRENCES IN THE TIMAEUS 
 
A) Χρόνος 
 
41 occurrences of χρόνος, 14 of which in the account of time: 20e5, 21b6, 21d6, 22b3, 22b8, 22d2, 
23b3, 25c7, 26a1, 26b6, 26d5, 36e5, 37d7, 37e3, 37e4, 38a2, 38a4, 38a7, 38b6, 38c2, 38c4, 38c6, 
38e5, 39d1, 39d4, 39e3, 40c8, 41e5, 42b3, 42d5, 44b4, 47a6, 81c7, 86a7, 89b7, 89c3, 89c6, 90d7, 
91a1, 91c3. 
 
Ancient dates and times: 20e5, 21b6, 22b8, 23b3, 25c7, 26b6, 26d5, 91a1. 
Time and its course: 21d6, 26a1, 36e5, 37d7, 37e3, 37e4, 38a2, 38a4, 38a7, 38b6, 38c2, 38c4, 38e5, 
39d1, 39e3, 47a6.  
In association with number: 22b3, 38c6, 39d4. 
In association with astronomical revolutions: 22d2, 40c8, 41e5, 42d5.  
In association with mortal life: 42b3, 44b4, 81c7, 86a7, 89b7, 89c3, 89c6, 90d7, 91c3. 
 
B) Περίοδος 
 
23 occurrences of περίοδος, 5 of which in the account of time: 34a6, 38c8, 39b5, 39c2, 39c5, 39d5 
42c5, 43a5, 43d1, 44a4, 44b2, 44d3, 47a5, 47b7, 47d3, 47d5, 58a5, 76a7, 83a2, 85a6, 86a7, 90d2, 
91e5. 
 
The cosmic circles of the Same and the Different: 39c2, 38c8, 39d5, 42c5, 47b7, 90d2. 
Planetary revolutions and time: 39b5, 39c2, 39c5, 39d5, 47a5, 86a7.  
Motion of the cosmic body: 34a6, 58a5. 
The immortal soul of mortals: 43a5, 43d1, 44a4, 44b2, 44d3, 47d3, 47d5, 76a7, 85a6, 91e5. 
Bodily cycles: 83a2. 
 
C) Ἀριθμός 
 
19 occurrences of ἀριθμός, 6 of which in the account of time: 23e4, 31c4, 32c1, 36a5, 36b3, 37d6, 
38a7, 38c6, 39b6, 39c7, 39d4, 47a6, 53b5, 54d1, 54d4, 54e3, 57d2. 
 
Concrete number: 23e4, 32c1, 36a5, 36b3, 38c6, 39c7, 39d4, 53b5,54d1, 54d4, 54e3, 57d2. 
Generic number: 31c4, 37d6, 38a7, 39b6, 47a6. 
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